

# THE MIDDLE EAST *Journal*

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Iraq ..... C. J. Edmonds

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Morocco ..... Douglas E. Ashford

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The cover photograph is of the King of Morocco and of Istiqlal Party leader,  
'Alal al-Fasi. Black Star.

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THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.



THE  
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NUMBER 1

THE KURDS AND THE REVOLUTION  
IN IRAQ

C. J. Edmonds

I

THE attitude of the Kurds of Iraq to the central government in Baghdad has already been discussed in a recent issue of this *Journal*.<sup>1</sup> The position before the revolution of July 1958 may be summarized as follows:

(a) Since 1945 there had been little manifestation of Kurdish political nationalism in either Turkey, Persia or Iraq. The intellectual leaders had been persuaded that for the time being, in the face of the determined opposition of the three governments, nothing could be done to forward their aspirations for an independent united Kurdistan; they could only wait in the hope that some international upheaval would give them, or their sons, the opportunity of renewing their movement with some chance of success.

(b) It was in Iraq (where, if fewer in actual number, they represent a higher proportion of the total population than in the other two countries) that the Kurds had had the fairest deal: only there were they legally recognized as a minority having certain rights of their own *qua* Kurds, and only there was their language used for elementary education, local administration and legal proceedings, or was there any lively cultural

1. "The Kurds of Iraq" in Vol. XI, No. 1, Winter 1957, pp. 52-62.

♦ C. J. EDMONDS is the author of the recent book *Kurds, Turks and Arabs*, published by the Oxford University Press.

and journalistic activity. One or two Kurdish Ministers were normally included in every Cabinet.

(c) Nevertheless the uneasy years between 1920 and 1945 had left wounds that had not been entirely healed. It was widely felt that the guarantees of their rights as Kurds given through the League of Nations in 1925 and again in 1932 were being ignored or grudgingly implemented, and that they were not getting their fair share of social services and development projects.

(d) Many young Kurds, with a racial grievance added to the feelings of frustration and discontent with the established order common to the youth of many countries besides Iraq, were tending to look to Russia for their inspiration; it was not that they knew or cared very much about Marxism, but rather that they were conditioned to lend themselves to activities inspired or directed from Moscow. Recent examples of Russian readiness to exploit Kurdish discontent had been the support given to the "Kurdish Republic of Mahabad" proclaimed by the Mukri Kurds of Western Persia in 1944 and the welcome extended in 1947 to Mulla Mustafa of Barzan, a fugitive rebel from Iraq, who had been given high military rank and had been encouraged to broadcast in Kurdish from Erevan.

There were, furthermore, two aspects of the recent foreign policy of Iraq that were distasteful to the Kurds. As Muslims they share with the Arabs their abhorrence of the Jewish settlement of Israel in what they regard as Islamic territory, but they have no sympathy with pan-Arabism; feeling that their relative importance must be diminished, they were not at all happy about the union with Jordan, with the emphasis in the title on its Arab nature and the omission from its Constitution of some special mention of the Kurds for which they had pressed. They also disliked the Baghdad Pact, seeing in it a reinforcement for the Treaty of Sa'dabad concluded between Iraq, Turkey and Persia in 1937, a Treaty which they have always regarded as having had for its main object cooperation in suppressing any manifestation of Kurdish aspirations.

## II

It is not surprising, therefore, that the news of the revolution in Iraq, followed as it was by the landing of American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan and the sabre rattling of Russia, should have suggested to Kurdish nationalists, in Iraq and abroad, that this might be the upheaval for which they had been waiting, and that they should have put in hand the preparation of a memorandum of their case, for submission to the immediate summit conference demanded by Mr. Khrushchev.

In the meantime, however, the new rulers of Iraq were playing their

cards with great skill. The Council of Sovereignty set up to perform, pending an election, the functions of President of the Republic, consisted of a Sunni Arab, a Shi'i Arab, and a Kurd, the last Khalid-i Naqshbandi, a member of a prominent family of Amadiya with religious connections. The Cabinet included as Minister of Communications and Works Shaykh Baba 'Ali,<sup>2</sup> son of that Shaykh Mahmud who for several years led the resistance of the Southern Kurds to incorporation in Iraq. Wide publicity was given to a photograph of General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim side by side with a Kurdish officer wounded in the fighting at the Royal Palace on 14 July. Among their first acts were the pardon of Shaykh Latif, another son of Shaykh Mahmud (unlike his cultured brothers very much a chip off the old block) who was serving a sentence of four years imprisonment, and the release from exile of Shaykh Ahmad of Barzan, his son, and the son of Mulla Mustafa, the Shaykh's brother. Before returning home some of the released Barzanis accompanied Shaykh Latif to Sulaymaniyah, the center of Kurdish nationalism, and received a rousing reception.

These preliminary measures were followed a few days later by the promulgation of a "Temporary Constitution." Although it describes Iraq as part of the Arab World it goes on to make specific mention of the Kurds as co-partners with the Arabs within the framework of Iraqi unity, and to guarantee their communal rights, provisions which the Kurds have not been slow to contrast with the short shrift accorded by the late régime to their representations at the time of the union with Jordan. The theme of "freedom" (the coincidence with Bastille day has not been overlooked) and "Kurdish-Arab brotherhood" has been "plugged" with unwearying persistence by the official "guidance" put out from Baghdad.<sup>3</sup>

The Kurdish newspapers and journals received up to the time of writing are for the most part submerged in a spate of sycophantic adulation of the "valiant champions of the revolution," served up with the monotonous repetition of the familiar clichés of Soviet and Egyptian propaganda, and the complete identification of the "dirty, stinking régime of criminals now overthrown" with the "colonizers, blood-suckers and Anglo-American imperialists" who had imposed that régime on the country, and, going farther back in history, with the Ottoman and Persian Empires.

But in the first two issues to appear after the revolution of the Sulaymaniyah weekly *Zhin* some very distinctly Kurdish threads stand out in

2. Shaykh Baba 'Ali was educated at Victoria College, Alexandria, a British school, and at Columbia University. He left the Cabinet in February.

3. The new coat-of-arms of the Republic includes a dagger to symbolize the Kurds, matching an Arab sword, and has been welcomed. The Kurds were never satisfied with the second star in the flag, which they had been invited to accept as their symbol, knowing that the two stars had been originally inserted to distinguish the flag of Iraq from the otherwise similar flags of the other Hashimite kingdoms.

the general pattern. On 14 July, in the streets of that town, the crowds demonstrating in favor of the Republic carried high the "portraits of the immortal Shaykh Mahmud and of other famous Kurdish leaders;" cheers were raised for "complete independence and freedom" and for "all the rights and privileges of the Kurds" together with Kurdish-Arab brotherhood; numerous telegrams from all classes were despatched to the Council of Sovereignty congratulating them on their success and "demanding the rights of the Kurds" (No. 1400 of July 17).

The second issue (No. 1401 of July 24) publishes the portraits of Najib Rubai'i and Khalid-i Naqshbandi of the Council of Sovereignty, of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim, the Prime Minister, and his deputy, and inserts, in a paragraph reporting the understanding with the United Arab Republic, a small photograph of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir. But there are also large pictures of Shaykh Mahmud who "in 1919 was wounded, captured and deported by the countless hosts of the colonizers while championing the cause of Kurdish freedom" (there is no mention of the subsequent Iraqi operations against him after his pardon and return), and, in Russian military uniform, of General Mustafa of Barzan, "who in 1945 escaped after a similar valiant fight for Kurdish freedom against the unjust colonizing army and was condemned to death" (this was of course many years after the expiry of the Mandate and a purely internal Iraqi operation). These are followed by an account, with their photographs, of a ceremony held at the cemetery outside Sulaymaniyah to commemorate four young Kurdish officers, at least two and perhaps all of whom accompanied Majid Mustafa to Barzan as political liaison officers for the new deal described below, deserted when the new deal policy was abandoned, and were hanged by the Iraqi authorities in June 1947.

The second anniversary of the death of Shaykh Mahmud on 9 October provides the opportunity for further tributes to the "fight for freedom" to which he devoted his whole life and for articles recording the doughty deeds of Kurdish history and legend from Saladin in the 12th century to the two girls of the Hamawand tribe who captured a detachment of Turkish soldiers and cut off their ears in the 19th (No. 1412 of 9 October). The same number contains an account of a visit by the special correspondents of the Tass agency and *Izvestia*, with the texts of the cordial speeches exchanged at receptions held in their honor.

### III

The event which perhaps more than any other has caught the popular imagination is the return of Mulla Mustafa, and some knowledge of the historical background is necessary for the proper appreciation of its significance.

Barzan is a remote, mountainous and economically poor district bounded on three sides by the Great Zab and two tributaries, the Ru-e Shin (or Shamdinan) and the Ru Kuchuk, and on the northeast by the Turkish frontier. In Kurdistan the title "Shaykh" denotes a religious teacher associated with one of the mystical dervish orders. Prominent Shaykhs have at all times been credited with the power of working miracles and have thus attracted to themselves the superstitions and unquestioning veneration of their disciples; they have in consequence tended to acquire worldly power and to become for all practical purposes tribal chiefs. In the more isolated parts of the country uneducated adherents of the Naqshbandi order seem to be particularly prone to manifestations of eccentricity.

The Shaykhs of Barzan trace their descent from a certain Shaykh Taj al-Din who, some time in the first quarter of the 19th century, was initiated into the Naqshbandi order by the celebrated mystic and saint, Maulana Khalid, and established his headquarters at the village of Barzan, about a mile from the left or north bank of the Zab. It was in the time of his son and grandson, the Shaykhs 'Abd al-Salam and Muhammad, in the second half of the 19th century, that the villagers in the mountains to the north of the river cast off their previous affiliations to profess obedience to their spiritual guide alone and so to form what came to be known as the Barzani tribe; they adopted a distinctive turban of red and blue check. Muhammad's son, Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam the Younger, like his father and grandfather before him, was accused at various times of heretical teaching and practices repugnant to orthodox Islam; having incurred the displeasure of the Ottoman authorities for resisting their efforts to introduce some kind of administration into his area, he was treacherously seized in 1914, tried by military court, and hanged at Mosul. The subsequent attitude of the Barzanis towards higher authority in general was no doubt profoundly influenced by this unhappy experience.

'Abd al-Salam was succeeded by his young brother Ahmad, a boy with a reputation for mental instability even more marked than that of his forebears. After the armistice of 1918 the British military command was by no means anxious to undertake responsibilities in the Kurdish highlands. In August 1919, however, the Shaykh (in temporary and unnatural alliance with his hereditary enemies, the Aghas of Zebar, south of the river) was implicated in the murder of two political officers, and there was a brief punitive operation. But no serious effort was made by the Mandatory Power to establish regular administration in Barzan.

In 1927 Shaykh Ahmad proclaimed himself an incarnation of the Divinity (a claim accepted without question by his own disciples) and



had some success in imposing his doctrines, together with the red and blue turban, in the district of Shirwan, east of the Ru Kuchuk and outside Barzan proper. Inter-village fighting necessitated official intervention and, under cover of a guard provided by the British-officered Levies (this was reckoned to be the last combat operation carried out by ground forces maintained by the Mandatory Power in Iraq, but there was in fact no resistance) a police post was established at the village of Barzan and a fortified serai was built closer to the river at Billê, both only just inside Barzan territory.

In 1931 a decision by the Iraqi Government to establish its authority up to the Turkish frontier before the expiry of the Mandate in 1932 coincided with a renewed manifestation of religious eccentricity by the Shaykh involving the abrogation of the law of Islam pending the appearance of the Mahdi and the end of the world. As before this led to fighting between his followers and those of a rival but more orthodox Naqshbandi Shaykh to the east. In the consequent operations (1931 and 1932) the Iraqi army and police were not very successful and on at least two occasions were saved from disaster by the Royal Air Force; as in earlier and later hostilities Mulla Mustafa, Shaykh Ahmad's brother, had shown himself a "bonny fighter" and a skillful and determined leader in mountain warfare.

In 1933 Shaykh Ahmad surrendered to the Turks, who had cooperated with the Iraqi forces by closing the frontier. In 1935, after the proclamation of a general amnesty, he returned with his brothers and principal followers to Iraq and exile, first on the lower Euphrates and later, after several changes, at Sulaymaniyah. Here, after the outbreak of the Second World War, local charity helped to eke out the miserable cash allowances that never kept pace with the rising cost of living, until in 1943 Mulla Mustafa and a few chosen companions escaped, made their way home across Persian territory, and quickly swept away all traces of the civil administration in Barzan and Shirwan; only the fort at Billê remained.

The military operations that followed again achieved very little; and early in 1944 the Prime Minister, Nuri Pasha, attempted to introduce a new deal by appointing Majid Mustafa, a Kurdish nationalist of forceful character with a good record as a successful provincial governor, as Minister without Portfolio with the special task of watching Kurdish interests in general and, in particular, of pacifying Barzan. At first his efforts met with considerable success, and he actually induced Mulla Mustafa to accompany him on safe conduct to Baghdad. But the new deal was bitterly opposed by fanatical, old-fashioned pan-Arab elements in both chambers of Parliament. Nuri Pasha resigned in June, the ap-

pointment of Majid Mustafa was not renewed, and disorders again broke out in Barzan. Finally in 1945 Mulla Mustafa crossed over into Persia to take service with the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and, after its collapse, escaped to Soviet Armenia as has already been mentioned.

By no stretch of the imagination is it possible to describe any of the troubles in Barzan up to 1943 as inspired by Kurdish nationalism; the normal processes of ordered administration were just intolerable impositions to be resisted as long as possible. The Kurds of northern Iraq had remained completely indifferent to the early struggles of Shaykh Mahmud and the activities of the intellectuals of Sulaymaniyah, nor had they ever even claimed the application to themselves of the rights set out in the Declaration of 1932 to the League of Nations and the Local Languages Law. On the other hand, during their long and miserable exile the Barzanis not only became in some sort a symbol of Kurdish grievances against the Government, but they established contacts with the educated leaders of the south, one group of whom kept in touch with Mulla Mustafa after his escape as part of a plot (which came to nothing) to provoke concerted risings elsewhere; the Mulla moreover found himself at the center of the passions roused by the resistance of the pan-Arab elements to the policy of the new deal.

When the news of the revolution broke Mulla Mustafa lost no time in telegraphing his congratulations to General Qasim and asking permission for himself and his companions to return. In all the October issues of *Zhin* (Nos. 1411-5), now appearing in enlarged format, he claims the lion's share of space with, under banner headlines (red in No. 1415), the text of telegrams and letters exchanged with the new Prime Minister, articles and poems celebrating the prowess of the "lion-cubs of Barzan" and more photographs of "the great hero General Mustafa." On 6 October he was met at Baghdad airport by Ministers, officers and a vast concourse of the public, and conducted in triumph, under banners carrying the usual slogans, to his hotel. For several days relays of deputations of welcome arrived from all parts of the country, from Fao to Zakho, causing severe traffic congestion near the hotel. A visit to Sulaymaniyah on 23 October (with a program including a municipal reception and pilgrimages to the tombs of Shaykh Mahmud and the martyred officers) furnished further opportunities for demonstrations of support for the Republic and gratitude to the Soviet.<sup>4</sup>

After his year at Mahabad and eleven years in the Russian sphere the "General Mustafa" of today must be a very different person from the

4. At Sulaymaniyah he was the guest of Shaykh Latif, who has since visited Moscow with a deputation of the "partizans of peace."



comparatively unsophisticated tribesman of 1945; but it is difficult to explain this rapid build-up into a national all-Iraqi figure, a "champion of the general struggle against the reactionary and colonialist monarchy" otherwise than as the work of a well-organized chain of communist propagandists long established throughout Iraq.

#### IV

The first three numbers, issued since the revolution, of *Hîwā*, the monthly magazine published under the auspices of the Kurdish Club of Baghdad, are openly communist in content, with extracts from speeches by Stalin and Mao Tse Tung prominently featured on the illustrated covers. But more interesting and significant than the adulatory and propagandist articles and poems, which differ little from those of *Zbîn*, is the full account in the October number of the proceedings of the Third Congress organized by the Cultural Society of Kurdish Students in Europe and held at Munich from 4 to 8 October.

It was ushered in by an unfortunate incident which those responsible will no doubt wish to forget as soon as possible. The Executive Committee of the Union of Arab Students in Germany issued a long and detailed manifesto denouncing, not only the aims of the Society as set out in its rules, but its very existence as an offence against the Arab nationality (quoted with marks of exclamation) of its members, a menace to Arab unity and the integrity of the Arab lands, and a stab in the back for all those struggling to shake off the yoke of imperialism; it called upon its own members to boycott the Congress with threats of punishment in case of default. Against this, messages of fraternal greeting and good wishes were received from the General Union of Iraqi Students and the Iraqi Students' Society in Great Britain.

The Congress, after deciding to extend the Society's activities to the political field (a decision which involved the dropping of the word "Cultural" from its title) passed resolutions: declaring full support for the Iraqi Republic, "the Republic of the Kurds and the Arabs;" protesting against the Anglo-American actions in Jordan and Lebanon; condemning the Baghdad Pact and demanding the application of the principle of self-determination to all peoples "including our Kurdish peoples . . . particularly in those parts of the Kurdish nation which have been forcibly incorporated in Turkey and Persia." A letter was addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations asking him to place the Kurdish question on the agenda of the Special Session called to discuss the problems of the Middle East and expressing the hope that Turkey and Persia would "recognize the national Kurdish entity and apply to the question a solution inspired by the new Iraqi policy.

Other letters were addressed: to President Nasir thanking him for the inauguration of a broadcasting service in Kurdish from Cairo; and to Mr. Khrushchev (with copies to the Soviet Republics of Armenia and Azarbayjan) expressing appreciation of the encouragement extended to Kurdish cultural activities in the Soviet Union, suggesting that the Latin alphabet should be used for Kurdish publications there instead of the Cyrillic, inviting him to introduce a Kurdish broadcast from Moscow, and enclosing copies of the letter Mr. Hammarskjöld and of the communiqué by the Congress at the end of its proceedings.

A final "Call to the Kurdish People" enjoins them: "Close your ranks, mobilize your forces to continue and consolidate the struggle for the freedom and unity of your nation, Kurdistan."

## V

There is so far no reliable information at hand to show what the Kurds in Iraq are really thinking. Nothing succeeds like success and, under a military administration still preoccupied with consolidating its position, no one would dare to raise a discordant note. But on the face of it, other things being equal, there seems to be little or nothing in recent developments which they are likely to regard as unfavorable to themselves as Kurds, rather the contrary: since the fall of 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif the danger of too close an alignment with Egypt (which would have been more detrimental to their relative importance than the union with Jordan) has receded; some of the older generation, knowing what individual "liberty" in communist countries really is, may dislike the marked Russian orientation of the new Iraqi policy, but against this the Soviets, by the creation of their minor Republics and Autonomous Territories, have set an example of encouraging the national consciousness and cultural activities of their racial minorities.

It is of course possible that General Qasim (who, in a recent speech, referred to the Kurds and Arabs as "indissolubly united within the Iraqi Republic") and his Kurdish supporters are not giving precisely identical interpretations to the passage about Kurdish-Arab partnership in the Temporary Constitution; the drafting of the definitive Constitution will be awaited with interest. What is probably the attitude of the great majority of Iraqi Kurds of the younger generation is well put in a letter from a Kurdish correspondent which appeared in a London newspaper of 30 July 1958. "The Kurds of Iraq," he says, "do enjoy a few elemental rights, but their conditions there, too, are far from satisfactory. We have rallied to the support of the new republican order in Iraq. We certainly regard Arab nationalism as our ally. . . . Our desire to free and unite Kurdistan is similar to that of the Arabs. A lasting and just settlement

of the Middle East crisis should include the solution of the Kurdish question based on the right to self-determination."

If in Iraq the Kurds have never since 1932 enjoyed such licence to vociferate about their rights, there is so far no indication that there is to be any greater devolution than that already provided by the existing Provincial Administration Law, or any extension of the special rights of the Kurdish (and Turkish) minorities set out in the Declaration to the League of Nations of 1932 and in the Local Languages Law. However, it is not so much the text of such instruments that matters as the spirit in which they are applied, and here there was, as had already been explained, much room for improvement.

The new rulers are strong enough to ignore the old fanatics who used to object to any kind of concession to Kurdish sentiment (a spirit echoed in the manifesto of the Arab students in Germany) and many of the younger Kurds were already in a state of mind to welcome the Russophile republicanism of General Qasim. He has therefore a golden opportunity to usher in a new era of Arab-Kurdish harmony. The irredentist hopes of the Iraqi Kurds for an eventual united independent Kurdistan are hardly compatible with the integrity of Iraq postulated in the "Temporary Constitution." But as long as the Kurdish nationalist movement and the policies of the Arab governments can be represented as part of the same struggle to shake off the shackles of a reactionary imperialism the incompatibility can be conveniently ignored, and much would have to happen before it became a live issue.

# POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN MOROCCO

*Douglas E. Ashford*

THE focus of political science has long been on sophisticated, formalized political systems where little or no allowance was made for violence. The study of Morocco since independence provides us with another case of how the Hobbesian paradox may hold a grain of truth, though it is not suggested here that it should form the basis of an analytical system. It may suffice for the present to note that the ultimate sanction in political, as well as in other behavior, is taking human life. Though advanced countries may possess institutions and norms precluding this kind of behavior, or keeping it within well-controlled bounds, many of the new countries emerging in the Arab and African world today have a heritage of violence which continues to reveal itself as the new political system takes form.

Newly independent countries, Morocco included, place a very high value on keeping "public order." The fundamental explanation is, of course, that, when life may be taken without check, not only does the political system itself cease to function, but the society may also be disintegrating. The problem of the new nation is complicated, since the struggle for independence may have been won by the use of violence and the earlier period of colonial rule may have been preserved in the same way. It is pertinent, but by no means original, to add that it is the colonial powers, who pride themselves on living in societies where bloodshed is minimized and generally excluded from politics, who have done much to teach the more refined techniques of violence to areas under their tutelage. Since no political system exists without some use of controlled violence in the form of an army or police force, this situation is not to be entirely avoided if the colony is to become an independent nation. Violence, however, like other forms of political behavior, undergoes certain changes in the transition to independent status.

The origins of violence are not as important for political analysis as an understanding of how this experience affects later political behavior. Participation in organized violence forms hardened loyalties, which may survive the achievement of the original goal of the organization and which may be in conflict with the needs of the new nation. Popular

◆ DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD recently returned from fourteen months of study in Morocco for his doctoral degree from the Department of Politics, Princeton University. He has been a Rhodes Scholar and an intelligence officer in United States Air Force.

The research for this article was done under a Ford Foundation predoctoral Fellowship. The Foundation is not responsible for any of the opinions or views expressed.

sentiments, especially among tribal regions, may be sufficiently inflamed not only to cause brutal incidents during the struggle for independence, but also to leave expectations that are open to exploitation in the new political system and may jeopardize the formation of new institutions. A liberation army, organized with a glorified view of the blessings of independence, may find the knotty problems and slow reconstruction of the new nation unrewarding. That the background of violence will henceforth reveal itself only in violence is, in a sense, the least of the problems of a new nation, for force that is calculable can usually be met with greater force, even if the new country must call on its colonialist tutor. The process of assimilating this heritage of bloodshed is more interesting for its more subtle, but persistent, play in the political system.

The Moroccan case is particularly fruitful in this regard, for not only has the new country experienced a variety of forms of violence, but one can also begin to identify its after-effects in the political system that has developed since liberation in 1956. The problem is made even more intriguing since the nationalist movement, led by the Istiqlal Party, condemned the use of violence up to the near total suppression of the party after the Casablanca strikes of 1952. The nationalists did not envisage the use of terror against the French, though there were certain elements within the Istiqlal who favored such a policy from the arrival of Resident General Juin in 1947. In the interval from 1952 to 1955 there developed an urban terrorist organization, an Army of Liberation and an increasing tendency for uprisings in the countryside. All these problems confronted the new nation from its earliest days of independence, including the Istiqlal Party as it reconstructed itself and tried to re-assert its claim to pre-eminence in Moroccan politics.

The transition of the urban terrorist organization will be described first, for it provides background for the Army of Liberation. Although it was summarily dissolved in 1956, its loyalties and leaders are still recognized. The leaders of the Istiqlal were aware of the presence of discontented members in the base of the party at least from the first attempt to exile Muhammad V in early 1951, but did their best to discourage its growth. The intent of Marshal Juin having been revealed, the King and the party were agreed that any provocation would be used by the French to suppress completely the growing nationalist organization. These early participants are perhaps best described by one of their leaders,<sup>1</sup> who called them "*gens du peuple*," workers and others of humble origin who were not prepared to accept the tedious and discouraging

1. Since many of the interviewees for this research are still active in Moroccan politics their names have been omitted. To those who helped the author wishes to express his appreciation.

process of negotiation or to wait for international recognition of the Moroccan problem. It is not coincidence that those who were Istiqlal members and have remained in the party since independence are today the core of the dissident group in the party and accused the Balafrej government of temporizing and inaction. Faqih Muhammad al-Basri, representative of the Istiqlal faction of the resistance, and the urban workers, now organized under Mahjub Ben Seddik, continued to fight when the party leaders went to prison or exile. Their lack of education has undoubtedly made it difficult to give them positions in the new country commensurate with their sacrifice, while their high expectations are difficult to satisfy. The vindication of their disapproval of the pre-1952 Istiqlal policy and three years of fighting has produced a lasting solidarity that is recognized by all Moroccans, including the King.<sup>2</sup>

After the arrests of 1952 a Provisional Executive Committee of the Istiqlal was organized in Casablanca under Bashir bin al-'Abbas, which had representatives in the major urban strongholds of the party. Neither prepared nor designed for terrorism, it concentrated on collecting funds to care for the families of the arrested and to finance the international efforts of the party. Until the exile of Muhammad V, eight months later, it reflected the traditional caution of the party. The committee was in contact with the clandestine leaders of the terrorist cells, but its leaders admit they took no part in the decisions of the resistance. Starting with single firearms and a handful of shells the urban terrorists built their own organization outside the party. At least one group was prepared for action in 1953, the Black Hand, under 'Abd al-Salam Bennani, now an official of the Istiqlal Youth. The chief organizers were Zerk-touni and Rashidi, both of whom died in the struggle. While many of these early members may have been cell members of the Istiqlal, their early efforts were discouraged by the party and their organization necessarily separated from the closely watched party organization. Their political coloration is not clear, though it is quite possible that many came from the only trade union admitting Moroccans, the C.G.T.<sup>3</sup> A distinctly Istiqlal-sponsored group probably did not exist until early 1954, when al-Basri's "Secret Resistance" began.

At best the urban terrorism could only harass the French. Without

2. In addition to a close, personal relationship with those who fought for his return, the King also consults resistance delegations during government crises and on major national issues. The group under al-Basri, for example, was received several times during the crisis after the formation of the Balafrej government and again on the problem of foreign troop evacuation.

3. Though hard to document reliably, it is possible that terrorist activity was first started by groups of workers already possessing a clandestine organization in the Communist Party. See the comment of Jean and Simonne Lacouture, *Le Maroc à l'Épreuve*: Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1958, p. 137.



some evidence of popular support it could result in bad publicity, for the Protectorate controlled the Moroccan press and France had better access to international attention than the nationalists. Much of the terrorists' early activity was clearing their own *madinas* of Moroccan informers and setting up a system for collecting funds. From early 1954 until mid-1955 a Frenchman never entered the large *madinas* of Casablanca, but there are no indications that production was seriously handicapped. The French Army maintained a strictly enforced state of siege in both the cities and the countryside. As plans progressed for the Army of Liberation in 1954, a chain of stations was set up leading to the Spanish Zone, where the resistance activity was tolerated, as Spain sought friends among the Arab nations. Terrorists suspected by the French police were smuggled north for cadres in the army, while arms and funds moved south to the surviving cells. There is no reliable chronicle of the terrorism by both Moroccans and French, but it is its aftermath that concerned the new nation.

At least three different terrorist groups emerged during the struggle for independence, the Black Hand, the Black Star and the Black Crescent. The new government was naturally eager to restore order in late 1955 as quickly as possible. Accords were reached on the transfer of police powers even before the Franco-Moroccan Agreement of March 1956. Urban terrorists were offered positions in the new police force and the Black Hand is reported to have joined willingly. Others were given posts in the rural administration and the Istiqlal, though many stories are told of the blunders that followed. Four of the provinces in the ex-Spanish Zone were assigned governors from the resistance, of whom two have been removed, one of them under charges of graft and smuggling, and two others have been transferred. That some of the most poorly prepared administrators were given posts in some of the most volatile areas of Morocco very likely contributed to the rural unrest in the fall of 1958, which ended with the Royal Army imposing a state of siege in several of these provinces.

How many terrorists joined the Sûreté Nationale is not known, but it is probably not more than half of the present 11,000 man police force.<sup>4</sup> Many of the most active terrorists found the return to peaceful life impossible and turned to crime. The Istiqlal was, of course,

4. Officials are reluctant to part with even the most rudimentary statistics on the structure and size of the government. One high official of the Ministry of National Economy told the author the number of civil servants in the administration was unknown. The number of police has never been officially published, but the figure given here was provided by the trade union as the number of members of the policemen's federation.



anxious to sustain its position as the leading nationalist organization. In the internecine fighting after independence among some of the terrorist groups, the party is reported to have used cells under its control to recruit or wipe out non- or anti-Istiqlal terrorists.<sup>5</sup> The most ruthless action was unleashed against the Black Cross, which many Moroccan officials claim was strongly Communist. In April 1956 there were frequent gunfights between warring terrorist factions in which at least one known resistance leader was shot down.<sup>6</sup> After several warnings the police were used to destroy the remaining incorrigibles, alleged to belong mostly to the Black Crescent. Until the summer of 1958 the only overt signs of the resistance in the cities were the King's consultations with al-Basri and the places given to the resistance on the Political Commission<sup>7</sup> of the Istiqlal.

The urban resistance came to a tragic end. Through the Political Commission of the party an effort was made to merge the two organizations, but they still remained distinct three years after independence. Under al-Basri the "High Council of the Resistance" participated in the national meeting of the Istiqlal in the summer of 1956. Their demands for rapid progress and special consideration were indicators of the problem facing the new nation only six months after liberation. So long as their distrust of the French and impatience with the government was expressed toward the first Prime Minister, Bekkai, the Istiqlal could escape being involved in conflicts with the resistance. When the government was given to Balafrej, the Secretary General of the party, in the spring of 1958, the balance was broken. As he continued the moderate, conciliatory policies of his predecessor the al-Basri faction of the terrorists broke from the party and joined the trade unions in active opposition to the Istiqlal government.<sup>8</sup> As political tension increased the resistance itself was again publicly divided and two new offices claiming a resistance following sprung up in Casablanca in the summer of 1958. Their political affiliations are not established, but it was during the summer

5. This was confirmed in interviews with both members and non-members of the Istiqlal. See also Lacouture, *op.cit.*, p. 144.

6. *La Chronique Marocaine*, Rabat, Service de Presse et d'Information, Embassy of France, 15 April 1956, p. 2, and 16 April 1956, p. 3. This is undoubtedly the best detailed documentary source on the first two years of independence, to which the author is indebted.

7. The Istiqlal's Political Commission was devised early in 1956 in response to the problem of coordinating policy and actions among the new nationalist organizations that the party wished to keep in its ranks. It includes about 40 members selected from the resistance, unions, youth, etc., and has gradually supplanted the Executive Committee of the party as the supreme policy-making group of the Istiqlal.

8. One of the leading spokesmen of the opposition was 'Abdallah Ibrahim, who became Prime Minister in December, 1958. He had refused to participate in the Balafrej government formed in May, 1958.

of 1958 that Communist-inspired activity increased in public and that another party founded in late 1957, the Popular Movement, from anti-Istiqlal resistance leaders began openly agitating for recognition.<sup>9</sup>

The problems of integrating the Moroccan Army of Liberation into the new political system are most easily followed. Its activities were more fully reported and its units less divided by rivalries, while its leaders have taken more public positions than those connected with the clandestine, urban resistance. The city terrorists and their supporters could be discreetly subdued by the new police force and more easily attracted to the Istiqlal than the approximately 10,000 tribesmen involved in the Liberation Army.<sup>10</sup> The secret organization of the terrorists lost its function entirely with independence as the new *Sûreté* was begun, but the volunteer army was potentially useful insurance against any change of plan by the French and was almost inaccessible in the most rugged mountainous regions of the country. With the establishment of the Royal Army, however, the Liberation Army became an anomaly to the new Moroccan administration as well as an obstacle to negotiation with the French on conventions for economic aid, etc. The absorption of the irregular army also posed peculiar problems for the Istiqlal. Many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were Moroccans of French Army background<sup>11</sup> who had had little or no connection with the party before independence. Those coming from the urban resistance were very likely cell members of the Istiqlal, but none were acknowledged party leaders prior to independence. The troops were recruited mostly from local tribes, who had never been in contact with the Istiqlal for the most part and who recognized only the King as their leader. Though many members of the army's clandestine system of supply and communication abroad were Istiqlal figures like 'Alal al-Fasi in Cairo, 'Abd al-Khalik Torres in Tetouan, 'Abd al-Latif Benjelloun in Tangier and 'Abd al-Kabir al-Fasi in Madrid, these men were not among the troops or in combat. The distinction is important, for it is the fighting "colonels" of the army who declined party membership and later emerged as the

9. Until November 1958 there was no legal procedure for the recognition of political parties and all civil rights had been severely limited since the Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef crisis in North Africa. The Movement was forbidden because of its "illegal" formation although the government was still using Protectorate laws that had earlier been used against the Istiqlal.

10. High ex-officers of the army estimate that this many participated, though probably no more than 7000 men actually fought in the Liberation Army. No reliable figure is possible since many tribesmen were rallying in one part of the country while units were being pacified in other regions. A summary will be found in *Le Monde*, 16 May 1956, p. 6.

11. About two-fifths of the officers of the Liberation Army came from the French Army, many of them veterans of the Second World War and also the Indochinese campaigns. Recruiting began in December, 1953.

leaders of the Popular Movement.<sup>12</sup> The party's weakness in the ranks of the army is apparent in the resistance delegates to the Political Commission, al-Basri from the urban organization and 'Abd al-Rahman Youssifi, who worked abroad for the army and did not return until most of the fighting ended.

The Moroccan Army of Liberation began operations in October, 1955, in the Rif Mountains. The reasons for selecting this moment have never been fully explained, though the negotiations for the removal of the puppet Sultan, Bin 'Arafa, had been lagging for several months and the intrigue of the Moroccan French "*colon*" group in Paris was obstructing the return of Muhammad V with a clear promise of independence.<sup>13</sup> The Rif section of the army drew tribesmen from the area famous for its fight against the French under 'Abd al-Karim in the 1920's and also from the Bani Snassen tribe near Oujda. The Middle Atlas section of the army was not active until several months later, when the King had returned, and grew from the Marmoucha tribe south of Taza. The other center was in the Sous Valley inland from Agadir, the only region where the Istiqlal had a history of earlier influence.<sup>14</sup> In the Rif and Middle Atlas areas Istiqlal offices are still scarce and party membership small in relation to the cities.<sup>15</sup>

The Istiqlal leaders, who were busy negotiating in Paris and Rabat, seem to have been caught offguard with the outbreak of warfare in the Rif. 'Alal al-Fasi and a leader of the Algerian National Liberation Front jointly announced the new campaign from Cairo. A few days later Muhammad Lyazidi reassured French opinion and clarified confusion among Moroccans by stating that 'Alal was basically in agreement with the negotiations until then, but had "expressed some reticence over the way in which the accords were put into effect."<sup>16</sup> As attacks intensified on French border posts the Istiqlal Executive Committee hastily met in Rome. Regardless of the authority behind these outbursts from al-Fasi, they are important in reference to the Army of Liberation, for he was the most important party leader actively associated with it and has con-

12. Mahjub Ahardane, Governor of Rabat province, announced the formation of the party in November, 1957, and was immediately removed from office. The Movement is discussed further below.

13. There are some reports that the Liberation Army originally planned its first offensive in coordination with the Algerian revolution in the fall of 1954, but failed owing to internal conflicts as well as logistical problems. The original center of operations was to have been Berkane, in the Beni Snassen area near Oujda and closer to Algeria, rather than the Rif.

14. There is a long history of close adherence to the Chraa among the Berber tribesmen of this valley, making the area suitable for early agitation by nationalists when pan-Islamism was basic to the movement. Due to demographic pressure many Sous peasants migrated to the cities, where they were open to party indoctrination before returning to their homes.

15. The observations on the organizational characteristics of the Istiqlal are taken from other data collected on the party, which will be the subject of subsequent publication.

16. *Le Monde*, 15 October 1955, p. 1.

tinued to encourage its modified version now in the Sahara. His discontent erupted again in November 1955 when he announced in Cairo that the King's St. Cloud Declaration was probably made under pressure.<sup>17</sup> The next day a delegation of Istiqlal leaders in Paris visited the King to reaffirm their devotion and the Executive Committee convened in Madrid the next week with al-Fasi.

There is little doubt but what the campaigns of the Army of Liberation hastened the return of the King from France to Morocco and placed a note of urgency on the subsequent negotiations for the Franco-Moroccan Agreement. The King submitted that the army would not be used to bring pressure on the French, but they could hardly have been unaware of the possibility that Morocco might be cast into the Algerian struggle and come under Cairo's influence. In early 1956 the fighting spread sporadically into the Zemmouri and Ziani tribes nearer the coast and around the inland cities of Fes and Meknes. As more tribesmen rallied to the army without the preparation or training that had preceded the first units in the Rif, there was the danger of spontaneous bloodshed across the entire country. There are few indications that the Moroccan leaders fully understood the difficulty of subduing this army, for as late as the summer of 1958 there were still small bands awaiting integration around Boured and Aknoul. The usefulness of the army in the negotiations is suggested, however, by the King's statement that an appeal for order would be sent once the new government had proof of French sincerity. He hinted at the problem of internal politics in asserting that it would then be possible to "isolate the patriots from those who make themselves instruments of occult forces."<sup>18</sup>

The first attempt to incorporate the Liberation Army into the new Royal Army was made by emissaries of the Istiqlal and was by no means a complete success. After an Executive Committee meeting in March, 1956, Ben Barka, Ben Seddik and several other party leaders visited army strongholds in the Rif to lay the groundwork for integration. At this time the competition among the parties for the loyalty of the large, organized mass of tribesmen began. The revelation of internal political differences in the speeches of the Istiqlal leaders is reported to have caused much confusion and disillusionment among the tribal troops, who pictured themselves as part of a solid front answerable only to the King.<sup>19</sup> Simul-

17. *Ibid.*, 9 November 1955, p. 5. Further comment on the Istiqlal reaction to the St. Cloud Declaration will be found in *Ibid.*, 6-7 November 1955, p. 1.

18. Press interview with the King by the *Gazette de Lausanne*, reproduced in the *Chronique*, *op. cit.*, 21 January 1956, Complement #1.

19. The irregular army swore allegiance to the King and the oath should be evaluated in consideration of the importance of religious oaths to fairly primitive tribesmen. Though 'Alal al-Fasi was also recognized, it is doubtful if the army organization was related to the Istiqlal in the minds of the troops.

taneously a bid was made by the Democratic Party, whose leader in Fes, the 'alim 'Abd al-Wahhab Laraki, released to the press an accurate list of the army chiefs in the Rif along with a promise that the party would bring them to the Palace soon afterwards. They did not come and a few weeks later Laraki was assassinated, allegedly on the order of the High Council of the Resistance.

Late in March thirty army chiefs came to the Palace on the invitation of the King. They agreed to a cease fire for one month while the Royal Army was to be formed, incorporating all the irregulars who wished to join. They gave no indication of any party attachment and stayed with a confidant of the King, who was also a leader of the Ait Youssi tribe of the Middle Atlas.<sup>20</sup> The delicate truce succeeded and order was restored to the north of Fes, Meknes and Taza. These first mergers were largely of troops of the Rif, where the army leaders were given rural posts or made officers in the Royal Army. In the Middle Atlas and around Oujda, however, incidents continued to take place and parts of the interior were harassed by roving bands. Some of the Liberation Army leaders objected to discontinuing the battle until all of North Africa was freed, which was the original intention of the army. Dr. 'Abd al-Karim al-Khatib, who later helped start the Popular Movement, declared that its mission was not filled and that it would be only when all of North Africa was liberated, including Algeria.<sup>21</sup> Still heavily reliant on the French, the new Moroccan government denied that the army would continue to fight for Algeria, but admitted that "for the moment the Army of Liberation is not in the structure of legality."<sup>22</sup>

The final pacification of the mountain army was accomplished only by visits of the King to the troubled regions. Some of the troops fled to Algeria, thereby increasing Franco-Moroccan tension around Oujda, while others moved southward toward assembly points on the edge of the Sahara south of Agadir, where tension also mounted as French reinforcements were sent. The Prince and the Istiqlal quickly arranged conferences in Madrid with al-Fasi, Dr. Khatib and army leaders. In the meantime there were reports of increased unrest among poorly organized units of the Middle Atlas, who were still rallying after independence was recog-

20. Their host was Qaid al-Ahsin al-Youssi, the first Minister of the Interior and later a member of the Crown Council when removed under criticism from the Istiqlal. He actively campaigned for the King against the Istiqlal in the Middle Atlas in the fall of 1956 when the Bekkai government was first attacked by the nationalist party. His unquestioning devotion to the King at this time is part of the background of the Popular Movement, but may also explain why he played a minor role when the party was formed.

21. *al-'Alem*, 16 May 1956, Press Translations of the French Embassy, no page.

22. Press conference of 'Abdallah Ibrahim, then Secretary of State for Information, *L'Echo du Maroc*, 24 July 1956, p. 1.



nized.<sup>23</sup> The trip of the King to the troubled areas in mid-July, 1956, marks the shift of irregular army operations to the Sahara, but not the end of the political rivalries and expectations that surrounded the short-lived army.

After the initial progress of the King, the Istiqlal again tried to assert its control of the Liberation Army as it moved southward. Help was given to the small remaining bands by Istiqlal offices and the goal of the army was re-oriented to the Moroccan Sahara by al-Fasi, although most of the party leaders were noticeably silent on this issue at that time. Regarding the interior of Morocco, the "Leader" of the Istiqlal denounced those trying to start a "fake army" and confuse the ranks of the Liberation Army who were supporting the "King and the party." The discord was dramatically revealed in the assassination of Si 'Abbas Messaïdi, generally acknowledged to be the army leader in the Fes region. Although the exact circumstances of his death are unknown, he is reported to have forbidden Istiqlal organizers to enter his area of command and his assassin was supposed to have been under Istiqlal influence.<sup>24</sup>

The Sahara Army of Liberation was begun with probably no more than 500 men, mostly from the Middle Atlas. There was no sign of even quasi-official recognition until the fall of 1957, when 'Abd al-Kabir al-Fasi was made Director of the new Sahara Department of the Ministry of the Interior. At least up to the Ifni fighting, which would have been impossible without some government help, given the scale of the campaign, the sole organization capable of supplying the desert-bound troops was the Istiqlal. While the fighting was directed only against the French around Fom al-Hassan in early 1957, some aid may have come from the Spanish, but it is not likely that they would have permitted sufficient arms to accumulate to support a battle like the Ifni offensive. Although there was certainly some disagreement within the Istiqlal over the proper role of the army, it probably came to be its main supporter and a known Istiqlal militant, Ben Hammou, is reported to have directed the Ifni war.<sup>25</sup>

The recent campaigns of the Sahara Army of Liberation were preceded by actions more pertinent to internal politics than the battles themselves. The original core of this army was from the Middle Atlas, where the party was and remains poorly organized. Although the tribesmen had

23. See *Le Monde*, 16 May 1956, p. 6.

24. The alleged assassin, Si Hajjaj, evaded arrest and his present activity is not known. See also Lacouture, *op.cit.*, p. 144.

25. Ben Hammou was also supposed to have been instrumental in the arrest of the sons of al-Glaoui by resistance elements in mid-1957. The government was presented with a fait accompli too difficult to undo and the Glaoui family was transferred to police custody. Relations between the King and Istiqlal faction of the resistance were very possibly strained by this, since Mohammed V allegedly promised safe-keeping to the family and had forgiven al-Glaoui publicly while still in France.

very likely accepted Istiqlal help, many of their officers and retired "colonels" had resented the politicization of the Liberation Army. As the Sahara operation developed new troops came from the Ait Bamrane tribe<sup>26</sup> around Ifni, where the Istiqlal was more firmly entrenched. The replacement of the less politically reliable tribesmen began in late 1957 and in early November, just before the offensive, a purge of officers thought to be loyal to the Popular Movement took place. This second, major overhaul of the army neither stabilized its relation to the Istiqlal nor to Moroccan politics as a whole.

The joint Spanish-French campaign against the Liberation Army in the Mauritanian Sahara in the spring of 1958 drove the army eastward, where it took up posts in the desert south of Oujda province and along the Algerian border. Momentarily unified by defeat, it again reflected the differences in Moroccan politics as dissensions grew within the Istiqlal over the summer. Late in August elements of the army representing the conservative and progressive factions of the party clashed near Bou Arfa,<sup>27</sup> reportedly between units loyal to al-Fasi and others adhering to al-Basri in the activist wing of the party. Both the Istiqlal leaders and the government were alarmed over the facility with which the internal dispute was transformed into violence. The fight was instrumental in bringing a temporary reconciliation of the Istiqlal factions, who were impressed with the threat that the entire nationalist party would be discredited.

A last potential source of violence in the new nations is discontent among the tribes, stemming from political differences on the national level or more obscure tensions as the tribal societies are transformed. There were four incidents at the time of independence, although the Oued Zem uprising occurred several months before the King returned. As with the other violent clashes, the precise origin of the incidents is not known nor is it essential to demonstrating the relation between violence and political change in a new country. It is, of course, presumptuous to discuss "tribes" as meaning the same throughout Morocco since they range from nearly intact, isolated societies to those whose tribal structure has nearly disintegrated. Though the study of tribal modernization is a distinct problem, it is noteworthy that the incidents have occurred in tribes in marginal areas where relatively primitive tribes are in close contact with areas undergoing political and social change. Problems of both

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26. The Istiqlal had several offices at Ifni, whose closure by the Spanish was one of the causes of the war. The local tribesmen bear allegiance to Muhammad V and a member of their tribe and Istiqlal militant, Muhammad Bouamrani, is Governor of Agadir province. He took office in the summer before the fighting started.

27. See reports in *Le Monde*, 2 September 1958, p. 3, and also *L'Echo du Maroc*, 28 August 1958, p. 1, when an extraordinary session of the cabinet was held to consider the clash.



research and analysis make it difficult to tell whether tribal tensions have been purposefully exploited or spontaneously erupted.

Like the problem of organized violence in the resistance, it appears that the nationalists did not fully appreciate the delicacy and complexity of tribal changes with independence. In the early months of independence there was no explicit recognition of rural tribal problems, although the almost uncontrollable mobilization of tribesmen in the Liberation Army may have forewarned some leaders who preferred to conceal the potential discord in the new nation. The uprising of the Smala tribe near Oued Zem in August, 1955, was the first warning, when nearly 80 Frenchmen and their families were murdered. The tribe had a history of fierce resistance to the French administration and was also under the influence of the Cherkaoui religious brotherhood centered in nearby Boujad. The retaliation of the French Army was swift and even more ruthless, having the instruments of modern warfare at its disposal.

The national problem emerged after the return of Muhammad V, when the rural administration virtually dissolved in the jubilation. The tribesmen refused to pay taxes and as the disorder reached alarming proportions the King cautioned:

"Independence does not signify the reign of license and anarchy, nor the preponderance of particular interests; it does not signify insubordination or the refusal to pay taxes, which are the condition of life of the state and its activities in all areas."<sup>28</sup>

This speech marked the beginning of admitted concern over maintaining public order in the countryside. The Pasha of Larache in the Spanish Zone, known as the "Glaoui of the North," was forced to flee as surrounding tribesmen attacked persons and property of the *ancien régime*. Similar riots took place in Marrakech where about 20 members of Glaoui's entourage were brutally murdered during the independence celebrations. There is little doubt but that Istiqlal organizers were involved in both these incidents, but they are of more importance here as a demonstration of the inexperience and poor judgment of sophisticated politicians seeking national gains by manipulating rural tensions. The most immediate advantage to the Istiqlal from these incidents was the replacement of the Minister of the Interior with a party member.

The Meknes uprising occurred in late October, 1956, after the arrest of Algerian leaders on their departure from Morocco. At the time the government was in the midst of vital negotiations with the French for economic, technical and administrative aid. A state of siege was declared in the province and an officer of the Royal Army made governor. The

28. Speech at the Grand Mosque of Casablanca, 8 February 1956. Reprinted in *Le Maroc à l'Heure de l'Indépendance*, Rabat, Ministry of Information, tome I, 1957, p. 46.

accused were promptly tried before a Moroccan military court and the French farmers compensated for property damages. This new rural violence was sufficient to persuade even the strongly pro-Algerian trade union to forbid sympathy strikes and demonstrations on the anniversary of the Algerian revolution a few days later. According to French sources the revolt had been stimulated by Algerian agitators on the admission of the Minister of the Interior.<sup>29</sup> Restrained by her dependence on France, the new country took severe measures to punish the tribesmen, risking offending her Arab neighbor engaged in a battle for independence.

Of all participants in Moroccan politics the Istiqlal is probably most embarrassed by evidence of rural tension and moments of violence. The King's rural influence has been repeatedly demonstrated in visits to the countryside and the cooperative response to his appeals. As differences between the King and the more progressive elements of the party have increased, especially over the past year, the delicate competition for their allegiance became more open and the risk of violence became more imminent. The intermediary of this internal struggle was the Popular Movement, whose leaders were among the officers of the Liberation Army opposing assimilation by the Istiqlal in 1956. Mahjub Ahardane, who helped recruit Moroccan officers of the French Army for the irregular army, was removed from his post as Governor of Rabat province after announcing the formation of the Popular Movement in November, 1957. He had been an extremely successful *qaid* at Oulmes for the Ziani tribe before independence. Another associate in the Movement was Qaid al-Ahsin al-Youssi, a shaykh of the large Ait Youssi tribal confederation in the Middle Atlas and a member of the Crown Council. A third spokesman for the Movement is Dr. Khatib, perhaps the most important leader of the Rif section of the Liberation Army and popular there. These tribal connections of the Movement are formidable opposition to the Istiqlal, which is heavily obligated to urban workers and had been free to work in the countryside only since independence.

Over the troubled summer of 1958 rumors of impending violence in the tribes multiplied as the Popular Movement began to organize clandestinely. They were confirmed when two members of the al-Youssi family were arrested while traveling in the Middle Atlas in a heavily armed vehicle and the *Sûreté* imposed stiff penalties by military trial on anyone found bearing arms illegally. The frustrated Popular Movement attempted a mass tribal demonstration among the tribes of Ajdir, north of Fes, during a national holiday early in October, for which Dr. Khatib and Ahardane were arrested. Local authorities were momentarily force-

29. Interview of Gen. Cogny, then commander of French Forces in Morocco, in *La Vigie Marocaine*, 2 January 1957, p. 1.

fully evicted as the tribesmen, active in the Rif Army of Liberation, attempted to exhume the body of the assassinated Si 'Abbas Messaïdi and construct a national shrine. The arrests provoked an armed revolt in the Oulmes region, where a friend of Ahardane and ex-colonel of the Liberation Army, Miloudi, surrendered only after the area was surrounded by Royal Army troops and several irregulars were wounded, including himself. The Istiqlal, of course, benefited from these revolts that discredited the new party, but they also previewed the eruption of more deep-seated tribal discontent accumulating in the Rif.

The nationalist party had already made serious blunders in the Rif in supporting the appointment of inefficient, but pro-Istiqlal, officials in the region, many of them urban terrorists who had taken refuge in the north and knew very little about tribal affairs. Though certainly not entirely the party's fault, the merger of the Spanish Zone had been slow, visible benefits from independence had been few in comparison with those given the urban workers, and many of the new officials were aggressively pro-Istiqlal, inexperienced and foreign to the tribesmen. The repression of the Popular Movement led to a general uprising in the entire area north of Fes and Taza, centered around the old Liberation Army strongholds of Ajdir, Boured and Aknout.<sup>30</sup> Again the Royal Army rescued a situation that could not be regulated by less forceful measures and all civil powers in the area were concentrated in the hands of the Minister of Defense. A Riffian officer of the Royal Army became governor of Taza province, but the ill-will toward Rabat was not easily eliminated.

Although the King received a delegation of tribal chieftains of the Rif and assured them their grievances would be promptly remedied, the tension and occasional violence persisted to the end of 1958. No sooner had the Rif been temporarily pacified than a bombing took place during the Festival of the Throne ceremonies at Khemisset in the midst of the large Zemmouri tribe, taking 40 lives. Again the King was cast in a key role, receiving the Zemmouri delegation and calming inflamed political rivalries. A law on civil liberties was quickly promulgated by the King, though not scheduled to be implemented until later.<sup>31</sup> Minor clashes between Royal Army troops and dissident bands continued, however, in the Rif and an Istiqlal official was murdered in Berkane in the Beni

30. An on-the-scene report with a detailed map appeared in *Le Monde*, 2-3 November 1958, p. 1.

31. The civil liberties law or *dahir* had been under consideration for over a year, but no action taken until the King reportedly put considerable pressure on the Ministry of the Interior. It was delayed by the crisis in Tunisia in early 1958, which had repercussions in Morocco, and also by prolonged negotiations for the formation of the Balafrej government. The first Prime Minister, Bekkai, was forced to resign by the Istiqlal after he had unilaterally presented a petition from the suppressed minority parties to the King asking for defined rights and procedures.

Snassen tribe of Oujda province. There was a serious increase in isolated terrorist acts for unmistakably political reasons, including an attempted bombing of the Istiqlal printing plant in Rabat and party office in Casablanca.

The experience of Morocco and many other new nations testifies to the importance of violence as a way of influencing political behavior. The description should not be assumed to be a criticism of the new country, whose development over the past three years has been remarkable considering the concrete limitation and intricate problems that have confronted her. Nor should it be forgotten that evidence occurs in advanced, industrialized nations in more subtle forms and, to the convenience of the social scientist, more neatly excluded from political and economic behavior. The higher incidence of violence in new countries simply means that analytical tools need revision and elaboration before being applied to new nations. As is so frequently the case, the analytical problem is much more difficult than the collection of facts. By considering how violence functions in a rapidly changing political system rather than exactly when it will occur a useful explanation of these phenomena is more easily discovered. As the Moroccan case suggests, in reference to certain defined goals violence is by no means completely dysfunctional and in some circumstances may be essential to political and social change.

## DEMOCRACY AND THE REVOLUTION IN EGYPT

Don Peretz

EGYPT, which in February 1958 became the Southern Region of the United Arab Republic, is like most nations of the Afro-Asian world in that it has never been—nor is it likely in the near future to become—a Western-type democracy. Although establishment of a democratic government has been among the stated objectives of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and other revolutionary leaders, the few experiments in relaxing the iron-fisted control of the central authorities have been transitory. Rule by the group of army officers who overthrew Faruq continues today not only in Egypt but, with the cooperation of their army counterparts, in Syria as well.

This is not to say that Egypt under Nasir has regressed from a previously existing democratic society. The old régime was also noted for its rigid press controls, masses of police spies and informers, and the ever-present threat to critics of arbitrary imprisonment. Pre-revolutionary parliamentary bodies and democratic institutions were perverted by venality and corruption. There was little if any possibility for a *vox populi* (such as there was) to express itself, let alone guide the nation's policy makers. It was not until the eve of the revolution that a small group of young Wafdists unsuccessfully attempted to democratize their party. But their attempts were frustrated by the military in the upheaval which finally ended all vestiges of the parliamentary system and other trappings of a democratic society which existed until July 1952.

Efficiency differentiates government control over institutions of popular expression today. Although royal directives in the pre-1952 era were as arbitrary as those of the present government, they were less effectively carried out. The present régime has spruced up its corps of police agents. Consequently, its critics are less carefree about their comments.

Although police controls are all pervasive and thoroughly effective, they can hardly be termed repressive. The atmosphere of democracy known in New York, London, Paris or Tel-Aviv does not exist in Cairo and Damascus, but there is not the terror which grasped Berlin during the era of Hitler, or Moscow during Stalin's reign. Critics of Nasir's

◆ DON PERETZ is the author of *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*, published last year. He has recently returned from a six-month stay in the Middle East.

Egypt are not difficult to find and it takes little encouragement, even from a stranger, to bring out the dissatisfaction which lies below the surface of the republic. In Cairo some of the ostensible centers for expression of discontent are the lobby of new Shephard's Hotel and the plush Gezira Sporting Club.

I heard many tales about discrimination, malfeasance, and arbitrary use of power at Shephard's Bar or along the edge of the swimming pool at the Gezira Club. They were always preceded by cautious glances over shoulders, but I did hear them—often from those with whom I had an acquaintance of but a quarter of an hour. Often I would be warned that some other informant was either an agent, either British, American, of the special office of the Foreign Ministry, or of a secret section in the Interior Ministry. The atmosphere was always just conspiratorial enough to make me feel uneasy about what might happen as a result.

Perhaps the régime's non-interference with such clandestine gatherings in such places is a device for letting off steam. If it is, it is one which is widely used and about the only such device permitted.

Conventional forms of expressing public opinion about the prevailing government are rigidly controlled, *de facto*. The press, cinema, radio, parliament, public meetings, sermons, publishing houses, and other media are subservient to the desires of the army officers who control the government.

President Nasir's view of democracy differs radically from that prevailing in the West. It must be established, he has said, "not in parliaments and slogans, but in the life of the people." The feeling among the revolutionary leaders seems to be that the Egyptian people are not yet ready for Western-style democracy, and that there must be a long transition period before the people can be trusted with such institutions. The emphasis of the young officers is on achieving social democracy—on destroying class barriers and creating a more fluid social structure.

The officers showed great suspicion of the parliamentary and democratic institutions existing when they came to power. True, these institutions were ineffective and perverted to the use of the small group who had ruled Egypt. Attempts either to amend the 1923 constitution or to draft a new one incorporating similar principles failed as did the plans to reform political parties.

An initial step was to end the role of political parties. Within a month and a half after assuming power the RCC issued the decree requiring political parties to reorganize within thirty days. A principal target was Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, leader of the formerly powerful Wafd Party. At first the Wafd resisted these attempts, especially the demand that the



party discard its leader, Nahhas. He declared that "no power on earth can force me to give up the presidency of the Wafd except God and the Egyptian people." The Wafd Executive Committee backed him with a resolution asserting that there would be no reorganization "except under the leadership of Nahhas."

Thereupon the RCC undertook a campaign to vilify the party leader. They said a dossier was prepared showing that, when Nahhas was Prime Minister in 1951, he had consented to the withdrawal of \$300,000 from the Ministry of Interior secret fund for investment in America by King Faruq. Charges were also made that state funds had been used to construct a quay for Mme. Nahhas' yacht and build a private road to her estate. Not only this, charged the government, but Nahhas was a "British tool and a faithful servant of imperialism" who had failed to supply arms to guerrilla fighters in the Suez Canal Zone, interfered in the Palestine arms scandal, and amassed wealth "at the expense of the poor."

General Nagib was sent on a tour of the Delta region, including Samannud, the birthplace of Nahhas and a Wafd stronghold, to expose the charges.

Finally, on October 2, 1952, an order from the Ministry of Interior froze the party's funds and stated that it was automatically dissolved.

Two days before the deadline for submitting new names of leaders and principles, the Wafd gave in. It submitted a list of leaders which omitted Nahhas. The capitulation was motivated, said the party, by the desire to "continue the national struggle for the service of Egypt's cause and that of the other Arab countries."

Fifteen parties registered under the decree, including eight which had existed during the reign of Faruq. The old parties were the Wafd, Liberal-Constitutionalists, the Kutlah, Sa'dists, Nationalists, Socialists, Labor and *Fallabin*. The Muslim Brothers and two feminist groups, the National Feminist Party and the Daughters of the Nile, which previously existed, but not as political parties, also registered. The new groups were the Nile Democrats, *Fallab* Socialist, New Socialist and Democratic Parties.

After the October registration, the parties were subjected to continued government pressure. They were "foredoomed" as presently constituted, warned 'Ali Mahir in August. "They must either be reshaped and reformed or disintegrate and disappear." "They belong to the nation and not to individuals. They must have definite and specific programs. They must differentiate from one and another, otherwise there is no need for the existence of different names for one idea. . . . We have had enough



of differences and bad feelings, enough of mutual accusations and political murders, enough of imprisonment and of restrictions on liberty."

'Ali Mahir said that party members would no longer have to obey their leaders "which is dictatorship, but the leaders have to obey the members, which is democracy." The existing system, stated the Prime Minister, kept Egypt in a "state of backwardness and retarded progress" because the parties "remained preoccupied with a struggle for their own power," each promising services when out of power and disappointing the people when in office. Egyptian public life was "cursed with sterility and paralysis" because successive parliaments had remained "subservient" to these weaknesses. The constitution was itself a "source of weakness and confusion."

The final blow came on January 16, 1953 when all political parties were abolished and their funds confiscated. A three-year transition period was announced during which constitutional government would be restricted. The abolition of the party system followed immediately an announcement that twenty-five officers had been arrested in a conspiracy to overthrow the government; this was the kind of announcement which usually accompanied RCC decrees increasing restrictions on parliamentary and democratic institutions.

During the transition period which was to end in January 1956, the leader of the Revolution, who was also Chief of State, was granted full powers to "guard national security." All his decrees and those of the army were exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts.

A month after General Nagib received special powers from the RCC, he abolished the 1923 constitution and announced the régime's intention of drafting a new one which would "realize the aspirations of the Egyptian people." He said because of "loopholes" in the 1923 document it had been possible to "bring Egypt to the brink of ruin." It was necessary to create new institutions for the work of political, economic and social reconstruction. A committee representing political groups, the professions, various religious communities and leading jurists was set up to draft a new constitution. After the new charter was drafted, promised Nagib, it would be submitted to a national referendum. There was also talk of a separate referendum on the "vital issue" of abolishing the monarchy.

Some months later the "representative" committee produced a draft which in many ways resembled the 1923 constitution. However, the officers decided that they did not care for the creation. Both the draft and the committee which drafted it were abandoned, and the work of constitution-making was taken over by a small group of hand-picked

associates of Nasir. They produced the document which he proclaimed in January 1956.

To fill the void in political life created by the abolition of parties, the RCC established a new body which came to life during the ceremonies commemorating its first half year in office on January 23, 1953. Nasir announced in Cairo, before a crowd of 250,000 people, the organization of the Liberation Rally. Political parties, he said, had tried to divide the people in their struggle against British imperialism. Faruq "had concluded a deal with the parties whereby he would close his eyes to their crimes and they would close theirs to his." Thus had been formed a "limited company for theft and robbery in which the people had no shares." It was differences among the parties which had enabled the British to remain so long in the country.

But now, the Colonel announced, "we have decided to put an end to it all and to start again from the very beginning. . . . We have already removed the hand of dishonor and torn out the root of corruption in government." Because of the great popular support for the government it "now needs a body to organize the people and to foster their unity, and to coordinate the efforts of the workers. In the name of the Egyptian people . . . I announce the birth of the organization which will build our unity." The motto of the new Liberation Rally was "unity, discipline, and work."

A stop-gap constitution was adopted in February 1953 to bridge the transition period. The provisional charter was more a list of principles than a formal constitution. It stated that the "nation was the source of all power." Personal liberties and freedom of opinion, property ownership and the inviolability of the home, were to be safeguarded "within the law." Complete freedom of religion was guaranteed provided it did not disturb public order. The independence of the judiciary was an accepted principle. The leader of the revolution was invested with powers of supreme sovereignty which would apply particularly to measures he might find necessary "to protect the revolution and its aims." These powers would apply to appointment and dismissal of ministers who would have executive authority in their spheres. General policy would be discussed by a "congress" consisting of the Council of Ministers and RCC under the chairmanship of the revolutionary leader.

In effect, the country was ruled by the RCC for the three-year transition period. Before the crisis of February-April 1954, competition had become keen between General Nagib and Colonel Nasir, who was supported by most other RCC members. By the middle of April the RCC had consolidated its control and had eliminated all potentially effective

political competition, including that of General Nagib and his supporters. At the height of the crisis, the RCC made a pretense of restoring parliamentary government and ending the military régime, with its many restrictions on political life. Promises were made to remove press censorship, transfer the sovereign power of the RCC to an elected constitution assembly, lift the ban on political parties, and withdraw the army from politics. The promises were but a maneuver.

Instead of restoring the parliamentary system, the RCC set up a National Advisory Assembly to discuss, but not vote on, vital issues. All decisions of importance continued to be taken by the RCC, and, increasingly, that body came to be dominated by 'Abd al-Nasir.

Since no constitution satisfactory to Nasir and the RCC had been drafted by the "representative" committee established in 1952, the document drafted by Nasir's committee was presented to the nation on January 16, 1956. The officers were committed to end their role in government, when the three-year transition period was supposed to terminate.

"The constitution which we proclaim today" Nasir told the people, "marks the end of the long battle against encroaching foreign despotism and internal despotism. . . . The new constitution marks the end of one struggle and the beginning of another."

Popular approval for the new charter and for Nasir as Egypt's new President would be sought in a plebiscite to be held on June 23. The balloting would be followed by a new National Assembly which would meet in October. The 1956 document was the first Egyptian constitution in the name of the Egyptian people. "We, the Egyptian people" introduces each of the paragraphs in the preamble. The section reaffirms the six-point program of the RCC: the abolition of imperialism, "feudalism," monopoly and control of capitalist influence over the system of government and the establishment of a strong army, social justice and a democratic society.

The first three articles proclaim Egypt a democratic republic. Some forty-three articles of the Constitution form a Bill of Rights which provide that Egyptians are equal before the law, not to be deprived of their citizenship, not to be discriminated against because of sex, race, language or religion, not to be arrested, imprisoned, or punished except by law, not to be banished from Egyptian soil, not to be compelled to reside in or abandon a specific area except by law, and not to be liable to confiscation of their property except according to the law. Extradition of political refugees is prohibited. Inviolability of the home, freedom and secrecy of correspondence, freedom of opinion and research, freedom of the press and publication, and freedom of association and assembly, all

"within the law" are guaranteed. The right of worship is protected in accordance with customs prevailing in Egypt. Not only does it guarantee Egyptians the right to vote, but citizens may petition the authorities and they may present complaints to any state agency regarding the failure of a government employee properly to discharge his functions.

This constitution established a parliamentary régime with ministerial responsibility and a strong chief executive. Political parties were to remain suspended until the government introduced a law regulating them. Pending such a measure, a National Union would be established "by the people to work for realization of the aims of the revolution."

The National Union would nominate the candidates for the 350 members of a newly established National Assembly. Later it was announced that affairs of the Union would be managed by its Chairman, President Nasir, assisted by three of his closest associates in the RCC, Major Kamal al-din Husayn, Wing Commander 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi, and Lt. Col. Zakariyyah Muhyi al-din.

The operative fact in the new constitutional structure was that Nasir and his three RCC associates controlled the National Union which would nominate all candidates in the new Assembly. This negated the possibility of a completely free electoral campaign.

The plebiscite for the constitution and for Nasir as President of Egypt merely presented citizens with the opportunity of voting "yes" or "no" on both issues. Nasir was the only candidate. In his major campaign address he announced that about 10 per cent of the 5,000 political prisoners would be released. Nasir's platform was to make Egypt "a cooperative society" and to end military rule. After the plebiscite, he promised, the RCC "would hand over its rule to the people in a way that will preserve the people's rights."

The week of the plebiscite was a gala. On June 13 the last "imperialists" left the country when the remaining seventy-nine British soldiers in the Canal Zone sailed from Port Said to Cyprus. "A lifetime's struggle against the foreign occupiers" was ended when Nasir raised the Egyptian flag over Navy House at Port Said on June 18th. The next day, four days before the plebiscite, press censorship was ended, all political prisoners were released, and martial law was abolished in all areas except the Red Sea provinces and the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt had been under martial law for sixteen years except for a period of a few months.

Little time was left for the press to work up any public debate on either the candidate for President or his constitution and none appeared in any local publication. The plebiscite was a landslide for Nasir. Of the 5½ million voters, 99.9 per cent voted for him and 99.8 per cent

voted for the constitution. The balloting was not only memorable for these figures, but because it was the first time voting was compulsory for men, the first time it was permissible for women.

The day following the plebiscite the RCC was dissolved. Its last act was to approve a decree giving the Minister of Interior, Zakariyyah Muhyi al-din, power, valid for a decade, to arrest and imprison any persons previously condemned by the various revolutionary tribunals. This meant that all former political prisoners, though now freed by presidential decree, could be rearrested and imprisoned if the authorities deemed it necessary.

The first elections to the new National Assembly were to have been held in November 1956, but were postponed until July 3, 1957 because of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt at the end of October.

Some 2,528 candidates filed papers for the 350 seats in the Assembly, but nearly half the names were eliminated by the officer-controlled National Union. It screened all who submitted applications for candidacy, eliminating those who had been convicted by the revolutionary tribunals and anti-corruption courts, those liable to "administrative custody," those convicted as criminals, and those dismissed from public office for "lack of integrity."

The names of 1,210 were rejected and 1,318 approved. In five constituencies every candidate was eliminated. All cabinet members were relieved of their opposition as were some former army and police officers. In all, sixty-two candidates had no opposition. Of the sixteen women who filed papers for candidacy, the National Union permitted only five to run, of whom two were elected, thus becoming the first Arab women to be elected to any Middle Eastern parliament.

Despite the rigid process of eliminating "undesirable" and "unworthy" applicants, the National Union did permit a variety of candidates, wide enough for some fierce campaigning. On support of Nasir, the revolution and the constitution, there was no difference of opinion. Neither was foreign policy a campaign issue. Division of opinion occurred over "too much" or "too little" socialism, personalities, and the accomplishments, or lack of them, of the candidates. Streets were filled with campaign posters, electioneering candidates addressed large crowds, bands and carnivals were sponsored for favorite sons, and there was distribution of largesse by some of the wealthy candidates.

A few months after the election I asked the new President of the National Assembly, 'Abd al-Latif Baghdadi, how decisions of major national importance were reached in Egypt. "There are six of us who make these decisions," he told me, and named, in addition to President



Nasir and himself, 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir, the Commander-in-Chief; Zakariyyah Muhyi al-din, Minister of Interior; Kamal al-din Husayn, Minister of Education and Husayn Shaf'i, Minister of Social Welfare, the last members of the now dissolved RCC. When Norman Thomas asked President Nasir the same question, he replied with a long and involved explanation of the constitution and the workings of the National Assembly.

Although the officers controlled the National Assembly through the devices described above, they did permit some free discussion in the new elected body. A number of controversial issues were debated before its demise, after the union with Syria in February 1958. During its short life there were debates on malfeasance in Liberation Province, and problems of national education in which policy was criticized severely. The Assembly's criticism of mismanagement in the desert project led to a drastic reorganization of its Administration. However, its lack of confidence in the Minister of Education had no effect. President Nasir did not accept the resignation of his friend. He thus overrode the will of the National Assembly and put into question the power of the legislature in conflict with the executive.

Although the only political party was the National Union, it was a party in name only. It had no organization, structure or real program. It merely represented the former RCC officers. The RCC had always been rather remote from the people and it had been hoped that, through the National Union, closer ties with Egypt's masses could be formed. The Liberation Rally established in the early days of the Revolution was an unsuccessful attempt to stimulate mass participation in the "blessed movement." It had never developed into more than a holding company through which the officers controlled labor, a number of professional bodies and a few sycophants.

After the July election plans were developed to build the National Union into a political party reaching out to all sectors of society. In November 1957 it was announced that the National Union would be "the" political party mentioned in article 192 of the 1956 constitution. Its program would be "to realize the objectives of the 1952 Revolution" and to promote efforts to build up the nation on a good foundation by establishment of a socialist, democratic, cooperative society, free from political, social and economic exploitations.

President Nasir headed a twenty-member supreme executive committee which would nominate all candidates to the National Assembly. A General Assembly was chosen from representatives of local, area, provincial and national committees. The Union would receive financial



aid from the state, which it was free to invest. Membership was open to all Egyptians over sixteen years of age who were approved by the committees. A month after the new party structure was organized, the nearly-defunct Liberation Rally was dissolved.

The structure of government established under the 1956 constitution was short-lived indeed. Within six months after elections to the newly-created National Assembly the body had outlived its usefulness. Among its last acts was approval, on February 5, of union between Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic. The Assembly then nominated President Nasir as the only candidate for the Presidency of the UAR and adopted his seventeen-point program, later incorporated into a constitution replacing both the 1956 Egyptian constitution and the existing constitution of Syria. On February 17, before the plebiscite of approval, Radio Cairo announced that all political parties in the Northern Region were to be dissolved by the President and replaced by a National Union as in Egypt. The order for dissolution was given on March 12 after the new constitution came into effect.

Although the Ba'th Party in Syria was among the most ardent advocates of union with Egypt, its existence was officially ended by unity because of Nasir's predisposition against political parties. On April 24, the Ba'th announced in Damascus that it was voluntarily disbanding. The party lost little of its political influence by the act, for several of the leading members of the National Union, which replaced Syrian parties, were former Ba'th leaders. Its informal activities and meetings were unaffected by the fusion and it continued to be a major political force in the Arab World.

The plebiscite, held both in Syria and Egypt on February 21, turned out results giving even more massive approval to Nasir than he had received in June 1956. In Egypt, 99.99 per cent of the voters supported the union and Nasir for President. Out of more than six million voters, fewer than 300 voted "no" in the election. In Syria, where more than 1,300,000 cast ballots, the vote was 99.8 per cent "yes" on both issues.

Although in theory this, as the previous plebiscite, was secret, practice varied within Egypt. One Cairo participant who opposed the Union told me that those watching his poll examined each ballot before it was placed in the box. Consequently, he voted "yes," as did others whose ballots were being scrutinized.

The UAR constitution was promulgated by President Nasir on March 5, 1958 without seeking the sanction of any representative body. The document was less specific about social aims and civil liberties than its 1956 predecessor. The only mention of individual rights were the guar-

antee of private property, and the equality of all citizens before the law regardless of race, origin, language, religion or creed. Punishments could not be imposed except by law and could not be retroactive. Extradition of political refugees was prohibited. The only reference to democratic rights was the article which stated that the UAR was a democratic republic, and the one where "public liberties are guaranteed within the limits of the law."

The dominant figure in government is the President and his powers are all-inclusive. The constitution does not refer to his future election. Members of the National Assembly, the supreme legislative body, are determined by presidential decree, the only requirement being that at least half be members of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies and the Egyptian National Assembly. Sessions of the Assembly are convoked and closed by the President and may not be held without his summons. The President has the right to initiate, oppose and promulgate laws. A presidential veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly. This is unlikely in view of the method by which members of the body are chosen. Ministers and UAR Vice Presidents are appointed and discharged by the President. Administrative regulations for the organization of public services are enacted by the President and their implementation is under his direct supervision. The armed forces and foreign relations are under the direction of the Chief Executive, though the National Assembly ratifies treaties. Finally, the President may declare a state of emergency and thus dispense with the advice of the National Assembly altogether.

The function of the National Assembly is chiefly to discuss and approve government measures. The various prerogatives with which it is endowed, according to the new Constitution, are hardly more than *pro forma* methods of sanctioning the Presidential will. The degree of independence which the Assembly may ultimately exercise will, in large measure, depend upon the desire of the President. Some observers maintain that President Nasir intends gradually to increase the amount of independence which the National Assembly obtains; that, for the time being, his approach is the development of a "controlled democracy."

In revolutionary Egypt the extent of freedom of the press has varied from time to time. There is now no formal censorship on the local press, but foreign correspondents must submit their copy for government approval. A month after the RCC took over the government it abolished censorship on all incoming and outgoing messages, but censorship on foreign correspondents was reimposed in January 1953. However, they were told, deletions, "if any," would be concerned only with military

matters. Two weeks after Egypt was declared a republic in June 1953, censorship on outgoing cables was abolished, although incoming messages still had to be approved. Of course, during the Suez War, all foreign and local press was censored.

It was not until after the Nagib-Nasir clash in 1954 that the Government practically took over the local press. Many newspapers sided with one or the other of the protagonists in their struggle for power.

One of the first moves by Nasir after his victory over Nagib in April was against the press. On April 15, the RCC ordered the dissolution of the Press Syndicate, and appointed a ministerial committee under Major Salim, then Minister of National Guidance, to take over its assets. This had to be done, the government explained, because when press censorship had been lifted "elements affected by corruption in the past era had betrayed themselves by spreading suspicion and doubts against the revolution." In other words, some newspapers had supported Nagib. A list of twenty-three Press Syndicate members who had received bribes up to LE 48,000 was produced. It included some of the country's leading journalists who had at times criticized the government, such as M. Husayn Abu al-Fath, editor of the Wafdist journal *Al-Misri* and President of the Syndicate; its Secretary General, M. 'Abd al-Qaddus, editor of the left-wing *Rose al-Yusuf*; and M. Edgard Gallad, editor of the *Journal d'Egypte* and the Sa'dist Party paper *Al-Asas*. Several of the journalists were sentenced by the Revolutionary Tribunal, and on May 4, the RSS banned publication of the opposition paper, *Al-Misri*. The Société Orientale de Publicité, which published Cairo's leading foreign language dailies, the *Egyptian Gazette*, *La Bourse Egyptienne*, and *Le Progrès Egyptien* was turned over to a government trustee. After spending a year in jail Qaddus "rethought" his criticisms of the revolution and was released. Ever since, *Rose al-Yusuf* has been a keen government supporter.

Most journals seemed to have learned their lesson, and one can find little criticism of the government in the local press since 1954. Lest there be any doubt, the government decreed in April 1955 that only Egyptians on the rolls of the revived Press Syndicate (under government control since the previous year) would be permitted to practice journalism. Only foreign correspondents who served Egyptian publications abroad were exempted. The order announced that the purpose of the Syndicate was to "raise the efficiency of the profession, safeguard its dignity, defend its rights and interests, and promote a spirit of cooperation among its members by raising their morale and material standards."

The following month, Colonel Nasir signed a military order partially lifting government censorship on the local press to allow "free discus-

sion" on all questions bearing on the system of government after 1956. He invited all Egyptians to "express their opinions without reserve" on his plan to restore parliamentary government without political parties. Censorship on other matters was retained. Despite this grant of freedom, no Egyptian publication expressed any criticism of the President or his plan.

In talking with an editor of one of the largest Cairo dailies, I was told that there is no censorship. There are only restrictions on foreign news. The government "assumes" that all publications support its struggle against "imperialism" and for "Arab unity." They are items by which loyalty to the "national cause" is determined, consequently one finds little variation in comment about them. Some variation does exist. The left-wing journals, *Al-Masa'* and *Al-Sha'b* generally are more vituperative in their attacks on America, whereas *Al-Akbbār* has acquired a reputation for being pro-American because it does not attack the United States as frequently or ferociously as other journals. *Al-Akbbār* has never eulogized the Soviet Union to the same extent as these others.

After reading summaries of Cairo newspaper editorials for some ten days, Norman Thomas commented that pro-American, neutral, and anti-American journals can be distinguished by the following: the anti-American press is most violent in its attacks on the U.S., the neutral press, less so, and the pro-American press, the least.

With licenses for import of newsprint and the like, it becomes increasingly difficult for any editor to publish criticism of the régime. Another method of government control is to request that newspapers give positions to editors who are close to the régime. Of the five Cairo Arabic dailies the government owns shares in, or gives direct financial assistance to, three.

There has been some press criticism of aspects of internal policy since 1954. These include the campaigns against mismanagement in Liberation Province, housing conditions, the government proposal that all Egyptians wear uniform clothing and the closing of newspapers on certain religious holidays. But since 1954 no paper has criticized Nasir or any other current member of the RCC, the constitution, the revolution, foreign policy, or the union with Syria.

On occasion, the government issues informal directives to the press about topics which it would like discussed. Such was the case a few years ago when a U.N. official mentioned to a high-ranking officer that it would be a good idea if some of the newspapers supported the organization. The next day, U.N. Day, nearly every Cairo newspaper had an editorial supporting the U.N. In October 1957 a similar directive was sent out by

the President ordering the press to make every effort to bring a more equitable balance in the presentation of news about the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, the directive was not longlasting, and with the change of political relationships with the West, deviation from it was again permitted.

A favorite device for dealing with foreign correspondents who seem to have displeased the government is expulsion. There have been several cases, including this writer. In most such instances the expellee is given a few days notice to leave the country and no reason is presented.

I have seen no evidence to prove that the secret police tap telephones or "bug" rooms of individuals, but the belief that these listening devices are employed is so prevalent that foreigners are constantly warned by their friends. Conversations on sensitive subjects take place, but they are guarded, for too many individuals have been summoned before the security authorities to account for some chance remark made in a casual conversation.

There is no overt legal discrimination against them, but there can be little doubt that non-Muslims do not have first-class citizenship. To date there has been no interference in religious worship, practice or observance, but the prevailing atmosphere in Egypt militates against non-Muslims enjoying the security enjoyed by the majority. I know of several instances in which non-Muslim medical students at Cairo University were questioned on final oral examinations—not about medicine—but about their religious and political beliefs. The questions, and whether or not they were asked, depended on the whim of individual professors and was not an accepted practice of the University. However, a question about religion appears on forms which must be submitted for applications to visit certain government offices, port areas and custom houses. A Jewish woman who was refused a pass to see off two sons leaving the country from Alexandria Port, was warned after waiting in line, to "get out, or you'll be thrown in jail!"

In the environment prevailing in Egypt today, there is little room for intellectual freedom. Intellectuals must follow the government line in professions such as the press or teaching, which are generally government-managed or -controlled. Several university professors have been dismissed for failure to give proper interpretations of history, economics and even literature. Those who are employed on government faculties are employees of the state, and are treated as such. In other institutions defiants are warned by "unofficial" calls from the authorities to mend their ways when they seem to be straying from the government line.

Private correspondence into and out of the country is scrutinized by



the securities authorities. The Minister of Interior told Norman Thomas that censorship of mail is determined by a spot check of every so many letters and a more minute examination of correspondence to and from "certain individuals." When Mr. Thomas returned to the United States, he found that all his letters had been opened by the Egyptian censor.

Although the 1956 constitution did spell out a detailed list of civil rights, including the inviolability of the home, freedom of opinion and research, freedom of the press and publication and freedom of association and assembly, "all within the law," the practice prevailing since these rights were first promulgated seems nearly to have negated them.

"Of course, you Westerners have different standards about these things," one is told again and again by defenders of the present régime attempting to rationalize limitations on basic civil rights. "Egypt is not ready for the freedom you enjoy in the United States. We are still too under-developed," runs the argument.

These are to a large extent the sentiments of President Nasir, who maintains that "intellectual freedom" and civil liberties were in the past only mirages. His emphasis, like that of many other Asian leaders, is on a system in which a dedicated leadership portions out freedom and civil rights to those who deserve them and have proven themselves capable of managing them. Social and economic democracy, in this view, must precede political liberty. The latter will come only after the standards of the nation have been raised to a point where full political freedom can be a useful tool in developing the national interest. It is obvious that political democracy as it is known in the Western world will be a long time in coming to the United Arab Republic.



## DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN TRANSCAUCASIA, 1897-1956

*Richard Pipes*

IN studying the nationality question in Russia one sooner or later arrives at the conclusion that it is to a large extent a byproduct of demography. What is decisive in the long run is not the ability of the Russians to assimilate culturally the national minorities, for assimilation has proven effective only in the case of small and isolated social or ethnic groups; nor is it the hostility (or lack of it) between Russians and non-Russians, since the relationship between nationalities is usually the result rather than the cause of nationalism. The decisive factor is the capacity of the minorities to withstand the relentless Russian population movement which presses outward, toward the peripheries of the state, century after century, regardless of how or by whom the country is ruled. The history of Russia is still largely a history of colonization. This process is long-term. It cannot be studied from year to year, but demands to be viewed from the perspective of decades.

The present essay is an attempt to analyze the evolution of the nationality question in terms of demographic development in a region where it has become acute in relatively recent times, and where its outcome is still in doubt. Transcaucasia fell into Russian hands only one hundred and fifty years ago. Administratively it was fully incorporated into the Russian Empire fifty years later, and the influx of Russians began only toward the end of the nineteenth century. The demographic pressures, therefore, have gotten under way at a time which is too close to permit conclusive generalization about their ultimate result. On the other hand, here the period of greatest demographic changes can be studied by means of statistics which are not available for older times.

This inquiry begins with the year 1897, the year of the First All-Russian Census, and ends with 1956. Its purpose is to determine the relative capacity of the principal Transcaucasian groups to weather the various upheavals which this area has experienced over the past sixty years, to adapt themselves to changing political and economic conditions, and to evolve viable and demographically sound population structures.

The sources of information are of two kinds: statistical and historical. The statistical data are derived mainly from the census reports

♦ RICHARD PIPES is an Associate Professor of History at Harvard University. His "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia" appeared in Nos. 2 and 3 of Volume 9 (1955) of this *Journal*.

(1897, 1926, and 1939), and from information released by the government at various times between the censuses. This information is by no means as definitive as the elaborate absolute figures and percentiles may lead one to think. In the first place, the criteria used by the various censuses are not the same; this is particularly true of so ambivalent a category as "nationality." In the second place, there are long periods between the censuses when we have no information at all, and must rely on interpolations, the accuracy of which is always questionable. In the third place, the census data for 1939 have not been fully published even at this late date. Finally, there has been no census at all since 1939, which means that the past two decades are not subject to statistical analysis except in a most general way.

Because of the inadequacy of the statistical information, it is necessary to have recourse to historical sources to help fill in the gaps and clear up certain obscurities. It is also necessary to depend on inference, interpolation, and plain guess. My method of computing the ethnic and urban breakdowns of the Transcaucasian republics in 1939 is very rough at best, and certainly makes no claim at being "scientific." In fact, all information on the period 1932-1956, i.e., for nearly one-half of the period under study, is approximate.

But although the factual basis of this study is not as solid as one may wish, the end-result is consistent enough to inspire some confidence. The advantage of undertaking a long-term study is that even if the individual parts are hazy in spots, the total effect, when seen from a distance, can be fairly clear. That is to say, the sum-total is more cogent than the component parts. In any event the materials gathered in this study provide a good vantage point from which to view the results of the forthcoming Soviet census, promised for 1959.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Population in 1897*

According to the First All-Russian Census of 1897 the region of Transcaucasia had the following demographic characteristics: high fertility, a high proportion of children and men, a predominantly settled, rural population with comparatively little movement between districts and provinces, and low urbanization.<sup>2</sup>

The child-woman ratio for Transcaucasia as a whole stood in 1897

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1. I would like here to thank the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for its generous assistance in gathering the information and analyzing the facts presented in this report, and Professor Frank Lorimer of the American University for several highly useful suggestions.
  2. In the discussion of the prerevolutionary period, the term "Transcaucasia" is understood to include the provinces of Baku and Elizavetopol (later Azerbaijan). Erivan (Armenia), Tiflis and Kutais (Georgia), and the Districts of Kars and Zakataly.

at 876.<sup>3</sup> In areas which were least urbanized, such as the province of Elizavetopol, this ratio rose as high as 1,032. Transcaucasia thus was a region with a high rate of natural growth.

A reflection of this fact may be seen in the age distribution which was heavily balanced in favor of the young. Thanks to its fertility, the population of Transcaucasia had the lowest average age in the whole Russian empire (23.94 years as compared to 25.16 for the national average). 40.3 per cent of its inhabitants were children of 15 or under, as compared to 37.9 per cent in the empire as a whole. At least somewhat connected with this phenomenon (due to the normal preponderance of boys at birth), and even more with the high proportion of migrants, was the high sex ratio, the highest in Russia: for every 100 women there were 117 men.

Since the majority of the inhabitants engaged in agricultural and pastoral pursuits, there was relatively little urbanization. The census reported 14.4 per cent of the inhabitants as urban, but even this figure is probably somewhat high.<sup>4</sup> The low degree of urbanization also tended to favor a high birth rate.

The vast majority of the inhabitants spent their lives in the localities in which they were born. Since the influx of outsiders was as yet insignificant, it is not surprising that between 90 and 95 per cent of the inhabitants in each of the five provinces (Kars excepted) were reported by the census as residing in their native districts.

Ethnographically, the population consisted of four principal groups: Azeri Turks, Armenians, Georgians, and Russians.

3. This ratio is arrived at by dividing the number of children aged five and under by the number of women aged 14-44 inclusive, and multiplying the result by 1,000.

4. Russia (Tsarist as well as Soviet) classifies a settlement as urban on the basis of a legal definition: a settlement becomes urban when it is so declared by the government. The term "urban" in Russia, therefore, has not so much a demographic as a legal and administrative connotation. That the two are not identical can be seen on the example of the 1926 data for Azerbaijan. These data reveal that four settlements with a population of 1,000 or less each were listed as "urban," whereas five others, each with 5,000-10,000 inhabitants, were listed as "rural." In a dynamic country such as the Soviet Union, one obsessed with the ambition of catching up with the most industrialized countries of the West, such a method of computing the urban population tends to give an inflated picture of urbanization. If one were to classify the urban population of Transcaucasia in 1926 by drawing an arbitrary line at 5,000 inhabitants (a compromise between the standards employed by some Western and Far Eastern states), the proportion of those living in urban areas would decline by some 10 per cent (from 24.1 per cent to 21.7 per cent). The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is little individual farming in Transcaucasia; there the bulk of the population lived and continues to live in fairly large villages which do not lose their purely rural character even when they do grow above a few thousand inhabitants. In addition, the Soviet regime makes use of an ambivalent category "settlements of urban type" which includes housing developments for workers. Thus, since the Soviet government is interested in showing the most rapid progress of urbanization possible, and yet is not hindered by anything from increasing the ratio of urban inhabitants by the simple procedure of legislative fiat, one must approach all urbanization data in Russia, especially since 1928, with utmost caution.

The *Azeri Turks* were racially and linguistically related to the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, but in their religious practices they were closer to the Persians, because they adhered to the Shiite branch of Islam. Approximately one-third of the Azeri Turks lived in Russian Transcaucasia, and the remainder in northwest Persia. They were an agricultural and pastoral people, whose élite consisted largely of well-to-do landowners. By 1897 one could discern a nascent Muslim industrial proletariat in connection with the rapidly expanding petroleum industry in and around Baku. This proletariat was made up of unskilled Turkic and Persian laborers. Two-thirds of the Russian Azeri Turks lived in the provinces of Baku and Elizavetopol, and the remainder in rural settlements of the adjoining provinces of Erivan and Kutais.

The *Armenians* were, like the Russians and Georgians, Orthodox Christians but with their own church establishment. Culturally they had little in common with the Muslims next to and among whom they lived, and whose way of life they largely shared. In view of the mounting Turkish-Armenian conflict in the Ottoman Empire, repercussions of which were felt in Transcaucasia, the Armenians tended to draw nearer to the Christian Russians and Georgians. As in the case of the Azeri Turks, only a minority of the Armenians resided in Transcaucasia; the majority lived under the Turks, and there were many scattered Armenian settlements in towns of Russia proper (e.g., Rostov on Don). The bulk of the Armenians in Transcaucasia consisted of peasants (71.2 per cent), but the proportion of those who worked on their own land was smaller than among either the Azeri Turks or Georgians (49 per cent for the Armenians, 65 per cent for the Georgians, and 68 per cent for the Azeri Turks). The Armenians had the largest indigenous middle class. It consisted of traders, professionals, and industrial employees. In consequence of this social structure, the Armenians were most urbanized of the native nationalities, and territorially least-concentrated. Two-thirds of the Armenians resided in the Erivan province, while the remainder was rather thinly distributed in urban and rural settlements of the other four provinces.

The *Georgians*, like the Armenians, were Orthodox Christians. They too, therefore, were oriented toward Russia, and their intelligentsia was remarkably Westernized. This intelligentsia descended mainly from the déclassé nobility which was largest in Transcaucasia.<sup>5</sup> It was politically very active, and already at the end of the nineteenth century showed

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5. The nobility in the predominantly Georgian provinces of Tiflis and Kutais comprised 4.2 per cent and 6.9 per cent of the population; in the Armenian province of Erivan it was 1.3 per cent, and among the Azeri Turks 2.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent (Baku and Elizavetopol).

strong Marxist predilections. The bulk of the Georgian population consisted of peasants. The Georgians were the most compactly settled group: 98 per cent of all the Georgians in Russia resided in the provinces of Tiflis and Kutais.

The *Russians* were relative newcomers to this area, most of them having settled there since the middle of the nineteenth century.<sup>6</sup> Approximately half of the Russians lived in the cities, where they worked for the government, and in industrial, commercial or professional enterprises. The other half lived in small but compact rural settlements, which included colonies of Old Believers south of Baku, and villages planted by the Russian government along the strategic road linking Erivan with Tiflis.

The remaining national groups consisted of two principal subdivisions: minorities of European origin, and minorities of Middle Eastern origin. The first of these subdivisions included Poles, Germans, Greeks and European Jews; the latter, Adjars, Abkhazians, Ossetes, Tats, Talysh, and local Jews (from the mountains of Daghestan, and from Georgia). The tendency of most of the nationalities in this category was to identify themselves, at least politically, with the major groups most closely related to them in culture, religion, and speech. This meant in the case of the European minorities identification with the Russians, and in case of the native ones identification with one of the three principal Transcaucasian nationalities.

Considering the ethnic diversity of Transcaucasia there was remarkably little crossing of cultural lines. This fact can be illustrated to some extent statistically in the case of one of the most important criteria of nationality, namely language. Since the 1897 census did not report on ethnic affiliations, it is not possible to show precisely how much each group adhered to its native language, but a juxtaposition of the data on the linguistic and religious status (which, in the case of some nationalities, was practically identical) shows the insignificance of linguistic assimilation. Where it did occur at all, the language which replaced the original one was not so much Russian as Caucasian. The Armenians, as the most urbanized and least compact group, were most likely to succumb to the influence of other cultures. Yet an analysis of the number

6. The term "Russians" will be here used to include also the Ukrainians and Belo-russians. There are at least two good reasons for so doing: (1) In a strange environment the cultural differences among the East Slav groups tend to disappear, and (2) a large proportion of the migrant Ukrainians and Belo-russians intermarries with Russians because of the shortage of women of their nationality. This is due to the common tendency of a migratory population to be heavily male. In Armenia in 1926, for example, there were 1,587 Ukrainian men and only 18 women. With the passage of time, the Ukrainians and Belo-russians living in such remote areas, therefore, merge with the Great Russians culturally as well as demographically.



of inhabitants reported as professing the Armeno-Gregorian or Armeno-Catholic faiths reveals that only 3 per cent of them spoke languages other than Armenian: of these, 35,000 spoke Georgian, and 1,000 Russian. The Muslims were almost one hundred per cent Turkic or Persian in their language; the number of those who considered Russian their mother tongue was a mere 200, and of those who adopted Georgian or Armenian even smaller. There is every reason to assume that the Georgians, for whom no such statistics are available because they were considered as belonging to the same church as the Russians, were equally loyal to their native language.

Fertility was highest among the Azeri Turks, with the Armenians following closely behind. The Georgians stood half-way between these two groups and the Russians, who were the least fertile of all. Age-wise, the Georgians showed the highest proportion of children, then came the Azeri Turks, Armenians, and, last of all, the Russians. The Russians, on the other hand, were most highly urbanized (60 per cent); the Armenians came second (20 per cent), the Azeri Turks and other Muslims third (10 per cent), the Georgians last (9 per cent).

#### *The Inter-Census Period 1897-1926*

The time which elapsed between the census of 1897 and the Soviet census of 1926 cannot be studied with much statistical precision, because, apart from some scattered and often unreliable data, there are no population figures for it. To understand what happened to the inhabitants of Transcaucasia during this turbulent era, and what the first Soviet census was later to reveal, one must largely rely on history.

The three decades can be historically divided into two periods. The first period (1897-1914) was one of peace, prosperity, and growth, during which the population increased by natural means as well as by immigration. The second period (1914-1926) was one of war, genocide, and conquest, in the course of which the population not only failed to show the normal growth, but in some respects declined.

Between the census of 1897 and the outbreak of World War I the population of Transcaucasia increased by an estimated one and a half million, i.e., by an average of 1.7 per cent annually. How much of this reported increase was due to the excess of births over deaths, and how much to influx of immigrants from other parts of the country we do not know; but the relatively small increase in the number of Russians over the whole inter-census period (from 249,000 to 375,000 in 1926) suggests that immigration was rather a minor factor. This was a time



of rapid urbanization, during which the areas connected with the petroleum industry (Baku, Batum) and transport (Tiflis, Aleksandropol, and others) experienced a boom.

The social changes which Transcaucasia underwent during the 1897-1914 period produced, as may be expected, a certain amount of friction, which often took the form of national antagonism. The most pronounced conflict was that between the Azeri Turks and Armenians. It was in part a conflict between the Azeri peasant and laborer and the Armenian petty bourgeois (not unlike that in which the Jews in Eastern Europe were involved), and in part a reflection of the mounting wave of anti-Armenian feeling in the Ottoman Empire.

The convulsions which all Russia underwent during the subsequent period (1914-1926) affected Transcaucasia somewhat later than the other parts of the Empire, and had a different impact on the various nationalities. But in the end the population losses for the entire area were heavy, and Transcaucasia entered the trying years of Stalinist dictatorship with a population no larger than that which it had had at the beginning of World War I.

The war itself spared Transcaucasia. The Russian armies in the Caucasus went on the offensive early in 1915, and from then on until the October Revolution the major campaigns were waged on Turkish territory. In the course of these campaigns, however, the Turks carried out a frightful massacre of Anatolian Armenians, whom they charged with pro-Russian sympathies. In these massacres perished an estimated one million Armenians. Several hundred thousand Armenian refugees fled to the Russian Caucasus, where their ordeal added more fuel to the smouldering fires of Armenian-Azeri Turkic hostility. In early 1918, during the short-lived Communist government of Baku (the so-called "Baku Commune"), the Armenians, assisted by the Bolsheviks, carried out a massacre of the Azeri Turks. In the meantime the Russian troops, influenced by Bolshevik propaganda, deserted the front lines, and the Turks virtually walked into Transcaucasia. They headed directly for Baku, which they seized in the fall. There they helped the Azeri Turks to revenge themselves on the Armenians for the events of the preceding spring, and so the mutual slaughters continued.

The Georgians escaped for a long time the horrors which had visited their neighbors. This they did first by placing themselves under a benevolent German protectorate (1918), and then by establishing a comparatively efficient independent Georgian republic (1919 and 1920). But in 1921 the Communists invaded Georgia, and after short, intense fighting, occupied it. In 1924 the Georgians rebelled. This uprising, as well

as the Azeri Turkic revolt of 1920, and the Armenian of 1921, were bloodily suppressed.

Little wonder that at the time of the final establishment of Soviet rule the population of Transcaucasia was decimated. The Armenians showed the heaviest losses. According to Soviet estimates, the Armenian population of Transcaucasia declined between 1914 and 1920 by one half million: 200,000 in consequence of Turkish, and, presumably, Communist, massacres, and 300,000 from other causes, mostly famine and disease. The population of the area included in today's Armenia (excluding areas seized by Turkey in 1920-21) dropped from over one million in 1914 to 780,000 in 1920.<sup>7</sup> As a result of the losses suffered during and immediately after World War I, the demographic gains made by the Armenians between 1897 and 1914 were entirely wiped out. One of the by-products of these disasters was a considerable decline in the birth rate during the decade 1911-1921, so that in 1926 the census proved the Armenians to be particularly short of children aged 5-15.

TABLE I

*The population of Transcaucasia*

1897	4,493,000	1931	6,775,000
1914	5,990,000	1932	6,976,000
1920-1922	5,321,000	1933	7,110,000
1926	5,851,000	1939	8,110,000
1929	6,273,000	1956	9,000,000

There are no statistics for the Georgians comparable to those available for the Armenians. It does seem that they were growing normally until the time of the Communist invasion which occurred in February 1921, and that most of their population losses were a consequence of the conquest and the 1924 revolt. A Soviet source estimates the population of Georgia in 1921 at 2,677,000, of which 17.7 per cent (475,000) was urban.<sup>8</sup> The census of 1926 reported the population at 2,667,000, indicating an apparent decline of 10,000; it must be remembered, however, that Georgia lost certain territories to Azerbaijan in the early 1920's.

The population of Azerbaijan was reported in 1921-1923 at 1,863,000.<sup>9</sup> Between this time and 1926 Azerbaijan was enlarged by the acquisition of Zakataly (from Georgia) and Nakhichevan (from

7. Institut Ekonomiki Akademii Nauk Armianskoi SSR i Institut Geografii Akademii Nauk SSSR, *Armenianskaia SSR*, (Moscow, 1955), 50.

8. Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Geografii, *Gruzinskaja SSR*, (Moscow, 1956), 53.

9. Upravlenie Narodno-khoziaistvennogo ucheta ASSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Azerbaidzhana*, ([Baku], 1934), 41.

Armenia), each with about 100,000 inhabitants. In 1926 the population of Azerbaijan was reported at 2,315,000—an apparent growth of some 13 per cent in three to five years.

The total population of Transcaucasia at the time of the final establishment of Soviet power in that area may be estimated on the basis of Soviet sources at 5,321,000. This figure represents a net loss of 670,000 since 1914.<sup>10</sup>

But statistics tell only a part of the story of Transcaucasia during the inter-census period. During these three decades the population not only suffered heavy losses; it also experienced social changes which influenced appreciably the internal and external situation of the nationalities.

TABLE 2

*The population of Transcaucasia by national groups 1897-1956  
(in millions)*

Nationality	1897**	1926	1939	1956*
Azeri Turks	1.6	1.7	2.2*	2.3
Armenians	1.1	1.3	1.9	2.1
Georgians	1.3	1.8	2.3	2.6
Russians	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.2
Others	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8
TOTAL	4.5	5.8	8.1	9.0

\*Estimated

\*\*Linguistic criterion used

The first striking change was the growth of the urban population, which increased between 1897 and 1926 from 14.4 per cent to 24.1 per cent. A breakdown of the available figures indicates that this growth was not continuous. The urban population of Transcaucasia in 1920-1921 was estimated at 20.6 per cent<sup>11</sup>—that is to say, it increased 6.2 per cent in the pre-Soviet period, and only 3.5 per cent in the Soviet one. The growth of urbanization occurred largely as a result of the industrial expansion of the first decade of the twentieth century.

The second change, closely connected with the economic expansion which accounted for urbanization, was the increased mobility of the population. Movement between district and district, province and province, village and village became more and more frequent; the area was beginning to lose its self-contained, settled character. The growing

10. This decline is in part explainable by the change in the Russo-Turkish frontier. In the Brest Litovsk peace treaty, Lenin had ceded to the Turks the Kars District with some 300,000 inhabitants.

11. Armenia 17 per cent, Azerbaijan 26 per cent, and Georgia 17 per cent.

mobility tended to make the various nationalities more conscious of their ethnic identity, and to lend the local political movements, which matured very rapidly in times of revolution and chaos, a pronouncedly national character.

Each of the major nationalities had its own national party even before World War I. Georgian political life was dominated by the Social-Democrats, largely of a Menshevik orientation. The Georgian Marxists were at first aggressively anti-nationalist. They preached internationalism, and argued to their more nationally-minded neighbors that the road to salvation lay through the worldwide socialist movement. But they quickly abandoned their internationalism when, in the course of 1918-1919, their land was threatened first by the Whites and then by the Reds. They then adapted their newfound nationalism to the Marxism which they continued to profess, evolving in the process an amalgam of nationalism and socialism which has proven a very potent force among newly-liberated colonial peoples ever since. The Armenians and Azeri Turks had no such qualms. Their political life took from the very beginning a clearly nationalist orientation, due perhaps to the fact that before the Revolution their mutual hostility was the outstanding problem facing both these nationalities. Both the *Dasbnaktsutiun*, with its predominantly bourgeois and petty bourgeois membership, and the *Mussavat*, which united the Azeri Turkic landlords and intellectuals, were openly nationalistic from their very inception.

During the period of the Revolution and Civil War these three parties took over the administrative responsibilities for the areas of Transcaucasia most heavily populated by their respective nationalities. Thus between 1918 and 1920, political authority rested in the hands of the nationalities themselves. What this did to their national *egos* can be easily imagined. Due to accident of war and revolution, they were suddenly transformed from passive, subject peoples into independent, sovereign nations. It is irrelevant to inquire whether the three Transcaucasian republics which had emerged in 1918 were viable: judged by the test of viability a considerable proportion of sovereign states today in existence would have to be condemned to disappearance. What matters is that political independence, once tested, produces a situation, psychological as well as material, which is most conducive to the development of national consciousness. National pride, the feeling of belonging to a real "nation," spread among the people and remained even after the republics and their leading parties had been suppressed by the Communists. It is not far-fetched to say that the experiences of the revolution transformed the ethnic groups into full-fledged nationalities.

Thus the inter-census period was one of important changes. During this period the population experienced a relatively slow rate of growth (if one takes into consideration its phenomenal fertility), but at this time it went a long way towards transforming itself from an agglomeration of self-contained ethnic groups into several fairly mobile and nationally conscious modern societies.

### *The Population in 1926*

The first Soviet census, conducted in 1926, conveyed the impression that demographically there had been no profound changes in the structure of the Transcaucasian nationalities toward each other, or toward the population of the Soviet Union as a whole. Everything that had been said of the Transcaucasian population as of 1897 applied also in 1926, only a bit less so. The process of transition toward a more complex modern society was obviously slower and more gradual in the realm of demography than in that of culture.

As stated above, owing to the losses incurred during the decade 1914-1924, the population had shown little or no gain since the outbreak of World War I.

The child-woman ratio had fallen somewhat, but it was still high, higher than in any other region of the Soviet Union. For Transcaucasia as a whole it stood at 746 (compared to 876 in 1897).<sup>12</sup>

There was a slight shift in the age distribution. The population was somewhat older than in 1897, but still young compared to the population of the USSR as a whole. The proportion of children 14 and under dropped from 40.3 per cent in 1897 to 39.6 per cent (in the whole USSR it was in 1926 37.2 per cent). The population of working age (15-60) also declined slightly (from 53.8 per cent to 52.8 per cent) so that the oldest group alone showed a gain. This ageing was in part due to the heavy losses suffered by the younger population during the disorders of 1917-1924, with the attendant decline in birth rates, and in part to growing urbanization.

Urbanization showed a gain of 9.7 per cent as compared with 1897, but approximately two-thirds of that gain had occurred before 1921, i.e., before the Soviet regime seized Transcaucasia.

The most startling demographic change was in the sex ratio which dropped from 117 in 1897 to 106.

The census documented statistically the population movement which

12. If one were to compute the child-woman ratio for Transcaucasia using the same standards as those commonly employed in the United States (i.e., children five and under, and women 20-44), the ratio for 1926 would rise to 970. In the United States at this time (1930) it stood at 481 for whites and 497 for Negroes. The Transcaucasian child-woman ratio in 1926 was comparable to that of the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century.



had been under way during the preceding three decades due to industrialization and the influx of refugees. In Transcaucasia as a whole 10.5 per cent of the inhabitants were born outside their place of residence. This figure was approximately twice that of 1897.

The relative fertility ranking of the four principal nationalities was the same as it had been in 1897, with the Azeri Turks and Armenians leading, followed at some distance by the Georgians, and the Russians far in the rear. The proportion of children showed the same order: Turks, Armenians, Georgians, Russians. The Russians had the highest proportion of persons of working age (68.5 per cent), the Armenians the lowest (48.7 per cent). The sex ratio was highest among the Azeri Turks (111); it did not differ significantly among the remaining groups, varying between 100 and 103.

The Russians continued to be the most heavily urbanized ethnic group, with 73.3 per cent of the Russian-speaking inhabitants residing in towns. This figure indicates that during the inter-census period the Russian population tended to concentrate in the cities, and suggests that practically all the Russians who had settled in Transcaucasia between 1897 and 1926 had moved into them: the Russian population as a whole increased during this period by 126,000, whereas the Russian urban population increased by 131,000. Two hundred and eighteen thousand out of the 275,000 Russian-speaking urban inhabitants resided in two towns, Baku and Tiflis. The Armenians were again in the second place as regards urbanization, with 29.3 per cent urban. The Georgians and Azeri Turks were more or less on the same level of urbanization, far behind the Russians and Armenians; but it is significant that during the inter-census period the Georgians, who in 1897 had been the least urbanized group, now gained a slight edge over the Azeri Turks.

Some of the national groups, which in 1897 showed a high degree of territorial concentration under the system of *gubernii*, became even more compact as a result of the introduction by the Communists of the national-territorial system of administration. The group which gained most in this respect was the Azeri Turks: the boundaries of their republic were drawn in such a way as to include 84 per cent of all Azeri Turks living in the Soviet Union (compared to the 65 per cent who had resided in the provinces of Baku and Elizavetopol in 1897). There was no substantial change in the concentration of the Georgians and Armenians, which remained very high for the former, and low for the latter. The Russians, by virtue of their tendency to move into the cities, also became more concentrated. Thus, notwithstanding the increased mobility of the population, there was no sign of dispersal. In 1926, as in 1897,



each nationality (the Armenians partly excepted) was identified with a definite territory or type of settlement.

The increased mobility also seemed to exercise no appreciable influence on the linguistic habits of the population. In 1926 93 per cent of all the inhabitants spoke their national languages. Of the 405,000 who adopted other languages, 100,000 switched to Turkic, 82,000 to Georgian, 39,000 to Russian (exclusive of Ukrainian and Belorussian), 1,600 to Armenian, and 141,000 to the languages of other, mostly North Caucasian nationalities. The gain of Russian was accomplished almost entirely at the expense of European languages (Yiddish, Polish, and German); only 2,500 Georgians and 10,000 Armenians adopted Russian. Georgian thus had made a clear gain since 1897 when only 35,000 non-Georgians had spoken Georgian. In 1926 the group of Georgian-speaking non-Georgians consisted mainly of Armenians (74,000). Turkic was adopted mostly by the smaller Middle Eastern groups (Kurds, Tats, etc.), by nearly half the Greeks, 13,000 Georgians, and 3,000 Armenians. It is worth noting that the number of Georgians who adopted Turkic was five times as large as the number of those who adopted Russian. Similarly, seven and a half times as many Armenians switched to Georgian as to Russian. The Armenians were, in 1926 as in 1897, least loyal to their native language, 6.5 per cent Armenians speaking other languages (compared to 4 per cent in 1897).<sup>13</sup> This information—the most complete ever supplied on the linguistic affinities of the population of the Russian state—suggests that (1) the inhabitants of Transcaucasia continued to show a high degree of loyalty to their native languages, and (2) the tendency of those who, for one reason or another, abandoned their mother tongue was, in the case of Europeans, to adopt Russian, and in case of the natives, to adopt either Turkic or Georgian.

#### *The Inter-Census Period 1926-1939*

After 1926 it becomes increasingly difficult to study population changes in Transcaucasia as ever thicker layers of secrecy hide from the eyes of the foreign observer not only statistical information, but virtually all information of any significance. Between 1926 and 1932 the Soviet government released, intermittently, some figures bearing on the present inquiry, and though most of them are estimates, they are very useful in tracing developments during this period. But after 1932, when the terror of the "second" or Stalinist revolution was gathering momentum,

13. Of the 118,000 Armenians residing in Georgia who could read one or more languages (alone or in various combinations) 80,000 read Armenian, and an almost equal number (47,000 and 50,000 respectively) Georgian and Russian. Among the literate Georgians in the Georgian SSR, totaling 701,000, 527,000 read only Georgian, 170,000 Georgian and Russian, and 3,000 only Russian.

the sources dried up completely. In 1937 there was a second Soviet All-Union census. Its results were apparently so appalling that they were never released, and its compilers thrown into prison as "saboteurs." The census of 1939, only partially released even at this late date, must therefore be treated with some caution. In other words, for the period 1926-1939 our sources of information are highly inadequate. This holds particularly true of problems connected with language and nationality, in part because such information is always difficult to obtain except by a regular census, and in part because the regime is particularly reluctant to release figures on this subject.<sup>14</sup>

How these lacunae hinder the study of our topic will be readily understood when one remembers that between 1926 and 1939 Transcaucasia was exposed to external forces more violent and more profound than any that have faced it since the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. Forced confiscation of all private landed property in the guise of collectivization, partial enslavement of the industrial proletariat, extensive and often indiscriminate arrests, all of which measures accompanied an enormous effort at industrialization—these well-known aspects of Stalinist rule must have had an overwhelming impact on Transcaucasian life in general, and on its demographic and ethnographic structure in particular. Yet all these facts are so poorly documented in published sources that they are known only in a most general way.

Some things, however, are known, and one of them is that the overall population of Transcaucasia increased at a rate that was quite unprecedented even for that fertile area. Between 1926 and 1939 the population of Transcaucasia was reported to have grown from 5,851,000 to 8,110,000 inhabitants, i.e., by 38.6 per cent, more than double the rate of increase for the USSR as a whole. This growth represented an average compounded rate of 2.5 per cent annually. This increase, however, was not evenly spread over the whole of the inter-census period, nor was it entirely due to natural growth.

To begin with, Soviet figures for the early 1930's indicate that the principal increase occurred between 1926 and 1932. During these six years the population increased by an estimated 3 per cent annually. From 1932 to 1939 the rate of growth may be studied on the examples of Armenia and Azerbaijan for which Soviet statistics happen to be available:

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14. The 1939 census, for instance, did not supply data on the ethnic structure of the constituent republics. Only since the death of Stalin has this information been allowed to trickle out in scattered sources, and even then only for the republics which had suffered no excessive losses, or have had relatively little Russian immigration.

*The population of Soviet Armenia, 1926-1939*<sup>15</sup>

1926	880,000	
1931	1,051,000	or 4.0 per cent annual growth
1936	1,187,000	or 2.5 per cent annual growth
1939	1,282,000	or 2.5 per cent annual growth

*The population of Soviet Azerbaijan, 1926-1939*

1926	2,315,000	
1930	2,570,000	or 2.7 per cent annual growth
1932	2,785,000	or 4.0 per cent annual growth
1939	3,210,000	or 2.0 per cent annual growth

Thus in the case of two of the three republics, the annual rate of growth declined appreciably after 1931-1932.

In the second place, the rapid increase of the population, especially between 1926 and 1939, was in large measure due to the mass influx of Russians from other parts of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, lacking full ethnographic data for 1939, we cannot determine the exact number of these migrants; we can only estimate.

Here are the ethnic breakdowns of the three Transcaucasian republics in 1939 as gathered from diverse Soviet sources, and compared with the figures reported for 1926:

*The population of Soviet Armenia in 1926 and 1939*  
(in thousands)<sup>16</sup>

Nationality	1926		1939		Change
Armenians	744	84.7%	1,062	82.8%	-1.9%
Azeri Turks	77	8.7%	131	10.2%	+1.5%
Russians	23	2.6%	56	4.4%	+1.8%
Others	35	4.0%	33	2.6%	-1.4%

*The population of Soviet Azerbaijan in 1926 and 1939*  
(in thousands)<sup>17</sup>

Nationality	1926		1939		Change
Azeri Turks	1,438	63.3%	c.1,900	c.59.4%	-3.9%
Russians	242	10.7%	512	16.0%	+5.3%
Armenians	282	12.4%	384	12.0%	-0.4%
Others	308	13.5%	404	12.6%	-0.9%

15. Before the Revolution and during the period 1920-1926 the population of Armenia had grown at an average annual rate of 2 per cent or slightly less.

16. *Armenianskaia SSR*, 51.

17. *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, article "Azerbaidzhan," gives the number of Azeri Turks in Azerbaijan in 1939 as "over three-fifths of the population." The figure 59.4 per cent is arrived at by deducting the number of Azeri Turks known to live in other republics from that reported for the USSR as a whole. This article reports the Russians in Azerbaijan as 16 per cent, whereas the special volume of the same Encyclopedia, SSSR, (Moscow, 1948) p. 1863, says the Russians accounted for "approximately 10 per cent of the population." The former figure seems closer to the truth.

*The population of Soviet Georgia in 1926 and 1939*  
(in thousands) <sup>18</sup>

Nationality	1926		1939		Change
Georgians	1,788	67.7%	2,210	61.4%	-6.3%
Armenians	307	11.6%	421	11.7%	+0.1%
Russians	111	4.2%	c. 350	9.7%	+5.5%
Azeri Turks	138	5.2%	190	5.3%	+0.1%
Ossetins	113	4.3%	151	4.2%	-0.1%
Others	180	6.8%	278	7.7%	+0.9%

These tables, although not entirely precise, yield some interesting conclusions.

The striking fact is the increase of Russians. The total Russian population of Transcaucasia increased between 1926 and 1939 from 376,000 to approximately 918,000. If we allow that the resident Russian population increased by natural growth less than the Russian population in the whole USSR (which showed a 27.1 per cent growth)—an adjustment which must be made in view of the high degree of urbanization and comparatively old age structure of the Russians in Transcaucasia—we arrive at the approximate figure of 426,000 for the resident Russians in 1939. The remaining 492,000 represent Russians who migrated into Transcaucasia during the inter-census period. It is a high figure, but not remarkably so. In the four republics of Turkestan, (Kirghiz, Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen) the Russian population during the same period increased by approximately 1,300,000, i.e., two and a half times as much; in the Uzbek republic alone there were an estimated 720,000 Russian migrants for a total population of 6,300,000.<sup>19</sup>

The Russians increased most sharply in the Georgian republic, where they more than tripled. The Russian migrants distributed themselves approximately as follows:

in Armenia	30,000
in Azerbaijan	237,000
in Georgia	224,000

The second significant fact is that, except in Georgia, the category of the smaller nationalities declined. This suggests a continuation of the process of assimilation of the smaller nationalities observed in our analysis of the returns of the 1926 census.

The third important conclusion which emerges from these data is

18. *Boľshaja Sovetskaja Entsiklopediia*, Volume SSSR, p. 1853. To the reported 8.7 per cent for Russians, I added an estimated 1 per cent for Ukrainians and Belo-russians.

19. Cf. this author's "Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects," *The Middle East Journal*, IX, No. 3, Summer 1955, pp. 296-297.

that, notwithstanding industrialization and the great movements of population which the first Five Year Plans entailed, the principal native nationalities not only did not scatter, but on the contrary, became territorially even more compact than they had been in 1926. In the case of both the Georgians and Azeri Turks the number of those residing in their respective republics remained unchanged: 98.2 per cent for the former, c. 84 per cent for the latter. The Armenians, however, tended to concentrate further in the Armenian republic, and the proportion of those who resided there increased from 47.4 per cent in 1926 to 49.4 per cent in 1939.

The urban population in Transcaucasia stood in 1939 at 2,593,700, or 32 per cent (Azerbaijan 36.2 per cent, Georgia 30.1 per cent, Armenia 28.6 per cent). This was a fifty per cent increase since 1926. Most of that growth had occurred in the first half of the inter-census period, especially in the years 1930, 1931, and 1932. Thus, for example, the urban population of Azerbaijan increased from 1926 to 1932 by 5.3 per cent and between 1932 and 1939 only by 2.8 per cent. The total numerical gain of the urban population in Transcaucasia was 1,181,000, of which 510,000 in Azerbaijan, 472,000 in Georgia, and 199,000 in Armenia.

These figures acquire added significance when juxtaposed to the figures showing the estimated influx of Russians. If we assume that the population residing in the cities of Transcaucasia in 1926 remained constant throughout the inter-census period, and grew at a rate two-thirds as large as the population of the republic in which it was located, we find that the resident urban population would have increased from 1926 to 1939 by an estimated 365,000; 187,000 in Azerbaijan, 128,000 in Georgia, and 50,000 in Armenia. The new urban population, therefore, was around 816,000. Here is its distribution by republics, and the estimated migrant population:

*Increase in the urban population and in the Russian population  
of Transcaucasia, 1926-1939*

Republic	New urban population	New Russian population	Difference
Azerbaijan	342,000	237,000	105,000
Armenia	149,000	30,000	119,000
Georgia	345,000	224,000	121,000

If the experience of the period 1897-1926 is any indication, then it may be assumed that for all practical purposes the entire Russian immigrant population moved into the cities. Land in Transcaucasia is scarce, much

of the agriculture is of a technical kind for which the migratory Russian lacks skills, and in general the conditions for Russian colonization are not propitious. On the other hand, the development of the petroleum industries, railroads, and the whole administrative as well as technical machinery which the Soviets require, provide inducements for Russian urban settlement. If that assumption is correct, then the national composition of the Transcaucasian cities in 1939 would have looked approximately as follows:

Natives.....	70 per cent
Russians .....	30 per cent

These figures indicate a considerable growth of the proportion of Russians in the urban population, for they constituted 22 per cent of the urban population in 1897, and 19 per cent in 1926. A comparison of the rate of urbanization of Russians and natives indicates that the Russians were urbanizing more rapidly.

We lack data to analyze the relative fertility of the principal national groups, but the rate of population growth over the whole period suggests that the Armenians outstripped the Azeri Turks in fertility, the Georgians continuing to occupy third place. The rate of increase was 59.0 per cent for the Armenians, 33.2 per cent for the Azeri Turks, and 18.4 per cent for the Georgians.

There are reasons to suppose that the Georgians continued to adapt themselves to the changes wrought by the Soviet régime better than their neighbors. The main reason for this adaptability was the nature of the Georgian élite. Whereas among the Armenians the élite was middle-class in origin, and among the Azeri Turks it consisted largely of well-to-do landlords—both classes actively persecuted and eventually destroyed by the Bolsheviks—the Georgian élite was an intelligentsia. Of all social classes in Russia, the intelligentsia had the best chances of survival. Relying on technical and administrative skills the Georgian intelligentsia, even when "contaminated" by nationalist and Menshevik ideals, could somehow fit into the Soviet system. The intellectuals were at worst persecuted as political foes, whereas the Armenian and Azeri Turks leaders were persecuted as political *and* social foes.<sup>20</sup> The other factor which helped the Georgians weather the storm was the fact that Stalin and Beria were Georgians. It may be open to doubt whether Stalin or

20. Georgia was traditionally top-heavy with an intelligentsia. In 1941, for instance, it had more specialists with a higher education than Armenia and Azerbaijan put together, and it was consistently in first place in the number of all other kinds of specialists and students of all ages. All through the Soviet period Georgia was and continues to be the best educated republic in the entire country. The high level of education is not proportionate to the relatively low level of Georgia's economic development, and therefore causes social ferment well-known from other colonial and ex-colonial areas.



Beria really intended to accord the Georgians a privileged status in Soviet society; but it is undeniable that many of the other nationalities thought they did, and, unwilling to expose themselves to unnecessary risks of punishment, gladly accorded the Georgians hegemony, a status which the Georgians eagerly acknowledged. In a society such as the Soviet, where so much of public life revolves around personal relations and is determined by subtle changes in the climate of opinion prevailing in the government, this psychological superiority of the Georgians was of immense importance to their capacity for survival. Georgian national feeling, intense to begin with, was further intensified by the influx of Russians in the 1930's. This influx, which brought to Georgia an estimated 224,000 Russians and tripled the number of Russians residing in the Georgian republic, was without precedent in the history of that area. Even in the best circumstances the sudden accretion of a foreign population by such numbers and in so short a time is bound to produce ill-will and social unrest. In the Soviet Union such effects are more keenly felt than elsewhere because of the acute housing shortage. There has been little construction in Tiflis, and the housing space available per capita has been declining steadily since 1926, which means that the influx of Russians caused very real hardships for the native population.

All these considerations help explain why the Georgians were best able to meet the challenge of the 1930's. Their unspectacular but steady population growth contrasts vividly with the uneven demographic evolution of their two neighbors.

The Armenians were saved by two factors from the complete destruction which faced them in consequence of Turkish and Communist persecutions. One of them was the fact that they had a relatively large urban population. In view of the privileged position which the urban inhabitants enjoy in the Soviet system *vis-à-vis* the rural inhabitants, the Armenians acquired a proportionately greater share of the political and social benefits than the less urbanized Azeri Turks. The second advantage was that of the three Transcaucasian groups the Armenians were least anti-Russian. The Communist regime, distrusting the nationalism of the Georgians and Azeri Turks, tended to rely on the Armenians, much as the Tsarist regime used to do on occasion.

Of all the national groups, the Azeri Turks lost most social and political status under the new regime. They were most heavily agricultural and had the smallest intelligentsia, which meant that they were least able to adapt themselves to the new conditions, and were most burdened with obligations. In urbanization as well as fertility they were gradually

slipping behind the Georgians and Armenians, respectively. Their national élite, small to begin with, vanished early in the Soviet period, leaving them virtually without a voice in the political cliques by whom the fate of the region was being decided.

There is evidence that in the period 1926-1939 the conflict between the Azeri Turks and Armenians lost much of its previous intensity. This conflict originally had three causes: religious (the clash between Muslims and Christians), national (the antagonism between Turk and Armenian in the Ottoman Empire), and social (the dislike of a peasant and unskilled laborer for the middle class). The religious conflict subsided in consequence of the fact that the Communist régime removed religion altogether from the sphere of public life. The national conflict lost its *raison d'être* with the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. And the social conflict was reduced by the elimination of all private enterprises in business as well as land.

This is not to say, however, that national antagonism disappeared altogether from Transcaucasia. Rather, it shifted. The old conflict between Turks and Armenians seems to have been replaced by a new conflict between the Georgians with their subgroups (Adjars, Abkhaz, and possibly Ossetins), and the other nationalities. This new conflict has been caused by the privileged position which the Georgians, because of the factors enumerated above, were able to enjoy under Stalin. The national animosities still had a socio-economic foundation: but now the struggle was for the benefits which could be gained only by securing a hold on the apparatus of the state. Economic benefits were, therefore, gained on a bureaucratic level: precisely where the Georgians and Russians enjoyed the greatest advantages. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the lines of conflict were drawn as follows: the Russians and Armenians united in their anti-Georgian sentiment, and the Azeri Turks on the side, hostile to all, especially to the Georgians and Russians as the two most privileged groups.

#### *The Period 1939-1956*

For this period there are no population statistics, except for three figures released in 1956 which reported the estimated total population of each of the three republics.

The striking fact about these figures is the sharp decline in the rate of growth. If the population of Transcaucasia had grown between 1939 and 1956 at the same rate as between 1926 and 1939, it would have increased to 11,000,000. Actually, it increased only to 9,000,000. From this we infer that (1) there was a considerable decline in fertility, and

(2) there was little or no migration from other parts of the country.<sup>21</sup> The annual rate of growth for Transcaucasia as a whole dropped from an average of  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent (1932-1939) to 0.6 per cent.

Armenia, which grew from 1,200,000 to 1,600,000 showed the most significant rate of growth; apart from foreign immigrants, its population increased by 15.4 per cent. Georgia ranked next in the rate of growth, with 11.1 per cent, and Azerbaijan last with 6.2 per cent. The Azeri Turks, therefore, continued to show further symptoms of a demographic decline, the first signs of which were already visible in the censuses of 1926 and 1939. The Georgians, on the other hand, notwithstanding their comparatively low fertility, kept on forging steadily ahead.

Barring unknown major population shifts between 1939 and 1956, the ethnic structure of Transcaucasia at the present time should look approximately as follows:

Georgians	—2.6 million
Armenians	—2.1 million
Azeri Turks	—2.3 million
Russians	—1.2 million
Others	—0.8 million

If these estimates are correct, only the Georgians and Armenians would have experienced any significant natural increase since 1939, with approximately 400,000 births exceeding deaths (to which must be added 100,000 immigrants for the Armenians). The Azeri Turks and Russians probably showed a less significant increase of 100-200,000 each.

The failure of Transcaucasia to grow demographically at anything like its traditionally high rate is even more significant when one bears in mind that this area was never occupied by the enemy in World War II, and thus escaped the horrors which had decimated the population in the Western regions of the Soviet Union. The dramatic decline of the rate of growth, therefore, cannot be directly related to the war, and must have occurred in consequence of inner developments, the nature of which is presently unknown.

One of the factors which may account for the decline in the rate of growth of the population may have been the relative decline of the importance of Transcaucasia in the economy of the Soviet Union. This latter process may be traced in various ways. One is to study the indices showing the rate of increase of the gross national output (*valovaia produktsiia*) between 1940 and 1950, which in Georgia and Azerbaijan has been slower than that of the whole USSR. The other is to compare

21. An exception to the second of these statements are the 100,000 Armenians reported to have migrated to Soviet Armenia immediately after World War II.

the figures showing the share of the USSR local budgets allotted to the Transcaucasian republics: it was in 1933, 12 per cent; in 1937, 11 per cent; in 1953, 5.6 per cent and in 1957, 4.4 per cent. An important reason for this decline, especially after World War II, was the shift of much of the oil industry from Transcaucasia to the Urals and Central Asia. It is perfectly possible that the Russian population in Transcaucasia, especially in Azerbaijan, actually declined as Russian technical personnel was moved to the new oil-producing areas. In that event the growth of the Azeri Turkic population would have been somewhat bigger than the estimate above suggests. There certainly can be no doubt that the strategic vulnerability of Transcaucasia has impelled the Soviet regime after 1945 to reduce its investments in that area, and that this reduction has had some effect on the population figures.

### *Conclusions*

The graph showing the population growth in Transcaucasia over the past sixty years has the shape of a curve which rises until 1932 (except for the decade 1914-1924, the losses of which were made up in the years 1924-1932), and then declines, at first gradually, and later precipitously. The annual rate of growth, which was 1.7 per cent before the First World War, rose to 3.0 per cent between 1926 and 1932, then declined to 2.4 per cent (1933-1939), and then further to 0.6 per cent (1939-1956). This decline was in part due to declining fertility brought about by the general "modernization" of society (urbanization, ageing, etc.), by the terror as well as by the uncertainties of life under the Soviet regime, and in part by the relative economic decline of Transcaucasia since World War II, which, among other things, put a stop to Russian immigration and perhaps even caused some Russians to depart.

The various nationalities inhabiting Transcaucasia adapted themselves with varying degrees of success to the changes which time has brought. In general, the Georgians seem to have done best. They owe their success to several favorable circumstances: the nature of their élite, the high cultural level of the population, the territorial compactness of their inhabitants, the large proportion of young people, and the favorite position which they enjoyed under Stalin and Beria. Demographically and culturally they have proven themselves over the past sixty years to be the most consistently dynamic nationality in Transcaucasia.

The Armenians have been somewhat less fortunate than the Georgians. They had suffered enormous losses during and after World War I, losses which they made good in remarkably short time owing to their extraordinary fertility, but which nevertheless left deep scars on their overall demographic structure. Culturally, they have demonstrated the

least cohesion, and in Georgia especially (where nearly one-fourth of all the Transcaucasian Armenians reside) they have shown themselves very susceptible to alien influences. What has helped the Armenians weather the storms of the past four decades has been their high fertility and relatively high urbanization.

The Azeri Turks have fared worst of the three principal indigenous nationalities. In 1897 the most numerous as well as the most fertile group in Transcaucasia, throughout the past sixty years they have been steadily falling behind their neighbors in all those respects which make for demographic growth. Their overall increase has been the smallest, and they have fallen behind in urbanization as well as fertility. The relative decline of this nationality must be attributed mainly to its low cultural standards, and to its social structure: the Azeri peasantry suffered probably more heavily than the less independent and proportionately less numerous Georgian and Armenian peasantry in the period of collectivization. The decline of the Azeri Turks must be viewed as part of the general process of decline of the Turkic population of the Soviet Union.

Of the other national groups, Russians excepted, the following general rule holds true: they tend to identify themselves with those major national groups which are closest to them in religion, language, and other cultural respects. This means that the European minorities fuse with the Russians, and the other either with the Georgians (if they are Christian) or with the Azeri Turks (if they are Muslim). For this reason they are not dynamic, and have been shrinking.

The Russian inhabitants do not seem to have gained a firm foothold in Transcaucasia. The large-scale influx of Russians occurred twice: at the end of the nineteenth century, and in the early 1930's. Corresponding to this inflow there were two outflows: in the period of war and revolution a part of the Russian population left for Russia proper, and it is likely that a similar exodus has been taking place since the end of World War II. The reason for this is that the Russian population in this part of the country is primarily urban, and therefore very sensitive to political and economic fluctuations. Only in those areas where they settled *en masse* on the land (e.g., Volga-Ural region, Kazakhstan, the Crimea) have the Russians been able to secure a solid hold on the territory and its population.

It thus appears that demographically Transcaucasia is within a Georgian "sphere of influence." The decline in Georgian political prestige since 1953, and the relative economic decline of Transcaucasia during the past 13 years have acted as powerful irritants stimulating Georgian nationalisms which on occasions (e.g., spring of 1956) assumes violent forms.



# THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN SYRIA

*A. Aziz Allouni*

**S**YRIA, a young nation, has already started a process of organization of labor which should, in coming years, produce an economy whereby the education of the laborer, either industrial worker or farmer, will provide the basis for development of the country on lines of the general social good. Serious problems have to be faced: modern industry was established in Syria only in recent years and the country's teachers have not yet had time to bring into being a large body of workers trained in mechanical skills.

Aside from personnel shortcomings in the technical ranks, Syrian labor is experiencing a change in the traditional relationships between employer and employee. Until comparatively recently the authority of the master was unquestioningly accepted by his workers; in return the laborer or artisan was assured the protection of his employer. As a result the relationship between master and man was a highly personal one and, since the majority of enterprises were small family affairs, reciprocal responsibilities were naturally reinforced by kin ties.

In Syria, as elsewhere, technological progress outsped social change and it was not surprising to see, at first, attempts made to accommodate (with only the minimum of concession to changing demands) the "pre-industrial" patterns into the de-personalized atmosphere of the large concern with hundreds of employees. Such attempts were bound to fail and, from the resultant uncertainties and frustrations, the organization of labor in Syria began to achieve direction and articulateness.

It is estimated that, of Syria's total population of just under four million, over two and a half million are a settled farm population. Another million are townsmen, from among whom the nucleus of the industrial labor force is being drawn, (of these 400,000 live in Damascus and a slightly greater number in Aleppo) while some 300,000 are nomadic or semi-nomadic. Though the drift of population from village to town is marked, very few of the villagers who arrive in the cities possess any mechanical skills; a good proportion are lacking in natural adaptability to industrial life, so that it may be assumed that for some time to come, at least, the backbone of the skilled industrial labor force will be provided by townsmen.

◆ A. AZIZ ALLOUNI is Counselor of the Embassy of the United Arab Republic in Washington. Mr. Allouni is a graduate of the American University of Beirut and has done graduate work at Cornell University and at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of New York. The labor legislation described in the article was passed before the union of Syria and Egypt, but remains in effect at the time of writing. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.



As to geographical distribution, the bulk of the industrial labor force is to be found in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Latakia. This spread applies also to professional workers and therefore it may be stated that practically all the skills of the country are concentrated in these five leading cities.

Although the achievement of independence gave additional impetus to the incipient Syrian labor movement, many thinking Syrians had for a long time understood the motivation and aspirations of labor leaders in the industrialized countries of Western Europe and in the United States. True, the industrial revolutions undergone in Britain, France and Germany passed Syria by; the Ottoman Empire, moribund and sluggish itself, by its very nature discouraged the peoples of its tenuously-held territories from organizing for economic and social reform. Thus the origins of the Syrian labor movement and similar movements in other Arab countries may be traced, at the very earliest, to the end of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. Prior to the collapse of the Ottoman regime labor in Syria was organized on some sort of guild system, in its essentials not unlike that practiced in Europe in the later Middle Ages. These controlling organisms, referred to as "Guild Associations," banded together laborers, skilled workmen, and employers engaging in the same occupations.<sup>1</sup> The chief of each guild enjoyed wide powers in the management of the affairs of the trade or craft specialty, regulating disputes, drawing up working codes, and exercising a general supervision of the development of the trade by awarding certificates of proficiency to apprentices when they had mastered the skills required of trained employees or master-men.

After 1918 this system started to disintegrate as the industrial age was ushered in. Mechanization began to take place in some industries, notably that of textiles, where hitherto the hand tools of the worker had sufficed. The small family shop, usually comprising the master, his sons, sometimes a small assortment of relations, was unable to compete for long with enterprises in which larger numbers of workers were employed, and where mechanization reduced costs and hours of work. The number of larger businesses grew and, in 1925, the workers, feeling the need of some sort of protection mechanism to replace the now defunct guilds, banded together into labor unions. "The National Union of Laborers of the Textile and Knitting Industries" was the pioneer group. This was shortly followed by the inauguration of a union for employees in the printing trade.

In spite of these advances the rapid growth of a labor movement was impeded by the obstructive and unimaginative provisions of a legislative decree of 1935,<sup>2</sup> which, while it completely superseded the old Ottoman

1. *Syria*, Vol. III, Government Printing Office, Damascus, 1957, p. 155.

2. Legislative Decree No. 152, issued on September 18, 1935, repealed the "Ottoman Law of Trades."

Law of Trades (which had lingered on in some areas) placed too many government restrictions on union functions. At the same time the economy of Syria, tied to that of the Mandatory power, France, was adversely affected by the weakening of the French franc, and Syrian workers became restless in regard to wages and conditions of employment. The delegates of the leading trade unions thereupon convened a conference, the outcome of which was a demand for:

1. The promulgation of a labor law.
2. The prohibition of employment of young persons.
3. Fixed hours of daily work, with a maximum of eight working hours daily.
4. A solution to the problems caused by rising living costs and the devaluation of the franc.
5. The establishment of an arbitration committee to settle labor disputes.<sup>3</sup>

The uncertainty of the political situation caused a delay in the plans of union organizers. Their demands did, however, reach parliament and although nothing was done immediately the occasion was significant in that the needs of organized labor became for the first time a factor in the consideration of Syrian politicians.

On January 18, 1939, the workers' efforts to form their own independent unions were realized when a government decision was issued specifying the occupations and professions that could form unions. Shortly thereafter the list was expanded and a Federation of Unions assumed a coordinating role.

Hopes for a further development of organized labor were cut short when, with the outbreak of World War II, the authorities prohibited all meetings and conferences. The federation of unions thereupon authorized its Secretary-General to follow up the efforts aimed at the realization of the unified demands of the workers. Legislative Decree No. 276 A.S., passed on July 11, 1942, gave dismissed workmen the right to claim an indemnity at the rate of one month's wages for each of the last three years of service and a half-month's wages for each prior year. Another Legislative Decree, No. 268 A.S. of November 7, 1942, regulated the fixing of wages and provided for the setting-up of rate-fixing boards, one in the northern part of the country and another in the south.<sup>4</sup>

Subsequent efforts during World War II led to little improvement in the situation of organized labor, although in 1943 two legislative decrees were published which paved the way to the later promulgation of the

3. *Syria*, Vol. III, p. 157.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 158-159.

Labor Code. The first of these<sup>5</sup> related to indemnities payable for dismissal, indemnities in lieu of notice and to the widow in case of death, and outlined provisions for the computation of these payments. In regard to indemnities for dismissal or termination of services the French Delegate General issued a decree, No. 104 F.C., on March 3, 1943, which provided for compensation in cases of industrial accidents.

The second decree<sup>6</sup> provided for the establishment of private employment bonuses and the regulation of the activities of such offices. Two years later Faris al-Khuri, then Syrian Minister of National Economy, presented to the Chamber of Deputies a draft bill on labor rights, but any action which might have been taken was held up by the hostilities in Damascus between the Syrians and the occupying power. It was not, therefore, until after the termination of the French Mandate that the Syrian labor Code, as it exists today, was given any effective consideration. At a general meeting of workingmen in May 1946 the Syrian Minister of National Economy, Mr. Khalid al-'Azm, gave assurance that he would do all he could to put through the draft legislation, and on the 29th of that month the Code was passed by the Chamber and was promulgated as Law No. 279, on June 11, 1946.

### *The Syrian Labor Code*

The Syrian Labor Code outlines in its preamble technical definitions concerning the formation, management and organization of trade unions, and encourages the formation of federations and affiliates of such unions. Special bodies were set up to arbitrate in individual and collective disputes arising from employment contracts. The daily hours of work in the various trades were fixed; holidays and sick leave were regulated. Industrial accidents and diseases were defined and provision was made for the granting of adequate compensation to workmen injured in such accidents or contracting such diseases in the course of their employment. The Code also provided for the setting up of a Directorate of Labor and Social Welfare to supervise the enforcement of these provisions.<sup>7</sup>

These were radical and sweeping provisions. Hitherto, as in most countries where craft and industrial undertakings were largely family affairs, the head of the business, or perhaps the chief of the guild embracing a number of small family businesses, was a person of considerable power and authority in his restricted community. This had been the pattern for generations and it could hardly be expected that things would change overnight. The workman, the laborer, the apprentice, did not see his hard lot as the result of oppression, nor was it, for many of the old master-

5. Legislative Decree No. 137 of July 21, 1943, made retroactive to November 18, 1942.

6. Legislative Decree No. 48 of July 10, 1943.

7. *Syria*, Vol. III, p. 160.

craftsmen were the kindest of men; employees did not resent the long hours of work, for their forefathers had labored thus for many generations and, like their forebears they were above all things stubbornly traditionalist. They took their subsistence-level existence as one of the manifestations of the Divine Will. As Sayigh so aptly points out:

"In the Arab Middle East the stock of scientific and technical knowledge is low . . . Education, though gaining in depth and in spread, still falls very short of Western standards. The philosophy of surrender to the will of God which Islam, the predominant religion, injects into the life and orientation of the people, has generally been taken also to mean surrender to all forces not understood by man. It has thus imparted some passivity and contentment and has created an attitude which is not highly critical and speculative . . . traditionalism or instinctiveness in behavior, rather than rationality of action, predominates.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, it is not surprising that, at first, apart from the few who had conceived and were helping to carry through Syria's industrial revolution, the conservatism of the workers themselves was one of the main causes of the slow progress of the industrial movement.

#### *Application of the Labor Code*

In order to overcome this conservatism and to make both employers and workmen understand their rights under the new code, a Labor Inspectorate was established and the Ministry of National Economy circularized factories, handicraft workshops and other industrial and commercial undertakings, asking that all proprietors should order their relations with their employees on the basis of the principles laid down in the Code. Ever since the inception of the Code the government's Directorate of Labor and Social Welfare has been active in promoting the formation of trade unions, protecting wages, settling disputes and combating unemployment. Cooperation between the government and the unions has, on the whole, proceeded satisfactorily, the unions on their part keeping records—a practice almost unheard of even as recently as the beginning of World War II—and the government, instead of standing aside, taking an active interest in union affairs.

In this latter respect a great step forward was taken in 1952<sup>9</sup> when it was determined that state assistance could be procured for labor funds established to help workmen in cases of industrial accidents and diseases; other monies were made available for the teaching of illiterates, for vocational training, the building of social centers, subsidized pharmacies and low-cost housing. At the end of 1952<sup>10</sup> the Ministry of National Econ-

8. Sayigh, Yusuf A., *Toward a Theory of Entrepreneurship for the Arab East*, Harvard University Research Center in Entrepreneurial History, April, 1954.

9. Legislative Decree No. 15 of February 2, 1952.

10. Legislative Decree No. 138 of November 6, 1952.

omy was empowered to issue decisions concerning the fixing of weekly holidays, working hours, opening and closing hours, illicit competition and the allocation of funds for social assistance in trade unions. Thus, by the end of 1952, the Labor Code carried specific provisions regarding all the aims set forth in the Syrian Constitution.

### *Wages*

Wages, formerly determined by employers in their capacity as members of the old guilds, were entirely dependent on supply and demand. If the employer ran upon hard times, his workmen starved. The principle of minimum wages in industry, which appears in Article 126 of the Labor Code, lays down that wage-fixing boards, consisting of representatives of government, employers and workers, shall meet twice a year. After a consideration of prices and general conditions within any given trade or trades, these boards, subject to the approval of the Ministry of National Economy, fix wages for the coming six months, taking into account Article 127 of the Code which stipulates that all wages shall be fixed at a level which will enable the employee to meet the costs of the essential needs of himself and his family. After these wage levels are approved, they become statutory and enforceable, and if an employer is found to be paying less than the minimum wage to any of his workers, he is liable to prosecution, while the worker, or workers concerned, may claim the balance through the courts.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the comparative study of wages in the several Muhafazat, or Districts, in Syria:

1. The manual and mechanical trades of Damascus and Aleppo are the most important in Syria's groups of trades, followed by blacksmithery and carpentry. The tobacco industry is found mainly in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia, while Homs specializes in making the *Hatta* (Bedouin headgear) and Aleppo in carpet-making.

2. Workers in the same trade earn approximately the same wages in all the Syrian districts. Thus the minimum wage of 400 to 500 Syrian piasters in a textile factory in Damascus is also paid in textile factories in Homs and Aleppo. A butcher's assistant gets 225-250 Syrian piasters per day in Damascus; in Aleppo 250 per day and in Latakia 225 per day.

3. Women are generally paid less than men in the same trade or industry. The Wage Fixing Boards, however, are exerting great influence in the direction of equal pay for the same work regardless of sex inasmuch as Syria voted in support of this principle in the International Labor Conference held in Geneva in June, 1951.

Although cash wages rose as much as eight times in some occupations during World War II, wages in real terms may have fallen below the 1939



level because of concomitant rises in prices.<sup>11</sup> A further drop in purchasing power may have occurred after 1948, when the 85,000 Palestine refugees who came to Syria entered the job market. Since many of these Palestinians were skilled and yet were willing to work for the bare minimum, unemployment resulted and wages tended to become stationary in the face of continuously rising prices. Today, with the rapid expansion of industry and agriculture, the situation is considerably improved.

The wages of the agricultural workers are about half those of the industrial worker. Apart from the sharecropper whose income varies with the size and value of his harvest, there are two main categories of agricultural workers; the daily worker, employed on a casual basis, who can earn between two and three Syrian pounds daily during peak periods, and the year-round worker, who, though he may make less than £500 a year, supplements his income in terms of food and lodging to the value of, say, an additional £200 a year.

While agricultural wages are often paid at least partly in kind, such is not the case in industry. There is as yet no provision for family allowances, though some of the larger companies provide allowances and give old age pensions to retiring employees, thus voluntarily exceeding the legal requirements. Some also furnish medical care and free transportation to and from work. In the most modern factories working conditions are favorable compared even with western standards—some have air conditioning—but in the smaller and older establishments conditions remain poor. In many, there are indications that regulations are evaded or ignored; there is, furthermore, evidence that government scrutiny is not as sharp as it might be. The most important dereliction concerns, as a rule, hours of work.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, the life of a craft apprentice can no longer be the round of drudgery that it once was. It is nevertheless toilsome and exacting. Beginning usually at the age of 15, the apprentice must first serve three months' probation without pay; for a year his salary is one-third that paid to skilled workers, the proportion rising to one-half, two-thirds, and four-fifths in the second, third and fourth years of service. At the

11. The retail prices in Damascus of 22 essential commodities rose from 100 in 1938 to 821 in 1945.

12. These are: A 48-hour week which may be raised to 60 in exceptional cases and where work is not continuous. Overtime to be paid at single time and a quarter. At least 7 official holidays yearly. Sick leave at the rate of fifteen days a year, with fifteen additional days at half pay and up to five months without pay. In case of dismissal, salary earners are entitled to one month's pay for each year of service, and daily wage-earners to one month's pay for the first three years of service and half a month's pay for every subsequent year. Women are prohibited from doing night work; they are granted 30 days maternity leave at half pay if they have more than one year's service, and at full pay if they have more than three years' service. The minimum age for employment is, theoretically, thirteen; for all persons under 17 parental consent is required before they may begin work. Maximum hours for minors are six a day, and an hour's rest after four hours of work. Night work is prohibited for persons under fourteen years of age.



beginning of his fifth year the apprentice, providing his work has been up to standard, joins the ranks of the skilled craftsmen and is given full pay.

### *The Industrial Labor Force*

The majority of the Syrian industrial labor force consists of men. A small though increasing number of women are employed, mainly in the textile, clothing and match industries, and in the processing of tobacco. Receiving lower wages than men, most women in industry are under twenty years of age. Muslim Syrians, the vast majority, are found in each and every industry and type of commercial undertaking, and the aversion to manual work on the part of the educated urban element (a widespread characteristic in the Arab world) is breaking down. There is some degree of occupational specialization among the religious and ethnic minority. The Christians, for example, having a tradition of better education and being a largely urbanized group, have tended to be found in the professional and white collar categories. This predominance, however, is being offset by a general rise in the educational level. Many of the Armenians are skilled artisans and tradesmen; the Circassians (a small minority of 25,000 concentrated mainly around al-Qunaytra, southwest of Damascus) enjoy a reputation as smiths and masons.

There is a fair amount of migration from the countryside to the cities. Some of this is permanent migration, much of it is seasonal—from country to town in winter and from town to country in summer when there is abundant and comparatively well-paid work available in the harvesting of cotton and grain. Consequently, a sharp increase in absenteeism has been noticed in summer in certain industries; in textile factories it has at times reached 15 per cent (as against an average of five per cent during the rest of the year).

These movements are tending to slacken as the migrants are coming to understand the meaning of the incentives to long-term employment offered under the labor code. Yet it is unlikely that the practice will cease altogether for a long time, since among the temporary workers are usually some who are only a generation or so removed from nomadic existence and who, as recently sedentarized bedouin, still feel the urge to keep on the move. Charles Issawi estimates that in recent years some twenty per cent of the nomads have settled into village agricultural communities.<sup>13</sup>

In spite of recent progress in vocational education the bulk of Syria's

13. Patai, Raphael (ed.), *Syria*, New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956, p. 552.

industrial labor force of some 120,000 is still unskilled.<sup>14</sup> Direct factory experience has helped a lot in the process of developing skilled labor, but the need for technicians is still very pressing. Other limiting factors are low productivity, due in some degree to slowness in adjusting to the efficiency needs of mechanization, and social conditions such as poor health, congested living conditions, and inadequate diet. Remedial measures as yet reach only a small proportion of the workers. To these deterrents to output must be added illiteracy, absenteeism, and, regrettably, the practice of some employers of dismissing apprentices just before the completion of the period at which they would become entitled to full pay.

Two aspects of the problem usually not given adequate recognition by the critics are that many workers, newcomers to the industrial system, are bewildered and frustrated by the requirements of factory discipline, and that most managers whose experience hitherto has probably been mercantile, are equally new to the special conditions of industrial management. Problems similar to those of Syria are experienced in varying degrees in all the countries of the Middle East faced with developing an industrial sector of the economy; the situation is perhaps more acute in Jordan and Iraq than it is in Syria, and even in Egypt, with a higher degree of industrialization, the same obstacles are present, though to a lesser extent.

### *The Settlement of Disputes*

Three types of organization cooperate in the settlement of labor disputes; the Joint Guild Boards, the Higher Arbitration Board, and the Wage Fixing Boards. The formulators of the Syrian Labor Code paid particular attention to the machinery for the ironing out of labor problems. The Joint Guild Boards are the first recourse and they are set up with special powers for the quick institution of inquiries and for settlement before tension between the disputants reaches strike proportions. These bodies usually comprise six members, three from employers or management and three representing the workers, the latter being nominated by the trade union concerned for periods of two years. The methods adopted are conciliation and arbitration, whether the dispute is individual or collective. If a dispute arises in a trade where no Joint Guild Board has been set up, the Wage Fixing Board operating in the area can act in its place. Compulsory arbitration is resorted to only when a dispute arises of such magnitude that the workers call a strike; in such a situation the Labor Code requires workers not to put the strike motion into effect, and employers are not permitted to dismiss the strikers until the dispute has been referred to the Joint Guild Board which must

14. In 1956 Syria had 16 vocational schools with 3000 students.

give a decision within eight days. Since their establishment in 1947 the Joint Guild Boards have settled over 200 cases referred to them, most of which were by unanimous agreement among the board members.<sup>15</sup>

Above the Joint Guild Boards and the Wage Fixing Boards is the Higher Arbitration Board, an appellate authority composed of government and trade representatives and presided over by a judge of the Court of Cassation (the highest appellate court). The duties of the Higher Arbitration Board are confined to the reconsideration of the merits of disputes in which the decisions of the lower boards are felt by the parties involved not to be satisfactory. Its decisions are final and are not subject to appeal.<sup>16</sup> In order to prevent the Higher Arbitration Board from being overloaded with cases, certain provisions are made under which the decisions of the lower boards may not be subject to appeal.<sup>17</sup> As a result, since its inception in 1947 the Higher Arbitration Board has only had to consider the most serious and difficult cases.

### *The Organization of Manpower*

The Syrian Directorate General of Labor and Social Welfare has drawn up plans for the organization of manpower and the combating of unemployment.

Unemployment is not high . . . There is, however, much underemployment in both the country and the towns. Both unemployment and underemployment affect mainly unskilled labor; skilled workers find it easy to obtain jobs. The experience of World War II shows that it is relatively easy to expand the unskilled labor force, but the supply of skilled labor remains very short. Neither government nor trade union policies act in a restrictive way on labor supply.<sup>18</sup>

Political uncertainties have not as yet had any profound effects on employment, nor has unemployment been a burning issue in party politics, but in order to alleviate any employment crisis should the necessity arise, the following principal policies, to be implemented in stages, have been devised:

1. The establishment of a network of labor exchanges to register available jobs and assist in finding workmen to fill them.
2. The holding of a census of workers in the various trades and professions in order to arrange for the shifting of unemployed workers into trades in which they are more needed.

16. See articles 75 and 76 of the Syrian Labor Code (Law No. 279 of 11 June 1946).

15. *Syria*, Vol. III, p. 169.

17. These are: 1) decisions of Joint Guild Boards given by a majority vote of the members, of whom at least two were representatives of each of the employers and the employees; 2) decisions of arbitrators if the arbitration agreement provides that such a decision be final; 3) decisions of Wage Fixing Boards when acting for Joint Guild Boards.

18. Patai, *op. cit.*, p. 554.

3. The inauguration of industrial training courses and the drawing up of programs for government trade schools.

4. The direction of labor to districts with greater agricultural and industrial responsibilities, and the provision of short-term and seasonal loans to help workers settle in such districts.

5. The control of emigration of Syrian workers to foreign countries in order to guard against possible shortages of labor in some industries in Syria.

6. The protection of Syrian workers against the competition of foreign labor and provision for the relief of the unemployed, probably through some form of unemployment scheme.

#### *Syria and the International Labor Organization*

Syria joined the International Labor Organization in December 1947 and a Syrian delegation attended the regional labor conference held at Istanbul in the same year. In 1948 Syria participated in the San Francisco Labor Conference and agreed to the international convention prohibiting the employment of women on night shifts. Moreover, the Syrian government has participated in all the conferences which are regularly held at the permanent offices of the I.L.O. in Geneva.

The Syrian Directorate of Labor and Social Welfare has made use of the United Nations technical assistance program for the training of officers in matters concerning labor affairs, such as the organization of manpower, the employment of foreign labor, trade unions, labor inspections, and the settlement of disputes.

#### *Trade Unions*

At the end of 1955 some 250 trade unions were registered in Syria with something over 28,000 members altogether. Industrial unions, defined as those concerned with industries manufacturing by the use of mechanical power, numbered 48 in 1954 and had a strength of 8,000 members. Of the non-agriculturally employed persons in Syria, less than one in four is a union member.

The textile industry, with 14 affiliated unions is Syria's most highly unionized industry; it is followed in this respect by the petroleum industry, the tobacco industry, the electrical industry, and the mechanical industries. Union membership is highest in enterprises where the factories are large; this is most probably because the bigger concerns abide strictly by the labor code and encourage workers to unionize by providing for the automatic deduction of union dues from wages and by contributing to union funds.

The Syrian Labor Code provides for three types of federations of unions; district federations, federations of several districts, and a gen-

eral federation of all districts. Over half the unions belong to a district or regional federation; slightly less than half are members of the General Federation. The unions in Syria are controlled by a representative board elected annually and responsible for the conduct of day-to-day matters, finances, and the drafting of an annual general report for the Ministry of National Economy. The unions organize classes for their members, maintain libraries, and operate sick and unemployment funds. Some 15,000 workers belong to these funds, the income for which is provided by special membership fees, the allocation of up to 40 per cent of the gross income of the union, and by various grants.<sup>19</sup>

Syndicates of employers look after managerial interests and their concentration in large cities and the kin and social ties which they share reinforce the formal cohesion supplied by the syndicates. Craftsmen employers whose small shops now produce mainly for the luxury trades are also formally organized, as are such trade groups, largely of self employed persons, as butchers and barbers.

### *Attitudes*

The Syrian labor movement is too new for the attitudes and reactions of the workers to have assumed the predictability found in countries with a hundred years or more of labor movement tradition. Thus the workmen and their leaders, though allowed to bargain, are not yet fully aware of the power potential which the bargaining process and the threatened strike give them. Strikes in organized labor in Syria have been rare and poorly staged; lack of strike funds has made them of short duration. A good example of this is the month-long strike of textile workers in 1954, when the main demands of the strikers' committees were limited to obtaining the enforcement of the minimum wage of £2.75 daily (the management was undercutting this by as much as 11 to 45 per cent), and the right to join unions. (Employees who joined unions were being dismissed.)

The greatest champion of the Syrian workers since 1945 has been the government, which has shown great sympathy with the aspirations of labor and which has tried both by legislation and as an independent conciliating party in industrial disputes to smooth the path of the labor movement. Experience has shown that the employers are still strong enough to challenge the labor movement, though not to the same degree in Syria and Egypt as has been possible in other Middle Eastern countries.

19. For example, in Damascus, out of a total income of £554,000 in 1953, 30% was contributed by the government, 63% by labor and 7% represented the balance carried over from the previous year. The distribution of the funds showed as much as 60% going to sickness relief, and the remainder for accidents and old age contributions. The funds have also made arrangements with doctors and pharmacists for the provision of services at reduced rates. Patai, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

The protective attitude of the government, dedicated as it is to its policy of industrialization of the country to a degree compatible with the maintenance of an agricultural-industrial economic balance, therefore justified itself. No political party since the achievement of independence may be exclusively labeled the party of labor; the fact that devotion is to politicians as persons and leaders rather than to ideologies precludes this. Thus the labor movement has never been made a political football. Neither have any of labor's leaders been strong political personalities identifiable with any specific group, though there have been the inevitable communist attempts to infiltrate the labor movement.

Concerning general worker attitudes, little research has been made. The labor movement is too weak to start any move to discriminate against non-union workers or to enforce the closed shop. The workers themselves, apart from those few who realize the potentialities of a successful labor movement, show little enthusiasm for mechanization, although accepting changes without protest. The presence of foreign advisory personnel seems to create no resentment. No attempt has been made to relocate industry, and this has caused no protest, though it is by no means certain that the present concentration is in the best interests of either the workers or the economy.



# Chronology

## General

1958

**Sept. 16:** Dr. Charles Malik was elected President of the General Assembly over Muhammad Ahmad Mahgub of the Sudan. The vote was 45 to 31, with four abstentions. The Israeli delegation was absent.

**Sept. 17:** It was reported that Jordan, Lebanon, and the UAR had approved of a plan by Secretary General Hammarskjöld to provide for a UN "presence" in the Middle East. The plan calls for a UN Committee in Amman, with other offices in Damascus and Beirut.

**Sept. 29:** Secretary General Hammarskjöld reported to the General Assembly that the US and Britain had given him renewed assurances regarding their early withdrawal from the Middle East. Furthermore, he asserted that both the UAR and Iraq had given assurances that they would end their economic blockade of Jordan after US troops had withdrawn from Lebanon and the British had evacuated Jordan.

**Sept. 30:** A General Assembly discussion of the Middle East began.

**Oct. 1:** The Arab League admitted Tunisia and Morocco to membership, which brings total membership to 10 Arab states.

**Oct. 2:** The Soviet Union requested the General Assembly to open debate on the failure of the US and Britain to withdraw troops from the Middle East. US delegate Lodge assailed the request as a "typical statement from the Moscow propaganda factory."

**Oct. 5:** The Arab League Council postponed consideration of adopting a budget for the Algerian nationalists because of Tunisia's failure to send a delegate to the meeting. No explanation for Tunisia's absence was given, it was reported.

**Oct. 7:** Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, UAR Foreign Minister, defended Cairo Radio broadcasts before the General Assembly. He stated that "freedom of peaceful self-expression" was guaranteed by the UN Charter, and added that "these broadcasts are feared and hated because they tell the truth, which people today readily understand with their minds and feel deeply in their hearts."

**Oct. 11:** Habib al-Shatti, head of the Tunisian delegation to the Arab League Council, charged today that the League was dominated by delegations from "some big countries." The UAR delegation walked out in protest, it was reported.

**Oct. 12:** It was reported that other delegations to the Arab League were attempting to mediate a dispute between the UAR and Tunisia.

**Oct. 13:** The Council of the League of Arab States formally and unanimously dissociated itself from Tunisia's charges that the League was dominated by the UAR, it was announced.

**Oct. 14:** Tunisian Foreign Minister Saduq Mokkadem

said that his government was studying the possibility of breaking diplomatic relations with the UAR.

The UAR delegation to the Arab League returned to the Council.

**Oct. 15:** Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with the UAR. President Bourguiba said that President Nasir was "meddling in Tunisia's internal affairs and harboring enemies" of Mr. Bourguiba.

It was reported from Cairo that Tunisia's action was a "complete surprise" to UAR officials.

**Oct. 16:** President Bourguiba declared that "I am Western, and I will remain so" before Tunisia's Constituent Assembly. He also attacked the UAR for working "with those who plotted to assassinate" him.

**Oct. 17:** The Cairo press and radio assailed President Bourguiba and accused him of "trying to curry favor with France and the West."

**Oct. 18:** Turkey and Iran signed an agreement to build a pipeline to carry oil from Iran to a Turkish Mediterranean port, it was announced in Ankara.

Arab sources at the UN reported that Tunisia "was willing" to resume diplomatic relations with the UAR provided that Salah ben Yusuf, Tunisian political leader and opponent of President Bourguiba, were expelled from Cairo.

**Oct. 22:** It was reported that the Arab States were considering formation of a Middle East "Common Market."

**Oct. 27:** Reports indicate that the UAR and the Sudan will resume negotiations over a long-standing dispute on division of the Nile waters, sources in Cairo said.

**Oct. 28:** Secretary General Hammarskjöld told the UN that the UN Emergency Force should be maintained along the borders of Egypt and Israel.

**Nov. 3:** It was reported that an official Egyptian source disclosed that Britain had supplied Israel with a number of jet bombers.

A British Foreign Office spokesman denied a report from Egypt that Britain had provided Israel with jet bombers.

The US State Department said that it had uncovered no evidence that Israel was preparing an invasion of Jordan.

**Nov. 7:** It was reported that the UAR and the Sudan may invite the World Bank to use its good offices in the Nile River waters dispute.

**Nov. 8:** Mrs. Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister, warned that UAR President Nasir was "out to make the Middle East his own back yard."

**Nov. 10:** King Husayn of Jordan charged that his plane had been "attacked" by Syrian jets while flying over Syrian territory en route to Beirut.

It was reported in Washington that the US is negotiating defense agreements with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan "as a means of bolstering the Baghdad Pact."

**Nov. 15:** Secretary General 'Abd al-Khalik Hasunah of the Arab League conferred in New York with Dag Hammarskjöld.

Nov. 22: It was reported that the UAR had agreed to allow Britain to fly jets over Syrian territory into Jordan.

A government spokesman in Amman charged that Jordanese trucks travelling across Syria to Lebanon were being held up at the Jordanese-Syrian border by UAR authorities.

Nov. 24: It was reported that Venezuela will send a delegation to the First Arab Petroleum Conference to be held in Cairo on April 16, 1959.

Nov. 26: The Soviet Union announced that it will commence an Arabic "class" by radio on Dec. 1. It will consist of "lectures" on Soviet history, economy, and politics. After three months, according to the report, a listener may apply to take an examination and receive a certificate.

Dec. 2: It was announced in Washington that Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree will tour the Middle East beginning Dec. 6.

It was reported that Iraq has agreed to a UAR request to investigate accusations by President Habib Bourguiba that the UAR was involved in an alleged "plot to assassinate him."

Dec. 6: Delegates from the Arab states began discussions in Cairo on the feasibility of establishing an Arab "Common Market" at a conference sponsored by the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce.

## Aden

(see also Yemen)

### 1958

Sept. 28: 'Ali ibn 'Abd-al Karim, deposed Sultan of Lahej, asked his people to boycott any referendum on the proposed Consultative Assembly.

Nov. 1: British officials arrested about 350 persons involved in two days of anti-British riots, which erupted after two Arab newsmen were sentenced to three-months imprisonment for contempt of court. They had charged in a publication that various government departments and the courts were corrupt.

Nov. 3: The government announced that 240 Yemenis, who had taken part in the riots, had been deported.

Dec. 8: It was announced that Amir Fadhil ibn 'Ali, cousin of the exiled former Sultan, 'Ali ibn 'Abd-al Karim, was elected new Sultan of Lahej.

## Afghanistan

### 1958

Sept. 30: Soviet President Kliment Y. Voroshilov left Moscow for Kabul on a good-will visit.

Oct. 1: The Afghan representative to the UN denied that his country is involved in any project for a confederation of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Oct. 2: It was reported that Kliment Y. Voroshilov announced in Kabul that a Soviet loan of 120,000,000 rubles (\$30,000,000) would be made to Afghanistan for development projects.

Oct. 16: Afghanistan's representative to the UN stated that reports of a new Soviet loan were untrue.

## Algeria

(See also General, Saudi Arabia, UAR)

### 1958

Sept. 16: The Algerian terrorist campaign in France continued unabated. Several clashes between Algerians and Frenchmen resulted in property loss and death.

Sept. 17: Police and military guards were strengthened throughout France, as Premier de Gaulle conferred with government officials on further measures to halt Algerian terrorist attacks.

Sept. 19: Formation of a Provisional Government for a Republic of Algeria was announced in Cairo. The new regime was immediately recognized by Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, Morocco, and the UAR.

Cabinet members of the new regime are:

Premier—Farhat Abbas

Vice Premier—Ahmad ben Bella

Vice Premier and Minister of Armed Forces—Abu al-Qasim Karim

Ministers of State—Husayn Ait Ahmad; Rabah Bitat; Muhammad Boudaif; and Muhammad Khider

Foreign Affairs—Dr. Muhammad Lamine Debaghine

Armament and Supply—Muhammad Cherif

Interior—al-Akhdar ben Tobal

Communications—'Abd al-Hafidh Boussouf

North African Affairs—'Abd al-Hamid el-Mehri

Finance and Economic Affairs—Ahmad Francis

Information—Muhammad Yazid

Social Affairs—Yusuf ben Hira

Cultural Affairs—Ahmad Tewfiq el-Medani

Secretaries of State—al-Amin Khan (East Algeria);

'Umar Ousseddik (Central Algeria); and Mustafa Stambouli (Western Algeria).

The French government termed the new rebel régime "artificial" and stated that it lacked control over the territory of Algeria.

An official spokesman for the new régime announced that the Provisional Government "considers itself in a state of war with France, under international law, and France must bear the consequences of such a situation."

Sept. 20: The Provisional Government announced that it will establish its headquarters in Cairo.

The Provisional Government protested to the UN against the extension to Algeria of the French constitutional referendum, alleging that Algerians had been forced to the polls by French soldiers and police during the first stage of the referendum in Algeria.

Sept. 21: Algerian rebel forces opened a general offensive against the French, occupying territory west of the Tunisian border.

Saudi Arabia recognized the Algerian Provisional Government, and Radio Amman announced Jordan's intention to do so.

Sept. 22: The Sudan recognized the Algerian Provisional Government.

The French government protested to Morocco and Tunisia because of their recognition of the Provisional Government.

The French Army in Algeria announced that it had discovered mass graves in Kabylia containing the bodies of 400 rebel fighters killed by their own commander, Colonel Amirouche.

**Sept. 21:** The State Department announced that the US would not recognize the Algerian Provisional Government.

**Sept. 26:** The Algerian Provisional Government offered to stop the killing in Algeria and to negotiate a peaceful settlement with France. The declaration also said that "Algeria is not France" and that Algerians would never submit to integration.

Tunisia offered to make a new attempt at mediation of the dispute between France and Algeria.

A three-day period of voting on the French Constitution began in Algeria.

**Sept. 29:** Voting on the Constitution ended, with a reported 80% of the registered voters participating. Official figures: 3,356,169 voted "oui" and 118,615 voted "non." Muslim women voted for the first time.

**Oct. 2:** Premier de Gaulle arrived in Algeria. In a speech at Orléansville, he reaffirmed France's determination to remain in Algeria, although he hinted that his policy might favor a special status for Algeria instead of total integration.

**Oct. 3:** In a speech at Constantine, Premier de Gaulle outlined a five-year program for the agricultural and industrial development of Algeria. Major provisions of the program are: ten percent of the young men and women entering civil service in France will be drawn from the Arab population; Algerian wages will be increased until they reach the level of wages in France; about 625,000 acres of land will be distributed among Muslim peasants; the first phase of an agricultural and industrial program will be completed during the five-year period; two-thirds of the Algerian children will be going to school by the end of five years.

The Premier also appealed to Algeria to "stop the absurd battles," and said "hope will flourish again; the prison gates will open and there will be a future wide open for all, especially for you."

Algerian rebel spokesmen in Tunis declared that de Gaulle's speech "changes nothing . . . the war continues."

**Oct. 6:** Premier Farhat Abbas left Cairo for Tunis for talks with Tunisian leaders.

**Oct. 7:** Muhammad Yazid, Minister of Information for the Algerian Provisional Government and an "observer" at the UN, announced that he will seek to be heard in the General Assembly debate on the Algerian question.

**Oct. 10:** Premier Farhat Abbas announced that his Provisional Government was ready for negotiations with France "to determine the political and military conditions of a cease-fire." He also announced that the rebels would release about 100 French prisoners to the International Red Cross.

**Oct. 13:** In a letter to Gen. Raoul Salan, military commander in Algeria, Premier de Gaulle told the French

Army to stay out of Algerian politics and permit free legislative elections. He also decreed that Muslims representing all shades of opinion—including those espousing Algerian independence—would be permitted to campaign freely for election to the French Parliament.

**Oct. 14:** Maj. Gen. Jacques Massu, leader of the All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety, and 11 other officers left the organization in obedience to orders from Premier de Gaulle.

**Oct. 15:** Right-wing civilian elements in the Committees of Public Safety called a general strike and mass demonstration for Oct. 16 in protest to Premier de Gaulle's order that withdrew Army officers from participating in the Committees. Gen. Raoul Salan returned from a conference with the Premier and announced that any strike was forbidden.

**Oct. 16:** The Committees of Public Safety rescinded their order for a general strike and mass demonstration.

**Oct. 17:** The French Cabinet set Nov. 30 as the date for legislative elections in Algeria.

**Oct. 18:** The Arab League Council voted to assess its ten members \$12,000,000 (\$34,400,000) to support the Algerian rebellion against France. About \$8,000,000 of the total will be contributed by the UAR, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

**Oct. 20:** The French Army in Algeria announced that it will free ten nationalist rebels as a gesture of conciliation.

The Algerian Army of National Liberation turned over four French prisoners to the French Ambassador in Tunis.

**Oct. 21:** The Committee of Public Safety in Algeria voted itself out of existence, and announced that its remaining members would organize themselves into a new political group.

The US announced that it will continue to aid about 80,000 Algerian refugees in Tunisia. About \$1,000,000 a year is provided for this purpose.

The French Army announced that French forces killed 68 Algerian rebels and captured 6 others in a three-day attack on a rebel stronghold in the mountains of Kabylia. A field hospital, barracks, and underground hide-aways were also destroyed, the announcement said.

**Oct. 23:** Premier de Gaulle extended an invitation to the Algerian rebels to come to Paris to negotiate a cease-fire. He promised them safe-conduct in France. He also made it clear that he would not discuss Algeria's political future with the rebels, but would reserve such discussions for democratically-elected representatives of the Algerian people.

**Oct. 24:** Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba declared that de Gaulle's offer to negotiate with the Algerian rebels constituted a "new element" in the Algerian problem.

**Oct. 25:** The Algerian Provisional Government rejected Premier de Gaulle's offer to negotiate a cease-fire, declaring that it was a "request for unconditional surrender." The communique, at the same time, left the door open for negotiations on neutral territory for "a true solution of the Algerian problem in its entirety."

Oct. 27: Muhammad Yazid, Minister of Information for the Algerian Provisional Government, announced that the Algerians remained ready to negotiate with France at any time. He explained that talks could not be held in Paris, and that negotiations must deal with a cease-fire "in its real context; that is, within the over-all political framework."

Oct. 28: Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba urged Premier de Gaulle to release Ahmad ben Bella, member of the Algerian Provisional Government, and four other Algerian nationalists, arrested by the French in 1956, as a means of "thawing out" the Algerian problem.

Oct. 29: General Assembly President Charles Malik conferred with Muhammad Yazid on the Algerian problem before the UN.

Oct. 30: Nine persons were killed and twenty-six injured when two artillery shells, rigged as time bombs, exploded in a crowded downtown street in Tiaret in Western Algeria.

Charles Malik conferred with the head of the French delegation on the Algerian problem. He later announced that he was not engaged in mediating the French-Algerian dispute.

Oct. 31: Premier de Gaulle ordered the release of 1,000 Algerians held in administrative detention in Algerian camps.

Nov. 1: The Algerian Provisional Government announced that a rebel force had succeeded in attacking the Morice Line, a 105-mile electrified barrier running parallel to the Tunisian border, erected by the French to prevent rebel infiltration into Algeria from Tunisia.

Nov. 2: The French Army in Algeria denied that rebel forces had penetrated the Morice line, and characterized the rebel attack as "harassing action."

Nov. 4: Colonel Amirouche, rebel commander in the mountain area of Kabylia, released six civilian prisoners, including a Roman Catholic missionary, who had been abducted earlier by rebel forces.

Nov. 5: The heads of the Tunisian and Moroccan delegations to the UN formerly presented to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld an Algerian rebel request that French authorities release five members of the Provisional Government, including Ahmad ben Bella, from prison.

The Moroccan government expressed concern over the state of health of the five imprisoned Algerian leaders, who reportedly went on a hunger strike a week ago.

Nov. 9: The deadline for candidates to file for election to the French National Assembly ended. It was announced that Muslims of nationalist views had failed to file.

Nov. 11: Farhat Abbas, Premier of the Algerian Provisional Government, stated that he was ready to accept a temporary cease-fire in Algeria, provided the UN supervised negotiations between France and the "free Algerian government."

Nov. 14: A new French law to open the Sahara to international research and oil development was an-

nounced by Information Minister Jacques Soustelle, who said that it had received Cabinet approval.

Ahmad ben Bella and four other members of the Algerian Provisional Government imprisoned in France ended their hunger strike.

Nov. 21: It was reported that members of the Provisional Government held secret meetings with Muslim Algerians "last month," and returned with a "mandate" to reject any French offer short of full independence. 'Abd al-Hafidh Boussouf, Minister of Communications in the Provisional Government, also denied that there was a rift between extreme rebels, who allegedly oppose any negotiation with France, and leaders in Tunis and Cairo, who are willing to negotiate on neutral territory.

Nov. 22: The Algerian Provisional Government asked Secretary General Hammarskjöld to use his good offices in an attempt to bring about negotiations between the rebel government and France.

Nov. 25: The French Army in Algeria announced that, in an offensive action against Algerian rebels which began on Nov. 2 and ended Nov. 23, French forces had killed or captured "more than 1,600 Algerian nationalist fighters."

Nov. 27: It was officially announced that Premier de Gaulle will visit Algeria from Dec. 3 to Dec. 8.

The Provisional Government announced that it will send a three-man delegation to Communist China on a visit in the near future. Arms and Supply Minister Mahmud Cherif will be on the delegation.

Nov. 28: Both Europeans and Muslims went to the polls today as a three-day voting period opened for elections to the French National Assembly.

Nov. 30: Muhammad Yazid, Minister of Information in the Algerian Provisional Government, said that Algerian nationalists may eventually be supported with military supplies from Communist China. He also said an Algerian delegation was on its way to Peiping for "negotiations."

The three-day voting period in Algeria ended. It was reported that about 70% of the registered voters went to the polls.

Dec. 3: The Algerian rebels released eight French soldiers to the International Red Cross.

Premier de Gaulle arrived in Algeria.

Dec. 5: Premier de Gaulle visited the Hassi Messaoud and Edjele oil fields. He told a group of technicians that "yours is a French achievement. You have created hope where no hope seemed possible. France may have found a new destiny here in the Sahara."

Dec. 7: Premier de Gaulle declared in Algiers that the time was not ripe for a political solution in Algeria.

Dec. 8: Tunisia proposed to the UN that negotiations be conducted between France and the Algerian Provisional Government to bring about a settlement "in harmony with the natural rights of the peoples to freedom and independence."

Dec. 12: The French government announced that Gen. Raoul Salan, military authority in Algeria, had been named Inspector General of National Defense. He will

be replaced in Algeria by a civilian administrator, Paul Delouvrier.

**Dec. 14:** The General Assembly failed to reach a decision on Algeria. A resolution, calling for negotiations between the two parties, failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority vote.

## Cyprus

(See also Turkey)

### 1958

**Sept. 18:** American vice consul John P. Wentworth was wounded by a gunman in the garden of his home in Nicosia.

The British Defense Ministry announced that two regiments of troops, flown to Cyprus in July, would be withdrawn soon.

**Sept. 19:** US officials on Cyprus said that American vice consul Wentworth was probably mistaken for a British citizen.

**Sept. 22:** The British on Cyprus released 130 Greek and Turkish political prisoners in an attempt to reduce communal tensions before introduction of the Seven-Year Plan on Oct. 1.

**Sept. 23:** Archbishop Makarios proposed a plan for the independence of Cyprus in an interview in Athens with a visiting British Labor Party official. The Archbishop proposed that there be a peace-making period of self-government for the island, followed by independence guaranteed by the UN.

The British announced that although the Makarios proposal was under consideration, Britain would not be deflected from instituting her plan for the administration of Cyprus during the next seven years.

Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO Secretary-General, arrived in Athens for talks with the Greek government about Cyprus.

**Sept. 25:** British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd explained Britain's Seven-Year Plan for Cyprus to the General Assembly, and called for a tripartite solution of the problem by Britain, Greece, and Turkey.

**Sept. 28:** It was reported that Paul-Henri Spaak had recommended that Britain postpone implementation of its Seven-Year Plan for Cyprus pending a conference of the interested parties. It was further reported that Spaak had suggested two changes in the British Plan: restriction of the jurisdiction of the two proposed communal assemblies to communal affairs exclusively, with a single chamber representing both communities to legislate for the island; and election of a Cypriot commissioner from each community to advise the British Governor, instead of the appointment of commissioners by both Greece and Turkey.

**Sept. 29:** The NATO Permanent Council began urgent consultations on the Cyprus problem.

The British government announced its willingness to attend a conference to discuss modification of its Seven-Year Plan.

The Greek government announced that it will accept independence for Cyprus as proposed by Archbishop

Makarios. It also announced that Greece would not participate in a conference on the Cyprus problem if the British implemented their Seven-Year Plan on Oct. 1.

**Oct. 1:** Britain's Seven-Year "Partnership" Plan was put into effect in Cyprus. The Greek community protested by a silent strike throughout the island.

**Oct. 2:** The British moved security forces into position on Cyprus to prevent mass demonstrations by the Greek community. Sporadic incidents of violence were also reported.

**Oct. 4:** British troops searched houses in the Greek quarter of Famagusta seeking gunmen who killed one British woman and wounded another. It was reported that at least two Greek Cypriotes were killed and 150 injured during the search.

Strong police forces patrolled the center of Athens and broke up groups of students shouting anti-British slogans.

**Oct. 5:** One British soldier was killed and five others wounded as terrorists on Cyprus struck at British troops in scattered ambushes.

**Oct. 6:** The Greek government endorsed the Makarios plan for Cyprus and formally presented it to NATO as a permanent solution.

**Oct. 13:** It was reported that Britain is willing to accept the Makarios proposals on Cyprus, provided that its guarantees against any future union of the island with either Greece or Turkey are strengthened.

Archbishop Makarios announced that he was prepared to accept a seven-year period of self-government leading to independence for Cyprus.

**Oct. 15:** The NATO Permanent Council postponed consideration of the Cyprus question after Greece requested more time to consider the proposal for a round-table conference.

**Oct. 16:** Drastic security measures—including the designation of "danger areas," where persons entering or staying "may do so at the risk of their lives"—were taken by the British on Cyprus to cope with mounting violence.

Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tossias flew to Paris to discuss Greece's participation in a conference with NATO officials.

**Oct. 17:** The NATO Permanent Council met in Paris to discuss the holding of a conference. It was announced that Greece favors inclusion of the US, France, and Italy as "neutral observers" in the negotiations.

**Oct. 25:** It was announced in Athens that Greece will not participate in a conference on Cyprus unless there are guarantees that results will be "constructive." Reports indicate that this decision was taken at an all-night session of the Greek Cabinet.

**Oct. 27:** Paul-Henri Spaak and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan conferred in London on the sudden stiffening of Greece's terms for participating in a conference.

**Oct. 29:** NATO officials indicated that they had abandoned efforts to bring about a tripartite conference on Cyprus.

A British Foreign Office spokesman reportedly announced at a news conference that Britain would



continue to push for a conference to solve the future status of Cyprus.

Premier Konstantin Karamanlis announced in Athens that failure of the NATO mediation effort on Cyprus was due to the "incomprehensible and unacceptable intransigence" of Britain.

**Oct. 30:** The State Department announced that the US was willing to participate as an "observer" at any conference on Cyprus sponsored by NATO.

**Oct. 31:** The British Foreign Office published a "white paper" containing documents on the NATO-proposed conference, and charged that "Greece had abandoned the attempt to convene the conference."

The Turkish representative to NATO issued a formal statement in which he charged that Greece was responsible for the abandonment of efforts to convene a conference on Cyprus.

**Nov. 3:** Violence continued on Cyprus.

**Nov. 4:** Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu expressed hope that Greece's decision against a conference on the Cyprus question was "only the result of a misunderstanding."

**Nov. 8:** Britain offered arms to its civilians on Cyprus to protect themselves against Greek Cypriot terrorists. The tightest security measures ever taken on Cyprus were put into effect.

**Nov. 9:** Three more British citizens were killed by terrorists on Cyprus, as British civilians arrived in Nicosia from all over the island for security briefings and to collect arms.

**Nov. 10:** The British barred over 4,000 Greek Cypriot workers from Army and Royal Air Force bases to curb acts of sabotage and terrorism in military installations.

Archbishop Makarios announced that he will fly to New York to attend discussions of the Cyprus issue before the UN.

**Nov. 12:** Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons that Britain would again try before the UN to arrange for a conference on Cyprus.

**Nov. 14:** Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu left Paris for New York to participate in the UN discussion of the Cyprus issue.

**Nov. 15:** Archbishop Makarios left Athens for New York to support a plea before the UN to grant independence to the people of Cyprus.

Sir Hugh Foot, Governor of Cyprus, appealed by radio to "all who love Cyprus" to help end the three and one-half years of violence on the island.

**Nov. 18:** Foreign Minister Zorlu conferred on the Cyprus question with Secretary of State Dulles in Washington.

British security forces launched a large-scale operation against the Greek Cypriot underground in western Cyprus.

**Nov. 21:** Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, leader of the Turkish minority on Cyprus, said that the Turks would press for partition of the island.

The State Department announced that it had no knowledge of a reported trip by Archbishop Makarios to Washington. The Archbishop had told a press conference earlier that "he had been to Washington," adding that "I am in a position to say that I got en-

couragement from the State Department to make the claim for independence" of Cyprus.

**Nov. 22:** The Greek delegation at the UN introduced a resolution calling for Britain to assist the Cypriotes toward "instituting the status of independence following a period of genuine self-government."

**Nov. 24:** EOKA, Greek Cypriot underground organization, called a general strike throughout the island.

**Nov. 25:** British Minister of State Allan Noble asked the UN not to endorse independence or any long-term solution for Cyprus "in the absence of a general agreement." He added, however, that if the issue were taken up at an international conference, Britain would not object to the consideration of "all possible long-term solutions, of which independence is naturally one."

**Dec. 3:** The General Assembly adopted a compromise resolution on Cyprus expressing UN "confidence" that the nations concerned would strive for a "peaceful, democratic and just solution" of the problem.

**Dec. 6:** It was reported that "official circles" in Greece considered the UN resolution on Cyprus "meaningless and indecisive."

## Ethiopia

### 1958

**Oct. 25:** The Ethiopian government shipped about \$4,000,000 worth of silver coins to the US in repayment of US lend-lease funds, it was announced.

**Nov. 18:** It was reported from Tel Aviv that Ethiopia has requested Israel to send Israeli teachers to Ethiopia to work in Ethiopian schools.

## Iran

(See also General, Afghanistan, Iraq, Persian Gulf)

### 1958

**Sept. 16:** It was announced that the Shah will pay an official visit to Italy, Switzerland and Morocco beginning on Oct. 9.

**Sept. 27:** The Shah was quoted in a press interview as having said that "the formation of a confederation composed of Persian-speaking nations—Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—is under serious consideration. We cannot talk much about it since no conclusion has been reached."

**Oct. 2:** An official spokesman for the Shah said that the Iranian monarch "had not intended to talk for publication" when he told a news conference that an Aryan confederation was under serious consideration.

**Oct. 6:** Iran withdrew as a candidate for the Security Council seat to be vacated by Iraq at the end of the year.

**Oct. 13:** The Polish Foreign Trade Ministry announced that Poland and Iran had signed a new trade agreement increasing the volume of goods exchanged by 25 per cent on each side.

**Oct. 16:** It was reported that the Shah, in an order to provincial governors and officers of the gendarmerie, has prohibited Iranian landlords from taking personal



gifts and other traditional exactions from peasants. The order also forbid the levying of fines on quarreling farm workers.

Oct. 20: Brig. Gen. Teimour Bakhtiar, Deputy Premier and Director of Iranian Internal Security, reaffirmed "his complete confidence" in the loyalty of Iran's Kurdish tribes.

Oct. 21: Premier Manouchehr Eghbal presented to the Majlis a bill requiring government employees and members of the Armed Forces to submit to the government full details on their personal wealth, property, and source of income. This followed another bill introduced earlier requiring that public servants divest themselves of holdings in organizations doing business with the government.

Oct. 26: The Shah celebrated his fortieth birthday by pardoning 82 Communists imprisoned since 1954. The prisoners had recanted their revolutionary designs.

It was reported that Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov plan to visit Iran before the end of the year.

Oct. 27: US Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy arrived in Teheran for a two-day visit at the invitation of the Iranian government.

Oct. 28: The Shah declared that he would push "with vigor and determination" his intended reforms, which he said were designed to bring about "honest, democratic government for Iran."

Oct. 31: The Soviet Union sent the Iranian government a note warning of the danger of Iran's "new military treaty" with the US, and adding that the Soviet government would not remain "indifferent" to a treaty that "subjects the southern borders of the Soviet Union to immediate danger."

The State Department denied that the US had signed or was negotiating a military treaty with Iran.

Nov. 1: Iran officially denied that she had signed any military agreement with the US.

Nov. 8: Iran formally rejected a Soviet note which had charged that the Iranian government had recently signed a military pact with the US.

Nov. 20: The Iranian government closed the newspaper, *Farman*, at the request of the UAR. The paper had charged in a leading article that, according to documents, President Nasir was "a servant of the Kremlin."

Nov. 22: The Shah was reported as saying that he would appoint the present ruler of Bahrain as Governor of the territory, if the Shaykhdom accepted Iranian sovereignty.

The Shah announced that Iran would respect the international oil agreement signed with several Western companies in 1954, but did desire a larger share of the revenue. Under the agreement, Iran receives 50 per cent.

Nov. 27: The Shah arrived in Rome for a state visit. He conferred with Italian officials, and it was reported that he would be received in an audience with Pope John XXIII.

Dec. 1: Following an audience with Pope John XXIII, the Shah hailed "this communion of minds and hearts at the service of humanity and peace." The Shah's words were in reply to an allocution by Pope John

pledging Catholics in Iran to loyal service for their nation.

Dec. 6: Pravda accused Iran of violating a treaty with the Soviet Union by concluding a military pact with the US.

Iranian government officials reportedly described Moscow's latest attack as a "simple bluff."

## Iraq

(See also General, Persian Gulf)

### 1958

Sept. 16: The Iraqi Military Attaché in Cairo reported that Col. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif was relieved of his position as Deputy Commander of Iraq's Armed Forces at his own request.

Sept. 20: The death penalty was asked for former Prime Minister Fadhil al-Jamali, on trial in Baghdad for allegedly conspiring against Syria to bring about the overthrow of the Syrian government.

Sept. 24: Fadhil al-Jamali made a plea for his life before the military tribunal trying him for treason. He warned that communism constituted a danger for Iraq.

The government terminated the services of a 50-man team of British service personnel on loan to the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Sept. 28: It was reported that Iraq opened economic and trade negotiations with the UAR.

Sept. 30: Col. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif was removed as Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior "on recommendation" of Premier al-Qasim. He was appointed Ambassador to West Germany. Also removed from their posts were Jabir 'Umar, Minister of Education, and Fu'ad al-Rikabi, Minister of Development.

The government proclaimed an agrarian reform law limiting individual land holdings to 1,000 dunums (250 acres) of irrigated land or 2,000 dunums of unirrigated land. Individual holdings in excess of these limits will be taken by the government for distribution to the peasants over the next five years. Premier Qasim broadcast a warning against any obstruction of the new law.

Oct. 2: An Iraqi-Yugoslav trade agreement, providing for an exchange of Iraqi agricultural products for Yugoslav industrial goods, was signed in Baghdad.

Oct. 6: Mustafa al-Barzani, Kurdish leader who fled Iraq after an unsuccessful Kurdish revolt in 1944, returned to Baghdad.

Oct. 7: It was reported that the government crushed a revolt by soldiers supporting Col. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif. According to reports, a group of officers in Col. 'Arif's regiment attempted to move against the government of Premier al-Qasim on Oct. 5. Several arrests were made and the regiment was transferred away from the capital. It was also reported that Col. Arif had been placed under house arrest.

Oct. 12: Col. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif left Baghdad for Bonn to take up his duties as new Ambassador to West Germany. Premier Qasim bid him farewell at the airport.

Oct. 25: The ruler of Kuwait, Shaykh 'Abdullah al-Salim

al-Sabah, arrived on an official visit in Baghdad. It was reported that he will discuss with Premier Qasim the improvement of economic and cultural relations between the two states.

**Oct. 26:** A trade agreement was signed with East Germany providing for the exchange of German electrical and engineering equipment for Iraqi agricultural products.

Jamil al-Midfa'i, former Prime Minister of Iraq and long associate of the late Nuri al-Sa'id, died in Baghdad.

**Oct. 28:** The British Foreign Office announced that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan will succeed Sir Michael Wright as Ambassador to Iraq.

An Iraqi-UAR cultural agreement was signed in Baghdad.

Fifteen Iraqi lawyers left Baghdad for a three-week visit to the Soviet Union by official invitation of the Soviet government.

**Oct. 31:** Moscow Radio reported that a delegation of Iraqi "peace partisans" had arrived in Moscow "to strengthen relations between the Iraqi and Soviet peoples."

**Nov. 4:** Baghdad Radio announced that Col. 'Arif was arrested for having returned to Baghdad from Europe without permission. The broadcast said that "because of the colonel's repeated attempts to disturb general security, he was arrested today and will be tried on a charge of plotting against the country's interests."

Unidentified "diplomatic informants" in Washington said that Col. Arif's unauthorized return to Iraq "was part of a plan for a rising of Nasir sympathizers against the Iraqi government."

Premier al-Qasim decreed salary increases for the army.

**Nov. 5:** It was reported that many arrests were made among members of the Ba'th movement by the government. Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani was reported to be "under close surveillance."

There were demonstrations in Baghdad against Col. 'Arif. Crowds of people carried pictures of Premier al-Qasim through the streets and demanded that Col. 'Arif be punished.

**Nov. 6:** Premier Qasim, in an address over Baghdad Radio, declared that "we will not go backward. We will go forward, preserving our independence and sovereignty, while at the same time, we shall do anything for the benefit of the Arab peoples."

**Nov. 7:** Demonstrations in support of the régime of Premier al-Qasim continued in Baghdad.

The government closed the newspaper of the Ba'th movement and arrested five members of the editorial staff.

**Nov. 10:** Former Premier Fadhil al-Jamali, former Chief of Staff Rafiq 'Arif, and former Deputy Chief of Staff Ghazi al-Daghistani were sentenced to death for treason.

**Nov. 13:** Former Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Basha'yan was sentenced to death for treason.

**Nov. 15:** Three agreements on trade, economic cooperation, and technical assistance were signed between Iraq and the UAR.

**Nov. 18:** The government announced its claim to a twelve-mile limit for Iraq's territorial waters in the

Persian Gulf. It was also announced that if this claim conflicted with the claims of neighboring states, Iraq would be willing to solve any problems in accordance with international law or mutual agreement.

Iraq announced the termination of the Khaniqin Oil Concession, affecting 753 square miles in eastern Iraq. The Khaniqin Oil Company was a subsidiary of British Petroleum, Ltd.

**Nov. 20:** Mahmud Baban, former minister in ten Iraqi cabinets, was sentenced to death for treason.

Waldemar J. Gallman resigned as US Ambassador to Iraq.

**Dec. 2:** The Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo reportedly said that Iraq "looks with deep concern on an alleged military pact between the US and Iran." He also said that if the agreement is implemented, it will threaten the peace of the Middle East and the world.

A Foreign Office spokesman said that Britain had information to confirm a report that the Soviet Union is supplying Iraq with jet fighters, tanks, and other arms.

A State Department spokesman said that the US "placed some belief in reports that Iraq was receiving arms from the Soviet bloc."

A joint Iraqi-Indian statement announced that the two states had agreed to treat each other as a "most-favored nation" for purposes of increasing mutual trade.

**Dec. 8:** Baghdad Radio reported that the government had discovered and foiled a "serious plot" against the regime. It said that "evidence, money, and arms" had been seized, and alleged that the conspiracy was "the work of some corrupt elements with the help of foreigners outside Iraq."

**Dec. 15:** US Assistant Secretary of State William M. Rountree arrived in Baghdad on an official visit. He was greeted by an anti-US demonstration, and mud, eggs, and a rock were thrown at his automobile. He was uninjured.

The US officially demanded that the Iraqi government take measures to guarantee the protection of William Rountree.

## Israel

(See also General, Ethiopia, Palestine Problem)

### 1958

**Sept. 22:** It was reported that Israel is currently receiving a small, steady flow of arms from Britain, France, and the US.

**Sept. 30:** The Israeli government announced that Italian President Amintore Fanfani will visit Israel in mid-October at the invitation of the government.

**Oct. 7:** The Foreign Office disclosed that Britain will sell two surplus submarines to Israel.

**Oct. 9:** The first of two submarines from Britain was delivered to the Israeli government at Portsmouth, England.

Cairo Radio denounced Britain for the sale of two submarines to Israel.

It was reported from Tel Aviv that an Israeli war-

- plane rescued a fishing trawler that had been seized by an Egyptian naval vessel off the coast of Gaza.
- Oct. 14: The Export-Import Bank granted a \$5,000,000 loan to the American-Israeli Paper Mills, Ltd., the largest paper producer in Israel.
- Oct. 17: Aharon Cohen, a leader of the Mapam Party, was arrested by security police.
- Oct. 21: Dr. Kalman J. Mann, Hadassah Medical Organization Director in Israel, said that the influx of immigrants into that country had created major problems of public health.
- Oct. 25: Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the US, said that the key to peace in the Middle East lies in the rapid strengthening of Israel. He also cautioned that "we must be patient in our view of Arab-Israeli relations, but constructively impatient in the pursuit of all our other constructive tasks."
- Oct. 27: Premier Ben-Gurion banned fund-raising activities by government officials, except in aid of the state treasury. The order resulted from opposition charges in the Knesset that Arieh Manor, head of the Israel Supply Mission in the US, had collected funds there for the Mapai Party.
- Nov. 2: The Cabinet decided to recommend a special bond issue in the amount of I£20,000,000 (\$11,100,000) to help finance the settling of 30,000 unexpected immigrants from Eastern Europe. It was reported that this is the first time that Israeli citizens have been asked to contribute directly to financing the settlement of immigrants.
- Nov. 3: The US Department of Agriculture announced that the US had signed an agreement with Israel under which Israel will purchase nearly \$38,000,000 worth of surplus farm products.
- Nov. 4: It was reported that Israeli police believe that large quantities of counterfeit Israeli banknotes, recently discovered in European banks, were "made in Cairo."
- Nov. 5: Israel's first School of Social Work was formally dedicated at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
- Nov. 9: The Israeli government announced that it will decide within forty-eight hours whether Aharon Cohen, a leader of the Mapam Party arrested two weeks ago, will be indicted on a charge of committing an offense against the security of the state.
- The United Jewish Appeal Mission in Israel recommended that a "special rescue fund" be raised in addition to the regular 1959 UJA campaign, to finance the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe.
- Nov. 13: Israel announced that a UAR "spy ring" had been liquidated and several arrests made. The announcement charged that Arab agents had transmitted military data to Damascus.
- Aharon Cohen, charged with committing espionage, was released on bail.
- Nov. 16: A government-sponsored Asian-African seminar on cooperation opened in Tel Aviv. Delegations from twelve non-Muslim Far Eastern and African states attended.
- Nov. 20: An army mission from Burma arrived in Israel to study Israel's fortified farm settlements.

- Nov. 21: It was announced in London that Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum will sell the Haifa oil refinery to the Paz Oil Company interests.
- Nov. 22: Moshe Shapiro, former Israeli Minister of Religions, charged in Atlantic City that Premier Ben-Gurion's cabinet was "isolating" the Israeli government from Jewish communities over the world by attempting to introduce secular practices in that country.
- Dec. 3: Rabbi Yaacov Toledano of Tel Aviv was confirmed by the Knesset as Minister of Religions. The confirming vote was 60 to 2, with 38 abstentions.

## Jordan

(See also General, Algeria, Palestine Problem)

### 1958

- Sept. 16: The former Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan, Baha al-din Nuri, was named to an ambassador's post in the Jordanian Foreign Ministry by royal decree.
- The US Embassy in Amman announced that the US granted Jordan \$5,000,000, bringing the total US support for the 1959 fiscal year to \$24,000,000.
- Sept. 19: The UN announced that Pier Spinelli has been named to go to Jordan for consultations with the Jordanian government. Mr. Spinelli will be concerned with the "practical arrangements" necessary to facilitate the withdrawal of British forces from Jordan.
- Oct. 1: King Husayn announced to Parliament that British troops would begin withdrawing from Jordan on Oct. 20. He also said that some security restrictions would be relaxed.
- Oct. 3: 'Abd al-Mun'im Rifa'i, Jordanian delegate to the UN, warned the Soviet Union to refrain from "fishing in the troubled waters of the Middle East" and to allow the Arab States to work out their own destinies. He spoke before the General Assembly in reply to a speech by Soviet delegate Andrei A. Gromyko. He also asserted that "the gates of Jordan and of our Arab homeland are closed to subversive ideologies."
- Oct. 6: Britain announced that the first installment of a £1,000,000 (\$2,800,000) loan had been paid to Jordan.
- Oct. 9: It was reported that the first British army truck convey left Amman for the port of Aqaba, marking the beginning of the British withdrawal.
- Oct. 11: The State Department announced that a nine-man Army mission is on its way to study possible reorganization and reequipment of the "Arab Army." The mission was sent at the request of King Husayn.
- The UAR agreed to permit Britain to fly her troops out of Jordan across Syrian territory.
- Oct. 14: The US military mission to Jordan arrived in Amman.
- Oct. 18: The British Ministry of Defense announced that all British troops would be withdrawn from Jordan by Nov. 11.
- The UN announced that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld has requested Maj. Gen. Odd Bull, executive member of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon, to begin arrangements for UN participation in the British withdrawal from Jordan.

Oct. 20: British troops began withdrawing from Jordan.  
 Oct. 22: Premier Samir al-Rifa'i said that his government was confident about the internal situation, and added that he could see no reason why subversive activities should succeed. He stated that Jordan's security rested on three "formidable" pillars: the popularity of King Husayn, the loyalty of the army, and the recent growth of an enlightened public opinion that would answer a call to reason.

Oct. 23: The British Air Force began an airlift operation to withdraw 2,000 paratroopers from Jordan.

Oct. 27: King Husayn commuted to 15 years in prison the death sentences of sixteen Jordanians, convicted on charges of causing an explosion at the Jordanian Development Board and British Council buildings.

Oct. 29: Pier Spinelli announced that a plan for establishing a permanent UN mission in Jordan has been completed. The plan calls for a mission of three men in Amman under the leadership of a special representative for Jordan.

Nov. 1: Air, road, and telephone communications between Jordan and the UAR were restored after an interruption of more than three months.

Nov. 5: It was announced that King Husayn would fly to Switzerland for a three-week vacation.

Nov. 7: King Husayn presided over a special meeting of the Council of Ministers. It was reported that he issued directions concerning Jordanian affairs prior to his departure for a vacation in Europe.

Nov. 9: The King broadcast to the people of Jordan. He announced that the "crisis" in Jordan had ended, and promised to return soon to continue "working and sacrificing" himself for the Jordanian people.

Nov. 10: King Husayn left Amman piloting his own plane. He returned to Jordan two hours later, after having been intercepted by two Syrian MIG fighters. In a broadcast to the nation, the King explained that he had been ordered to land at Damascus by Syrian authorities while en route over Syrian territory. He was intercepted, he explained, as he was flying back to Amman.

Demonstrations in support of the King broke out in Amman following his broadcast.

It was rumored that Jordan would take the incident to the UN.

Nov. 12: The UN announced that neither UN headquarters nor its special representative in Jordan had anything to do with a request for clearance of King Husayn's plane over Syria.

Nov. 13: The government announced that because of an "administrative slip," King Husayn had not received proper clearance to cross Syrian territory.

Anti-Nasir demonstrations continued in Amman.

Nov. 15: It was announced that Queen Mother Zayn would return to Jordan from Switzerland. She had gone there during the Middle East crisis in July.

Nov. 16: It was reported that Jordan has protested to the US and to the UN that the UAR is blocking US military assistance by refusing to grant permission for the flight of ten US jets over UAR territory.

It was reported that British officers have resumed training the Jordanian Army for the first time since

March, 1956, when King Husayn dismissed Gen. Sir John Bagot Glubb.

Nov. 17: Premier al-Rifa'i announced that Jordan would not press the issue of the incident involving King Husayn's plane before the UN.

Nov. 18: President Eisenhower extended his "warmest wishes for success and prosperity" to King Husayn through the new Jordanian Ambassador to the US, Midhat Jum'a.

Nov. 25: Ten jet fighter planes, a gift from the US, arrived in Amman. They flew across Egypt with UAR permission.

Dec. 1: King Husayn ended martial law throughout Jordan. It had been in effect for nineteen months.

Dec. 4: The US Embassy in Amman announced that the US had ended emergency deliveries of gasoline to Jordan.

## Kashmir

(See also Pakistan)

### 1958

Oct. 16: The Pakistani government released from prison Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, leader of an attempted invasion of Kashmir by an unarmed "liberation movement" last June.

Oct. 24: The government of Kashmir indicted Shaykh Muhammad Abdullah, a former Prime Minister, on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government by force and of facilitating the "wrongful annexation" of Kashmir to Pakistan.

Nov. 28: The trial of Shaykh Muhammad Abdullah began in Jammu.

Dec. 2: The treason trial of Shaykh Muhammad Abdullah was suspended for two weeks upon the request of the defendant to petition the High Court of Kashmir for a change of venue.

## Lebanon

(See also General, Algeria, Sudan)

### 1958

Sept. 16: US Ambassador Robert M. McClintock and Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, commander of US forces in Lebanon, conferred with Gen. Fu'ad Shihab, President-elect. It was rumored that the discussions concerned early withdrawal of US troops.

Four ships carrying two US marine battalions sailed from Beirut.

Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Foreign Minister, was elected President of the General Assembly.

Sept. 18: President Sham'un broadcast an appeal for national unity in the interests of all Lebanese.

Lt. Col. Fu'ad Lahhud, commander of Lebanon's southern defenses, was arrested on a charge of plotting against the government. It was rumored that he had been in close touch with Syrian military authorities.

The UN announced that "steps have been taken" to bolster its team of military observers in Lebanon.

The State Department declined comment on a report

that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld had won the approval of the UAR, Jordan, and Lebanon to establish a UN "presence" in the Middle East.

**Sept. 19:** It was reported that members of the Lebanese Parliament were opposed to rebel demands that Rashid Karami, rebel leader in Tripoli, become the first Premier under General Shihab.

Fu'ad Haddad, a political commentator, was kidnapped.

**Sept. 20:** Premier Sami al-Sulh secretly left Lebanon for Turkey.

**Sept. 21:** An around-the-clock curfew went into effect in Beirut to cope with a campaign of kidnapping by pro-government and opposition forces.

**Sept. 22:** The Cabinet formally resigned.

Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker announced that Canada will supply fifty-six more officers and men to the UN Observer Group in Lebanon.

**Sept. 23:** Fu'ad Shihab took over as President of Lebanon. The strict curfew continued, and the streets of Beirut were heavily patrolled. Gen. Shihab said he would work for the early withdrawal of US troops. Outgoing President Sham'un left for a vacation in the mountains, but said that he would return "to serve Lebanon as a simple citizen."

The Christian Phalange Party called for a general strike in protest against the disappearance of Fu'ad Haddad.

**Sept. 24:** President Shihab appointed a Cabinet headed by former rebel leader Rashid Karami. Severe violence broke out in Beirut in which 30 persons were reported killed. The President directed vigorous measures to halt the violence and restore order.

Members of the Cabinet are:

Rashid Karami, Premier, Minister of Interior and Defense

Philip Taqla, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Yusuf Saudah, Minister of Justice and Social Affairs

Rafiq Naja, Minister of Finance

Muhammad Safi al-din, Minister of Health and Education

Fu'ad Najjar, Minister of Agriculture and Communications

Farid Trad, Minister of Public Works

Charles Hilu, Minister of Economy and Information.

**Sept. 25:** It was reported that US officials expect American forces in Lebanon to withdraw by the end of Oct., dependent on "UN arrangements" and Premier Karami's ability to maintain order.

Premier Karami said that he will ask for the immediate withdrawal of US troops. He also appealed to the nation to "pull down your barricades, for the regime that will reap the fruits of the revolution has begun." He added that in foreign affairs, his government would work for the continued independence of Lebanon, brotherhood with all Arab countries, and neutrality between East and West in world politics.

**Sept. 26:** Despite a twenty-four hour curfew, Christian Phalange elements paraded through Beirut in protest against the appointment of Rashid Karami as Premier. Clashes occurred and several people were injured.

Pierre Jumayil, leader of the Phalange, presented his demand for at least one seat in the Cabinet to President Shihab. The Phalange charged that the Cabinet is composed only of rebels and "neutrals."

**Sept. 28:** The last battalion of US marines began preparing to leave Lebanon, leaving about 7,500 US soldiers there.

Sporadic violence occurred in Beirut. The Phalange announced that two of its members were killed in clashes with the Lebanese Army.

**Sept. 29:** The last US marine battalion embarked for departure.

The Phalange continued to enforce its general strike in those areas under its control. Clashes with the police and army continued.

**Sept. 30:** It was reported that Parliament would meet the week of Oct. 6 to vote on the new Lebanese Cabinet.

US Ambassador Robert McClintock brought top leaders of the new government and the Phalange together for talks. It was rumored that a compromise Cabinet was discussed. The only Cabinet member present was Philip Taqla, Foreign Minister. Pierre Jumayil also attended.

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld told the General Assembly that the US and Britain had confirmed their intention of withdrawing from Lebanon as soon as "the area had been stabilized."

**Oct. 1:** Details of the meeting arranged by Ambassador McClintock were announced by him to the press. He reported that he had made three proposals to the two factions: that Parliament give the new Cabinet a vote of confidence; that the Cabinet be expanded to include "two or three of the loyalists, who had supported former President Sham'un"; and that the membership of Parliament be increased from 66 to 85 Deputies.

Premier Karami said that he would "not reshuffle my Cabinet under any circumstances."

The UN Observer Group in Lebanon reported that armed infiltration across the border from Syria had "virtually ceased."

**Oct. 2:** Former President Sham'un said that he did not consider the proposals of US Ambassador McClintock a suitable basis for a settlement.

Ambassador McClintock came under fire from several segments of the population for what was charged as "interference in the affairs of Lebanon."

**Oct. 3:** Crowds of Christian women used sticks and stones to enforce a traffic blockade of three roads into Beirut as a mark of protest against the Cabinet. It was reported that five were wounded in a clash with the Army.

**Oct. 4:** About 1,000 US soldiers embarked for departure from Lebanon.

Beirut was quiet while negotiations to end a general strike by Christian Phalangists were carried on.

**Oct. 7:** At least 29 persons were injured and one killed in a series of disorders from Beirut to Tripoli. Two shops in downtown Beirut were bombed for violating the general strike called by the Phalange.

**Oct. 8:** A group of Deputies in Parliament demanded that the Cabinet appear before that body within forty-eight hours or resign. It was reported that Premier



Karami has been unable to muster a vote of confidence from Parliament.

**Oct. 9:** It was reported that Premier Karami and his Cabinet had offered to resign. There were no indications that President Shihab had accepted the resignations. It was rumored that he was forming an "emergency Cabinet" to meet the mounting crisis in Lebanon.

**Oct. 11:** Premier Karami agreed to enlarge his Cabinet to include supporters of former President Sham'un, it was reported. The Premier was believed to have approached some politically moderate Christians about serving in the new government.

Beirut was quiet. However, there were warnings by both sides that there would be more violence if the Cabinet crisis were not settled in two days.

**Oct. 12:** A US military spokesman in Beirut said that the US forces were "in the final stage of withdrawal."

Ten persons were reported killed in northern Lebanon in a shooting affray between feuding families. It was considered not to be connected with Lebanon's political crisis.

**Oct. 13:** At least four persons were reported killed in a new outbreak of violence in Beirut. One of the victims was Wadi al-Sulh, a nephew of former Premier al-Sulh and an official of the Ministry of Public Works.

**Oct. 14:** Final agreement was reached on the formation of a compromise Cabinet following a conference at the residence of President Shihab. A four-man Cabinet, headed by Premier Karami and including Phalangist Party leader, Pierre Jumayil, National Bloc leader, Raymond Eddé, and leader of the Islamic Council, Hussayn 'Uwayni, was formed.

Portfolios were distributed as follows:

Karami—Premier, Finance, Economy, Defense, and Information

'Uwayni—Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Planning

Eddé—Interior, Social Affairs, and PTT

Jumayil—Public Works, Education, Agriculture, and Health

It was also reported that former President Sam'un and all religious communities had approved of the compromise.

**Oct. 15:** Shops reopened in Beirut as the city returned to normal. Premier Karami broadcast to the nation that "a new era returns today. Let us unite our forces and work for a return to peace."

The new Cabinet met under the chairmanship of President Shihab to study the necessary steps toward restoring law and order and disarming civilians.

**Oct. 16:** Curfew regulations were relaxed. Army bulldozers leveled barracks, and streetcars began to operate throughout Beirut.

**Oct. 17:** Parliament gave the new Cabinet a unanimous vote of confidence.

**Oct. 18:** It was reported that final preparations were being made to airlift all US troops out of Lebanon.

The State Department announced that the wives and children of US Embassy personnel in Beirut would be permitted to return.

The new government issued an order rescinding a

previous order expelling the UAR Ambassador from Lebanon.

The government raised the ban on Syrian newspapers in Lebanon.

**Oct. 19:** The airlifting of the last US military personnel from Lebanon to Germany began.

**Oct. 21:** Foreign Minister 'Uwayni said that adoption of the Arab resolution by the General Assembly had "made obsolete" charges which the former Lebanese government had made to the UN against the UAR last May 22. Lebanon then accused the UAR of interfering in her internal affairs.

**Oct. 24:** The evacuation of US forces was completed, one week ahead of schedule. The last 1,500 troops sailed from Beirut.

**Oct. 25:** Minister of the Interior Eddé announced that the curfew in Beirut could not be completely abolished until the general atmosphere permitted it.

**Oct. 27:** Lt. Col. Fu'ad Lahhud, former commander of Lebanon's southern defenses, demanded that the army try him by courtmartial on charges of plotting against the government.

**Oct. 29:** Premier Karami said that the US had offered Lebanon economic aid to help make up losses incurred during five months of civil strife. This was confirmed by the State Department.

**Oct. 30:** The Director of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon announced that he considered "the work of his 400-man mission in Lebanon complete," and would arrange for the Group's withdrawal.

**Nov. 3:** It was reported that four persons were killed in clashes between Druze tribesmen and Christians in central Lebanon.

Former Premier Sami al-Sulh said in Paris that "the UAR has not ceased to meddle in Lebanese domestic affairs."

**Nov. 4:** The government sent a bill to Parliament requesting power to rule by decree for six months. It was announced that such power was essential to effect urgent reforms, disarm civilians, and restore peace and order.

**Nov. 11:** The UN Observer Group informed the Lebanese government that it would withdraw 200 observers "within the next few days."

**Nov. 12:** Parliament voted emergency powers to Premier Karami to rule by decree for six months. The vote was 39 to 1 with 1 abstention.

The Cabinet immediately acted to curb small groups still causing disorder.

**Nov. 16:** The Lebanese delegation to the UN was instructed to withdraw its complaint against the UAR.

**Nov. 19:** Secretary-General Hammarskjöld announced that the UN Observation Group in Lebanon would be abolished now that the Lebanese government had withdrawn its charges against the UAR.

The government announced that all work permits for foreigners would be suspended, and that the number of new permits granted would be cut by 80 percent. The reason given for this action was to reduce unemployment among Lebanese.

**Nov. 21:** The government lifted the curfew in Beirut.

- Nov. 25:** Some shooting and minor incidents of violence were reported in Beirut. It was also reported that the government was acting swiftly to eliminate disorder.
- Nov. 29:** The government ordered heavy army and police reinforcements into Tripoli to crush a wave of shooting and vandalism led by old rebel bands.
- Dec. 3:** Premier Karami announced that Lebanon had accepted a \$10,000,000 grant from the US.
- Dec. 8:** US Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree arrived in Beirut for talks with Lebanese officials.

## Libya

### 1958

- Sept. 30:** Libya protested the French bombing of Esin on the southwestern frontier with Algeria to the General Assembly. The protest charged that "serious damage and one death" resulted.
- Oct. 11:** It was reported that Libyan Premier 'Abd al-Majid Kubar was considering a reinforcement of Libyan forces along the Algerian frontier because of "repeated French aggression."
- Oct. 13:** Premier 'Abd al-Majid Kubar took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by royal decree. The former Foreign Minister, Wahbi al-Buri, became Minister of State, succeeding Khalil Qallal, who resigned.
- Oct. 14:** The Ohio Oil Company reported that its subsidiary, Oasis Oil Company of Libya, had discovered oil about 100 miles from the Mediterranean coast.
- Nov. 30:** Premier 'Abd al-Majid Kubar opened Parliament. He told the body that the government would review the four-year-old pact with the US providing for US Air Force bases in Libya.
- Dec. 3:** The UN Economic and Financial Committee approved a resolution that would invite governments to extend to Libya financial aid for economic development through the UN.

## Morocco

(See also General, Algeria, Iran)

### 1958

- Sept. 16:** It was reported that the US has asked the Moroccan government to sign a contract for continued use of five military bases in Morocco for seven more years. It was also reported that the US has agreed to the principle of eventual evacuation.
- Work came to a standstill for one-half hour in Morocco's main cities in a protest strike against the holding of the French Constitutional referendum in Algeria.
- Oct. 2:** A ten-man trade delegation from Communist China arrived in Rabat. It was rumored that commercial agreements between the two countries would be discussed.
- Oct. 3:** Four leaders of the opposition People's Movement, a political organization banned a year ago, were charged with responsibility for illegal demonstrations disturbing public peace.

- Morocco broke off trade talks with West Germany.
- Oct. 6:** Four Frenchmen and four Algerians, suspected of having set off an explosion in the town of Bou Bekar, have been arrested by Moroccan authorities.
- Oct. 7:** King Muhammad V has accepted the appointment of Dmitri P. Poxhidayev as the first Soviet Ambassador to Morocco.
- Oct. 10:** Moroccan officials reported that the French government has officially protested to Morocco against proposals for oil prospecting in the Moroccan-Algerian border region.
- Oct. 11:** The government banned a news conference that was to have been held by Dr. Hadi Messouak, leader of the Moroccan Communist Party. He had been expected to make a public protest against a police raid on Communist headquarters in Casablanca last week.
- Oct. 13:** 'Ali Yata, Secretary-General of the Moroccan Communist Party who was expelled from Morocco in 1948, was arrested for entering the country illegally.
- Oct. 21:** The Royal Moroccan Army has moved large forces into the region of Oulmes to combat a group of guerrillas, reportedly causing disorder because of its opposition to the Istiqlal Party.
- Oct. 22:** It was reported that the Army had encircled the guerrillas in the region of Oulmes.
- Oct. 27:** The government announced that the Rif Mountain area had been placed under martial law because of unrest there. A government spokesman said that "foreign influence" was "not totally absent."
- Oct. 28:** It was announced that Morocco and Communist China had concluded a \$23,000,000 trade agreement.
- Nov. 3:** The port of Casablanca was paralyzed by a strike of 3,000 dockers. The dispute involved wages and working conditions.
- Nov. 4:** King Muhammad V has ordered that 'Abd al-Karim, leader of the Rif revolt against the French and Spanish in the 1920's, be given back his property, which was seized in 1926.
- The dock strike in Casablanca ended.
- Nov. 8:** In an address at the opening of the National Consultative Assembly, King Muhammad V reaffirmed his determination to transform Morocco into a "democratic constitutional monarchy."
- Nov. 10:** 'Abd al-Rahim Bouabid, Deputy Premier and Minister of National Economy and Agriculture, submitted his resignation. It was reported that this move reflected a dispute within the Istiqlal Party over a successor to the Minister of Interior, Mas'ud Chiguer.
- Nov. 18:** In his annual message to Parliament, King Muhammad V announced Morocco's determination to obtain "total and unconditional" evacuation of US bases as well as French and Spanish troops. He asserted that their presence "constitutes a constant threat to Morocco."
- Nov. 19:** The government announced that emergency measures will be taken against persons responsible for "criminal attacks" aimed at undermining the government. Disturbances have occurred throughout Morocco recently.

- Nov. 22: King Muhammad V accepted the resignation of Deputy Premier 'Abd al-Rahim Bouabid.
- Nov. 23: Auguste Thuveney, a French attorney, was killed by a bomb in Rabat.
- Nov. 25: It was reported that King Muhammad V consulted 'Alal al-Fasi, leader of the Istiqlal, about a Cabinet reshuffle. It was also reported that Premier Ahmad Balafrej would resign soon.
- Nov. 28: It was reported that 'Alal al-Fasi failed in his attempt to form a new Cabinet.
- Nov. 30: Former Deputy Premier 'Abd al-Rahim Bouabid said that Moroccan "leftists" were ready to form a Cabinet if called upon by the King. He is generally considered the leader of the left-wing of Istiqlal.
- Dec. 3: It was announced that the King had accepted the resignation of Premier Ahmad Balafrej, but had requested all Ministers to remain in office until a new government could be formed.
- Dec. 4: Morocco protested to France against a border attack by French Forces in which several Algerians, who had taken refuge in Morocco, were killed.
- Dec. 5: A captain in the French Foreign Legion was killed in a riot in Casablanca. It was reported that the riot occurred as a result of protests against an alleged French attack on Algerian refugees in Morocco.
- Dec. 6: The French government protested to Morocco the death of a French captain in Casablanca, and demanded that the guilty parties be punished.
- Dec. 14: It was reported that the rural population in the Rif area had gone on strike.
- Dec. 15: The Cabinet crisis continued.

## Pakistan

(See also General, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Turkey)

### 1958

- Sept. 16: It was announced that Prime Minister Malik Feroz Khan Noon expanded his Cabinet to include Hamidul Huq Choudhry, a former Foreign Minister. It was believed that the action represented a move to consolidate the government's support in the East Pakistan province.
- Sept. 20: The East Pakistan Provincial Assembly met to confirm the appointment of Ataur Rahman Khan as Chief Minister. A clash broke out between members of the Awami League and the opposition which damaged the interior of the chamber.
- President Mirza banned the formation or maintenance of private armies and paramilitary organizations by political parties in Pakistan.
- Sept. 23: The government quelled a minor demonstration in Karachi by members of the Muslim League protesting the ban on private armies. The League has maintained a uniformed "national guard" of about 40,000.
- Sept. 25: Shahid Ali, Deputy Speaker of the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly, died from injuries received during a clash in the Assembly chamber. Twelve opposition members were arrested on a charge of attempted murder.
- Oct. 6: The government forcibly deposed and arrested the

Khan of Kalat, who has been charged with trying to set up an independent state in Baluchistan.

- Oct. 7: President Mirza dissolved the central and provincial governments, outlawed political parties, and declared martial law in a major political upheaval. This action followed the resignation of six ministers of the government who said they did not wish to be associated with "a failure of the government" to hold Pakistan's first general elections as promised on Feb. 15, 1959. They were members of the Awami League. The President also abolished the national and provincial assemblies and abrogated the Constitution. Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan was appointed Supreme Commander of the country.
- Oct. 9: President Mirza said in an interview that the decision to move against the government of Premier Noon had been the "common responsibility" of him and Gen. Ayub Khan in order to save Pakistan "from ruin through the misrule of corrupt politicians." In the same interview, Gen. Ayub Khan was quoted as saying that "we both came to the conclusion that the country was going to the dogs."
- Oct. 10: The new government of Pakistan began to crack down on influence-peddling, bribery, and hoarding and traffic in import licenses. It was reported that former Defense Minister Muhammad Ayub Khuhro was arrested and charged with black market sales of automobiles.
- Oct. 11: A martial law regulation was decreed making it illegal to hoard, short-weight a customer, adulterate food or medicine, or charge more than a controlled price. It was reported that this decree is being enforced against Pakistani merchants. The result, according to official sources, has been a reduction of prices and a greater abundance of goods in the markets.
- Oct. 12: The government arrested several political leaders. They include: Maulana Bashani, Khan Abd al-Ghaffar Khan, and G. M. Syed of the National Awami Party; Mujiburrahman Khan, Abd al-Mansur, Muhammad Abd al-Khalik, and Nur al-din Ahmad of the Awami League of East Pakistan; and Hamidul Huq Choudhry, a former Foreign Minister, of the Krishak Shramik Party.
- Eugene R. Black, President of the IBRD, arrived in Karachi for talks with the government on the country's economic situation.
- It was announced that the Ford Foundation has granted Pakistan nearly \$8,000,000 for "various purposes" during the quarterly period from July 14 to Oct. 13, 1958.
- Oct. 15: President Mirza lifted all press censorship.
- Oct. 18: Changes in Pakistan's administrative structure were announced. The Ministries of Parliamentary Affairs, Labor, States of Frontier Regions, and Economic Affairs were abolished and their functions merged with those of other Ministries. The National Planning Board was redesignated the National Planning Commission in charge of the administration of national development plans.
- Oct. 19: Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan announced a series of reforms which will be put into effect under his

government by martial law. The reforms include: alteration of Pakistan's legal system, based on the British code, to "give the people quicker justice;" introduction of birth control to reduce the high birth rate; abolition of the piecemeal distribution of farms in favor of more practical development on a larger scale; and putting Pakistan on a sound economic footing, even at the price of enforced austerity.

Oct. 20: Former Premier Noon disclosed that he was holding 3,000 tons of wheat in his warehouses, it was reported.

Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, former Minister of Defense arrested on charges of black marketing, was refused bail.

Oct. 24: President Mirza appointed Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan Prime Minister to head a Cabinet composed of 4 generals and 8 civilians.

Members of the Cabinet are:

Gen. Muhammad Ayub Khan—Prime Minister, Defense, and Kashmir Affairs

Lt. Gen. Muhammad Azam Khan—Rehabilitation

Mansur Qadir—Foreign Affairs

F. M. Khan—Communications

Lt. Gen. W. A. Burki—Health and Social Welfare

Habibur Rahman—Education, Information, and Broadcasting

Lt. Gen. K. M. Shaykh—Interior

'Abd al-Qasim Khan—Industries, Irrigation, Works and Power

Hafizur Rahman—Food and Agriculture

Zulfikar Ali Khan Bhutto—Commerce

M. Shoaib—Finance

Maulvi Muhammad Ibrahim—Law

Oct. 27: President Iskander Mirza resigned as President of Pakistan in favor of Prime Minister Ayub Khan. He will also remain chief executive, although the office of Prime Minister will be abolished.

Oct. 30: Gen. Ayub Khan said in an interview that he forced President Mirza to resign because "the people demanded a clean break with the past."

Nov. 3: It was reported that the military is gradually being withdrawn from tasks of day-to-day administration in Pakistan. Martial law is still in effect, however.

Gen. Ayub Khan fixed a deadline on confessions without penalty by those guilty of illegally holding foreign exchange and of filing false income statements. Former President Mirza arrived in London.

Nov. 6: The government ordered all newspapers to clearly mark as "advertising" all special supplements inserted in honor of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet Embassy, it was reported, had arranged for such supplements, glorifying the Communist way of life.

Nov. 7: Indian Prime Minister Nehru said that the risk of war between Pakistan and India had increased since the change of the Pakistani regime. He described the government of Gen. Ayub Khan as a "naked military dictatorship."

Nov. 11: It was reported that army troops on civil administration duty had been withdrawn from Karachi, and that military courts, set up under martial law, had been closed.

The government of the Indian state of Assam protested to the government of Pakistan against firing by Pakistani forces in the Bagali area of the Assam-East Pakistan border.

Nov. 13: A truce to end recent firing on the Assam-East Pakistan border has been arranged, it was reported.

Nov. 15: The State Bank of Pakistan announced removal of restrictions on bank credits. The restrictions were imposed a year ago to curb inflation.

Nov. 19: Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who arrived in New Delhi from Pakistan, said that he was "confident that the military rulers of Pakistan wished to return to a parliamentary government at the earliest possible moment."

Nov. 20: Prime Minister Nehru told Parliament that the attitude of Pakistan's new regime "had not been friendly and in some instances had even been menacing." He warned that India "must be prepared for any emergency that might arise."

Nov. 26: It was announced in Accra, Ghana, that Prime Minister Nkrumah will visit Pakistan in January, 1959.

The Department of Agriculture announced that an agreement had been reached between the US and Pakistan for the sale of \$28,000,000 worth of surplus US farm products.

Nov. 27: The Indian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister said that the US had assured India that military discussions being conducted between the US and Pakistan "do not envisage a new military treaty."

Dec. 6: India and Pakistan appealed through the UN to the Union of South Africa to negotiate with them on the question of the treatment of people of Indian and Pakistani origin in the Union.

Dec. 8: The IMF announced an agreement with Pakistan to allow the Pakistani government to draw up to \$25,000,000 in dollars and other currencies over the next twelve months.

## Palestine Problem

(See also Israel, Jordan, UAR)

### 1958

Sept. 25: A Jordanian Army spokesman charged that three shepherds were kidnapped by an Israeli patrol that crossed into no-man's land between the two countries.

Oct. 3: An Israeli military spokesman charged that Jordanians opened fire on an Israeli patrol inside Israeli territory. The Israelis returned the fire.

Oct. 12: Eight border policemen were found guilty of murder for their part in the killing of 43 Israeli Arabs two years ago in the village of Kafr Qasim.

Oct. 16: Prison sentences ranging up to 17 years were imposed on eight border policemen found guilty of murdering 43 Arabs.

Oct. 22: Leslie J. Carver, acting head of the UN aid program for Arab Refugees, reported to the UN that Arab governments were interfering in the relief operation. He also requested a UN budget of \$37,500,000 for UNRWA for 1959.

Oct. 24: Saudi Arabia warned Israel that an attack on Jordan would call for "collective military action by all the Arab states."

Oct. 27: The US called on the Arab States and Israel before the UN for renewed efforts to resolve the problem of the Arab refugees.

Oct. 29: Premier Ben-Gurion said that if there is a change in the status of Jordan, Israel "should insist on demilitarization of Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River."

Oct. 30: Cairo newspapers charged that Israel was mobilizing and was concentrating troops in the vicinity of Jerusalem and Beersheba near the Jordanian border. The Israeli government denied the charges.

Nov. 2: The Israeli Cabinet voted to open a new investigation of the Kafr Qasim massacre.

Israeli spokesmen said that two infiltrators from Lebanon were shot and killed by an Israeli border patrol.

Nov. 6: A UN Truce Supervision Team halted a border affray between Israeli and UAR forces. It had begun as a skirmish and developed into an artillery duel. There were no deaths reported.

Nov. 10: The US told the UN that it did not favor continuance of relief to the Arab refugees after 1960. The US delegate asserted that some alternative must be found, and suggested that the UN help them become self-sufficient in the areas where they are now located.

Nov. 11: The Israeli Foreign Ministry announced that it favored the suggestion of the US on the Arab refugee problem.

Saudi Arabia expressed opposition before the UN to the US suggestion that the UNRWA relief program be dropped after 1960.

Nov. 17: Israel told the UN that she was willing to compensate the Palestine Arab refugees without insisting, as she has in the past, that such payment await a general Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Israel also asked that international financial help be made available to Israel to help settle the refugee claims, it was reported.

Nov. 18: Saudi Arabia attacked the Israeli proposal for compensation to the refugees as an "unscrupulous proposal belonging to the jungle," and proposed that the UN appoint a trustee to safeguard refugee holdings in Israel and collect revenues and rents.

Nov. 19: The wife of the British Air Attaché in Israel, Mrs. Joyce Doran, was found murdered in a field of reeds near the Jordan River.

Israeli authorities charged that infiltrators from Syria had killed Mrs. Doran.

A UAR spokesman termed as "lies" Israeli charges that Arab infiltrators had killed Mrs. Doran.

Nov. 21: Israel charged that Syrian forces opened fire on an Israeli reclamation area south of Lake Hula.

The UAR charged that an Israeli band crossed the Jordan River and attempted to attack a Syrian frontier post.

Nov. 23: Maj. Gen. Carl von Hord, Chairman of the UN Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, met with UAR President Nasir to discuss the reactivation of the

Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission, boycotted by the Israelis since 1956.

Nov. 28: Premier Ben-Gurion said that he expected to confer with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on the implementation of Article 8 of the Jordanian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, which would permit Israel to have access to the Jewish holy places within the Old City of Jerusalem, now Jordanian territory.

Dec. 2: The UAR charged that four Israeli planes violated the air space of the Gaza Strip.

Dec. 3: An artillery clash between Israeli and Syrian forces was stopped by UN truce supervisors, it was reported. The Israelis reported one dead and three wounded. Israel also claimed that eight Israeli villages were shelled.

Dec. 4: Israel decided to ask for an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the shelling of eight Israeli villages along the Syrian border, it was announced in Jerusalem.

Dec. 5: The Security Council was called to meet on Dec. 8 to consider Israel's latest charges of border violence against the UAR.

Dec. 6: The Lebanese Foreign Ministry announced that Lebanese and Syrian troops along Israel's frontiers have been alerted following reports of "unusually heavy Israeli troop concentrations near the borders."

Israel charged that Syrian troops had poured intermittent rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire into the Israeli border area near Lake Hula.

Dec. 7: The Israeli Army denied reports that Israel was concentrating forces along her frontier with Syria and Lebanon.

Dec. 8: Israel charged before the Security Council, which met to hear charges against the UAR, that the UAR was guilty of an "act of war" in its bombardment of Israeli villages.

The UAR counter-charged that Israel "had committed daily violations of the 1949 Palestine Armistice Agreement."

Dec. 15: Secretary-General Hammarskjöld announced that he would leave on Dec. 18 for the Middle East to try to settle the latest border troubles between Israel and the UAR.

## Persian Gulf

(See also Iraq)

### 1958

Sept. 29: An Arab League spokesman reported in Cairo that Kuwait had applied to join the League.

Oct. 23: The first Bristol Britannia jet-prop airliner to fly the new BOAC service from London to the Persian Gulf landed in Kuwait.

Oct. 27: The British Foreign Office announced that "it had no knowledge of any intention by Qatar to join the Arab League."

Nov. 1: It was reported that the British have rushed troops to Muscat and Oman to help repel increased rebel activity against the Sultan.

The Oman Bureau in Cairo reported that clashes



between British troops, parachuted into Muscat and Oman, had resulted in five "nationalist deaths."

**Nov. 13:** It was reported that the Arab League members at the UN have agreed to raise the question of "British aggression" against the Imam of Oman at the General Assembly in 1959.

**Nov. 25:** The Oman Bureau in Cairo reported that a British plane had been shot down in a raid. The office also said that the forces of the Imam of Oman had killed eight British soldiers and wounded seven others in clashes.

## Saudi Arabia

### 1958

**Sept. 17:** The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency announced a reduction in the free market rate of the Saudi riyal in relation to the US dollar of two guruh. The Agency also said that the forces of the Imam of Oman had killed eight British soldiers and wounded seven others in clashes.

**Sept. 20:** The government recognized the Provisional Government of Algeria.

**Sept. 24:** King Sa'ud formally sent congratulations to the new President of Lebanon.

It was reported that the Minister of Agriculture promised Saudi businessmen assistance from the Ministry if they would invest in agricultural projects.

**Sept. 26:** It was announced in Riyadh that Fahd Ibn Sa'ud, eldest son of the King, has been reinstated as Minister of Defense.

**Sept. 30:** The Saudi delegate to the UN said that the proposed special fund for underdeveloped areas "would not create conditions for making new capital investment feasible."

**Oct. 1:** Minister of State Ahmad al-Shukayri suggested that France negotiate directly with the Provisional Algerian Government in Cairo, and that UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld act as mediator.

**Oct. 8:** The British Ministry of Defense announced that four British soldiers were arrested and imprisoned in Saudi Arabia for crossing the Saudi-Jordanian border during a night exercise on Sept. 29.

**Oct. 11:** The government confirmed a royal decree appointing Anwar 'Ali Governor of the Monetary Agency as of April 1, 1958.

**Oct. 14:** It was reported that Saudi Arabia has presented a proposal for an oil concession to the Standard Oil Company of Indiana. The terms of the proposal would prescribe Saudi participation in the operation on an "integrated company" basis.

**Oct. 15:** Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Yasin, arrived in the US to consult heart specialists. He was quoted as saying that "Saudi Arabia and the UAR are allies whose policy is first to promote Arab interests."

**Oct. 16:** It was reported that Saudi Arabia's offer of a new oil concession to Indiana Standard has been rejected.

**Oct. 23:** Crown Prince Faysal said in a press conference that Saudi Arabia has achieved an independent foreign

policy based on neutralism and Arab nationalism. He also said that "our financial position has now improved, though the results are not as we would have desired."

**Oct. 24:** Ahmad al-Shukayri warned Israel that an attack by Israel against Jordan would be an attack on all Arab states.

**Oct. 31:** The government released four British soldiers held in custody for illegally crossing into Saudi Arabia from Jordan.

**Nov. 8:** It was reported that Saudi Arabia has granted an oil exploration and mining concession to the Italian Sani Company covering 13,000 sq. miles in the Jizan area, including the Farasan Islands.

**Nov. 15:** Representatives of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAR met in Damascus for a preliminary meeting of the Executive Committee for repairing the Hijaz railway.

**Nov. 20:** The Saudi Arabian government recognized the new government of the Sudan.

Muhammad 'Ali Ridha Zaynal resigned as Minister of Commerce.

**Nov. 24:** The ban on the importation of private automobiles was extended for another six months by royal decree.

**Nov. 28:** Saudi Arabia charged Britain with "armed aggression" before the UN. The Saudi delegate said that Britain occupied the area of Khor al-Udayd, south of the Persian Gulf, in violation of a bilateral agreement to maintain the status quo in disputed territory on the fringes of the Arabian Peninsula.

## Sudan

(See also General, Algeria, Lebanon)

### 1958

**Sept. 16:** Muhammad Ahmad Mahgub, Sudanese Foreign Minister who was supported for President of the General Assembly by the UAR, was defeated by Charles Malik of Lebanon.

**Oct. 6:** Foreign Minister Mahgub called on the US and Britain to hasten their withdrawal from Lebanon and Jordan.

**Oct. 29:** Premier 'Abdallah Khalil left Khartoum for a ten-day private visit to Ethiopia to receive medical treatment.

**Oct. 31:** The British Foreign Office announced that Britain will send "urgent shipments" of arms, ammunition, and equipment to the Sudan.

**Nov. 13:** It was announced in Cairo that Premier Khalil will confer with President Nasir in Cairo on outstanding problems between the two countries.

**Nov. 16:** Sudanese Commerce Minister, 'Ali 'Abd al-Rahman, said in Cairo that a basis had been laid in "cordial" discussions with President Nasir for UAR-Sudanese discussions of outstanding problems. He also announced that a new trade payments agreement between the two states had been drawn up.

**Nov. 17:** Lt. Gen. Ibrahim 'Abbud, Commander in Chief of Sudanese Armed Forces, took control of the government following a quiet coup. There was no disorder

or violence. The government of Premier Khalil resigned. Gen. 'Abbud issued a series of decrees declaring a state of emergency, suspending the Constitution and all newspapers, dismissing Parliament, and dissolving political parties.

In a public statement, Gen. 'Abbud declared that the country was suffering from the malady of political wrangling and of self-seeking leaders. "The natural step in such circumstances is for the Army to put an end to the corruption and to restore stability and security for all." He added that "as to our sister country, the UAR, we shall work hard to improve relations, solve all outstanding problems, and end the tension that was spreading before."

Political observers in London told the press that the Sudanese coup was interpreted by them as "neither a pro-Egyptian nor anti-Western development."

Nov. 18: Gen. Ibrahim 'Abbud declared that the Sudan would remain a democratic republic, and appointed a Supreme Council and a Cabinet to govern the country. The Council delegated its authority to Gen. Abbud.

Members of the Cabinet are:

Ibrahim 'Abbud—Premier and Defense

Major Gen. Ahmad 'Abd al-Wahhab—Interior and Local Government

Maj. Gen. Muhammad Tal'at Farid—Information and Labor

Brig. Ahmad 'Abd al-Hamid—Agriculture and Irrigation

Brig. Ahmad Rida Farid—Works and Mineral Resources

Brig. Hassan Bashir Nasir—Council and Presidential Affairs

Brig. Ahmad Magdub al-Bahari—Communications

Ziyadah Arabab—Education and Justice

'Abd al-Majid Ahmad—Finance and Commerce

Santino Deing—Animal Resources

Ahmad Khayir—Foreign Affairs

Dr. Muhammad Ahmad 'Ali—Health

Nov. 19: Gen. 'Abbud took the oath of office as Premier of the Sudan.

Premier 'Abbud announced that the Sudan would honor its obligations to the UN and the Arab League, and would honor accords concluded since the nation became independent in 1956.

The UAR, Britain, and Ethiopia recognized the new regime.

Nov. 21: Interior Minister 'Abd al-Wahhab declared that the Sudan would reconsider all of the country's agreements with foreign states and reject those unfavorable to her. He was also quoted as saying that the new regime "would rather die of hunger than accept any aid from abroad that lessened the Sudan's independence." However, he added, the government would carefully consider any offer of help from the Soviet Union.

France, West Germany, Jordan, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Iraq, and Tunisia recognized the new regime.

Nov. 22: Premier 'Abbud declared in a press interview that "as soon as things are put right," the Army would return the country to civilian control.

Nov. 23: Ahmad 'Abd al-Wahhab, Minister of Interior, was quoted as saying that the Sudan's policy was now "neutralist rather than pro-Western."

Nov. 26: Former Premier Khalil said that he knew in advance of the coup in the Sudan and "approved of it." He further said that the coup saved his country from a "foreign-sponsored move to end Sudanese independence."

Secretary of State Dulles praised the new government of the Sudan in a press conference in Washington. He said the new government seems "dedicated to the independence of the Sudan and good relations with its neighbors, both of which policies we favor."

Nov. 27: Premier 'Abbud said that he favors "in general" the \$31,000,000 US economic aid program for the Sudan.

Nov. 29: The Sudan recognized Communist China.

## Tunisia

(See also General, Algeria)

### 1958

Sept. 16: President Habib Bourguiba in a press interview recognized a trend toward growing authoritarianism in his country, but said "if they accuse me of dictatorship, I accept. I am creating a nation. Liberty must be suppressed until the end of the war in Algeria—until the nation becomes homogeneous."

Sept. 18: Tunisia accused France of "repeated violations" of Tunisian territory by French troops, which resulted in the deaths of "at least" four Tunisians within the last week.

Sept. 19: The French Defense Ministry denied Tunisian charges that French forces had violated Tunisian territory.

Sept. 22: Former Premier Tahar ben Ammar and 23 others went on trial in Tunis on a charge of complicity in receiving jewels belonging to the former Bey of Tunis.

Oct. 3: President Bourguiba took steps to "decentralize" the political control of the Neo-Destour Party. He announced that Political Commissioners in each of the 14 provinces would replace party federations.

Oct. 9: Habib Bourguiba, Jr., son of the President, was appointed Tunisian Ambassador to France.

Oct. 30: President Bourguiba announced that a new currency, the dinar, valued at 1,000 French francs, would be issued next week.

Nov. 5: Tunisia accused France of sending two regiments of French troops, accompanied by forty-two tanks and supported by mortar fire, across the Tunisian border in the vicinity of Kalaat-es-Senam.

Nov. 6: The French Command in Algiers formally denied Tunisian charges that French forces had penetrated Tunisian territory.

Nov. 8: The Tunisian Foreign Ministry announced that Tunisia would not agree to any "restrictive conditions" attached to arms supplies she is seeking from the US and Britain. The announcement also said that Tunisia would renounce the arms rather than have her right

to buy them "submitted to the agreement of a third party."

**Nov. 12:** The State Department announced that Tunisia has been assured that her arms deal with the US was not subject to any kind of veto by France. The announcement continued that the "French have been generally informed in this matter and have registered no objection to Tunisia's arms purchases."

**Nov. 13:** President Bourguiba said that Tunisia was trying to buy arms from two Communist states—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He also asserted that "his traditional Western friends had offered to supply them only under unacceptable circumstances."

The British Foreign Office issued a statement that it still considered it possible to sell arms to Tunisia.

**Nov. 19:** President Bourguiba said that he still intended to go ahead with limited purchases of arms from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He also expressed hope that arms shipments from the US would also begin soon.

**Nov. 23:** President Bourguiba said today that several officers of the UAR had been arrested in Tunisia. He indicated that they would be tried for allegedly trying to stir up a plot to overthrow his regime and assassinate him. He charged that they were "followers of Salah ben Yusuf," former Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour Party and foe of Bourguiba.

Salah ben Yusuf said in Cairo that Mr. Bourguiba's charges against him and his followers were "fantastic." "I never took part in any plot against him," he was reported as saying.

**Nov. 25:** The State Department said that the US will soon sign an agreement with Tunisia to sell the Tunisians enough arms for one Tunisian battalion. This will be done in conjunction with the British, it was reported.

**Nov. 29:** It was reported that President Bourguiba plans to buy all agricultural lands held by foreigners in Tunisia.

**Dec. 2:** It was reported that the French government and French land interests in Tunisia were disturbed by reports that the government would buy land held by foreigners.

## Turkey

(See also General, Afghanistan, Cyprus)

### 1958

**Sept. 21:** Premier Adnan Menderes defended his huge spending program and the use of US and other foreign aid to support them.

**Sept. 22:** President Celal Bayar arrived in Karachi for a two-day visit.

**Sept. 25:** Premier Menderes opened a dam at Nazilli. It was reported to be one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in Europe and will provide electricity and irrigation water for "scores of villages."

**Sept. 29:** It was reported that the US has encouraged Turkey in her efforts to stabilize the economy, and expects to continue long-range economic aid to the Turkish government.

**Oct. 11:** It was reported from Ankara that Premier Menderes faces much opposition to his economic development program. Reports indicate that criticism in the press and from the opposition is increasing.

**Nov. 1:** President Bayar opened the Turkish Parliament with a statement that cooperation with the US remained the "pivot" of Turkey's foreign policy.

**Nov. 5:** It was reported that a new US-Turkish military agreement within the Baghdad Pact has been prepared. Details were not revealed.

**Nov. 19:** The government announced that a new university—Ataturk University—would be established at Erzurum in eastern Turkey.

**Nov. 20:** The editor of the newspaper, *Ulus*, was sentenced to 22 months in prison for having "insulted Press Minister Server Sonmumcuoglu" in a press article.

**Nov. 21:** The Turkish Press Minister rebuked a recent foreign critic of the country's press laws on the ground that he was trying "to interfere with Turkey's domestic affairs." The foreign critic was identified as Urs Schwarz, Chairman of the Executive Board of the International Press Institute.

**Nov. 23:** The government raised the prices of tea, sugar, cigarettes, and liquor. These products are controlled by government monopolies.

An appeals court upheld a one-year prison sentence against Usuf Adenhan, editor of the newspaper, *Akis*, on charges of publishing libelous material.

**Nov. 24:** The Liberty Party voted to dissolve itself and to merge with the People's Republican Party, chief opposition party to the government.

Robert College and the American College for Girls, both located in Istanbul, formally merged.

**Nov. 30:** Metin Toker, a magazine publisher and son-in-law of former President Ismet Inonu, went to jail after being convicted on charges of violating Turkey's press laws.

**Dec. 2:** It was announced in Paris that Turkey has been granted financial credits totaling \$70,000,000 by a dozen European countries through the OEEC.

**Dec. 6:** Harold Stassen was appointed an advisor to the Middle East Technical University at Ankara.

## United Arab Republic

(See also General, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon)

### 1958

**Sept. 17:** It was reported that the US will soon release about \$5,000,000 in foreign aid to the UAR. These funds were frozen when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956.

It was announced in Belgrade that President Tito will visit the UAR as part of a projected tour of Asian countries.

Nuritdin A. Mukhitdinov, a member of the Soviet Communist Party's Presidium, arrived in Cairo on a cultural visit.

**Sept. 18:** The UAR and the Soviet Union signed a maritime agreement.

**Sept. 21:** It was reported from Cairo that President Nasir plans to centralize the administration of the UAR by replacing the dual ministerial arrangement with a stronger central government. The reports also indicated that the Egyptian-Syrian union had not been functioning as smoothly as hoped.

**Sept. 25:** President Nasir said today that Arab nationalism has been moving "much quicker than we had expected."

**Sept. 28:** A presidential decree created a General Petroleum Authority to plan petroleum policy and to "supervise the administration and exploitation of oil" in the UAR.

**Oct. 2:** Egyptian newspapers reported that Vice President Sabri al-'Asali had been linked to a "plot of the former Iraqi government to overthrow the Syrian regime" by testimony given at the Baghdad trials. Vice President al-'Asali arrived in Cairo to confer with President Nasir. It was reported that a "special commission" will investigate the charges against al-'Asali.

**Oct. 7:** President Nasir announced plans for the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the UAR. He said that the dual Cabinet system would be replaced by a single Cabinet. He also announced the resignation of Sabri al-'Asali as Vice President.

Radio Cairo unleashed an attack against the US for failing to withdraw troops from Lebanon. Broadcasts also attacked President Eisenhower.

**Oct. 16:** It was reported that the UAR government has rejected a Soviet bid to build schools, hospitals, and orphanages in the UAR.

**Oct. 17:** It was announced that Field Marshal 'Abd al-Hakim Amir will visit the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet government.

**Oct. 18:** 'Abd al-Mun'im Qaysuni, Minister of Economics, said that a new currency—the Arab dinar—will replace the Egyptian pound and Syrian lira by July, 1959.

**Oct. 19:** 'Abd al-Hakim Amir arrived in Moscow.

**Oct. 22:** It was reported that the UAR has asked the Soviet Union to warn the US, Britain, and France against aiding Israel should war again occur between the Israelis and the Arabs.

**Oct. 23:** The Soviet Union announced that it would loan the UAR government 400 million rubles (\$100,000,000) for first-stage construction of the Aswan Dam.

**Nov. 14:** President Nasir pledged continued support of the UAR for the Algerian nationalist cause. He also declared that "the same applies to Aden. We shall help its people all we can, not heeding any threats."

**Nov. 27:** The Foreign Ministry announced that it had refused to grant permission to the US to land MAT Service planes at Cairo.

**Nov. 29:** A large delegation of educators and publicists will represent the UAR at the All-Africa Peoples' Conference at Accra, Ghana, it was announced.

**Dec. 3:** President Nasir accused President Bourguiba of "manufacturing an assassination plot against him to distract attention from his subservience to the French."

**Dec. 5:** President Nasir met with President Tito of Yugoslavia on board Tito's yacht at Suez.

**Dec. 14:** US Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree conferred with President Nasir for three hours.

## Egypt

### 1958

**Sept. 18:** The Egyptian government freed French assets frozen in 1956 when Britain and France attacked Egypt.

**Oct. 10:** A record cotton crop for Egypt this year was announced by the government.

**Oct. 20:** The Sahara Petroleum Company, an operating subsidiary of the Continental Oil Company, announced that it would abandon prospecting operations in the Western Desert of Egypt. The announcement also stated that about \$30,000,000 had been spent on the operation in four and one half years.

**Oct. 23:** The Soviet Union extended 400,000,000 rubles to Egypt for construction of the High Dam at Aswan.

**Oct. 24:** It was reported that the Soviet offer to Egypt to aid in the building of the Dam was enthusiastically received throughout the Middle East.

**Oct. 29:** It was announced in Tokyo that Japan still hopes to participate in the Aswan Dam project.

**Oct. 31:** It was reported that some countries using the Suez Canal have refused to pay a 3 per cent surcharge, authorized by the General Assembly, to repay money borrowed by the UN to clear the Suez Canal.

**Nov. 9:** Dr. Charles Malik, President of the General Assembly, said that the US "should make a gift to Egypt" to help in the construction of the Aswan Dam.

**Nov. 14:** A group of Soviet experts arrived in Cairo to work out details of Soviet aid in the building of the High Dam.

## Syria

### 1958

**Sept. 20:** Nuritdin A. Mukhitdinov arrived in Damascus from Cairo to visit the Syrian Province.

**Oct. 5:** The exploration concession of the Menhall oil interests was cancelled by the Syrian government for alleged violation of their exploration license.

**Nov. 12:** The Syrian government accused Jordan of "provocative aggression" following a clash on the border in which a Syrian corporal was wounded.

## Yemen

(See also Aden)

### 1958

**Nov. 3:** It was reported that Muhammad Ashami, Director General of the Foreign Ministry of Yemen, was killed when a Yemen Airlines plane crashed in the Apennine Mountains in Italy.

**Nov. 20:** It was reported in Aden that Imam Ahmad was injured in a fall from a horse.

**Nov. 21:** It was reported from Aden that the Yemeni government had denied reports that the Imam was injured, adding that he "enjoyed good health."

## BOOK REVIEWS

### GENERAL

AZMAT AL-FIKR-'AL-'ARABI (THE CRISIS IN ARAB THOUGHT), by Ishāq Mūsa al-Husayni. Beirut Dār Bayrūt, 1954. 152 pages. £L 1.50.

*Reviewed by Harold W. Glidden*

Among the books and articles written by Arabs themselves on the subject of Arab nationalism and unity that have appeared in Western languages there are few if any of the type represented by this work of Dr. Husayni. Almost all of the material in European languages tends to be propagandistic or apologetic in tone and hence gives a poor impression of the scope of Arab thinking on this subject. Yet there are Arab writers who are attempting a rational analysis of the problem of Arab unity and related matters.

The central theme of this book is the problems of Arab unity. In this respect, the author points out the lack of agreement regarding a fundamental basis of Arab unity, namely the "Arab nation." In examining Arab thinking on this subject he notes several characteristics that have also become apparent to Western students of the subject, namely: (1) lack of any sure sense of direction, (2) a tendency toward improvisation, (3) lack of a rational approach to the problem, (4) absence of intellectual courage and freedom and self-criticism, and (5) an obsession with the past. These and other faults he lays at the door of the low state of social and intellectual development in the Arab lands. For these reasons, he maintains, the Arabs as such carry little weight in international politics and he attributes such importance as they have solely to their strategic location and natural resources.

The term "Arabism" (*'urūbah*), the author stresses, has no one accepted meaning among the Arabs; some predicate it on religious affiliation (Islam) while others interpret it in an ethnic sense. Dr. Husayni feels that it should be defined on a cultural and attitudinal basis. In particular, he emphasizes the importance of language in

creating a feeling of unity among the Arabs and he regards the disparate Arabic dialects as forces working for division rather than unity. His final contention is that the current concepts of unity to a great extent have been predicated on false assumptions and have been imposed from above rather than built up from below as they should be. He believes that Arab political leaders have no true knowledge as to how pervasive the feeling for unity is or how much actual substance there is to it. Dr. Husayni himself believes that it is little more than a veneer and that before such unity can have any solid basis there must take place a process of "Arabization of the Arabs." To recapture their "Arabism" they should (1) hold fast to their language and literature, (2) take pride in their history and endeavor to understand it, (3) cling fast to the traditions of the Arab nations, (4) adhere to the customs, policies and religious faith in which the Arab nation for centuries has taken pride, and (5) defend the honor of Arabism.

It is refreshing to find an Arab approach to the problems of Arab unity that does not harp on the well-worn stereotypes of "imperialism" and foreign conspiracies as the source of disunity. Dr. Husayni rightly sees that the major obstacles to unity are found among the Arabs themselves. Yet there is a marked ambivalence in his approach that is characteristic of the present-day Arab intelligentsia. This ambivalence produces for the Western reader certain bizarre inconsistencies that an Arab reader probably would not perceive. For instance, while Dr. Husayni on the one hand criticizes the Arabs for their obsession with the past, on the other he exhorts them to immerse themselves in their history and cling to their traditions and inherited religious attitudes. He does not seem to grasp the connection between these traditions and attitudes and the sorry social and intellectual state in which the Arab world, as he says, finds itself today. In other words, the reader is impressed with the fact that the Arab intelligentsia, even the best of them, have not



succeeded in applying Western methodology to the solution of their own problems. The Western and the Arab thought-processes seem to co-exist largely independently of each other; though at times they may approach each other, they never seem to merge.

◆ HAROLD W. GLIDDEN is a member of the board of advisory editors of the MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.

KHURAFAT AL-MITAFISIQA, by Zakī Nāguib Maḥmūd. Cairo: Nahḍa Library, 1953. 233 pages. No price indicated.

*Reviewed by George F. Hourani*

This book has a somewhat unusual interest as an intellectual product of the modern Arab world. It is an Arabic exposition of logical positivism, the analytic philosophy which takes its inspiration from Hume and was developed in Europe, Britain and the United States in the twenty years between the two world wars. The author, an Egyptian professor of philosophy at the University of Cairo, took his doctorate at London, where he must have come strongly under the influence of A. J. Ayer, a leading exponent of analysis.

In chapter I Dr. Nāguib gives a general description of analytic philosophy, concluding with its historical pedigree in Greek philosophy (Socrates, Aristotle) and British philosophy (Locke, Berkeley, Hume). Chapter 2 gives an account of Kant's critical philosophy. Chapter 3 is the author's criticism of "the rejected metaphysics," and the last three chapters illustrate the analytic method from the work of Moore, Russell and Carnap. Dr. Nāguib's handling of his subject is always clear and lively and often illuminating. At times it will seem to most readers that he is too enthusiastic a disciple, condemning as meaningless words which do not deserve such a fate, such as "essence" (*dhāt*) and "existence" (*wujūd*) (pp. 75-8). The central problem of ethics which has engaged the attention of philosophers for centuries, the meaning of "good" and "obligatory," is simply flattened out à la Carnap by declaring the terms to have no descriptive reference in their categorical use. "The Absolute" is likewise disposed of rather easily, while the term "God"

is expressly avoided as suggesting religious ideas which have only a slight connection with philosophic concepts.

The interest of *The Nonsense of Metaphysics*, however, does not lie in its specific theses so much as in its pioneering character as a serious attempt to deal with problems of philosophy in a manner that is thoughtful, honest and modern. As such it is half the globe's distance beyond most of the productions which go by the name of modern Islamic thought. This is al-Kindi once more introducing genuine philosophy to the Arabs; only this time the style is not crude, for Dr. Nāguib writes with an easy elegance worthy of Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd. He proves, if anyone still demands such a proof, that Arabic is capable of expressing the most abstract thought that the human mind is capable of conceiving.

◆ GEORGE F. HOURANI is associate professor of Arabic studies at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

MIDDLE EAST INDICTMENT, by Arslan Humbaraci. London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1958. 281 pages; appendices, index. No price indicated.

*Reviewed by William Yale*

For purposes of review this book was read first in July and again in November. On second reading it proved even more interesting and more significant in the light of subsequent events. Using a time-honored academic phrase, one has no hesitation in saying that *Middle East Indictment* should be required reading for the Pentagon, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, for members of Congress and all others who concern themselves with Middle East affairs.

It goes without saying that a book by a man like Humbaraci is controversial. A liberal Turkish journalist and correspondent for the *New York Times*, he incurred the wrath of the Turkish nationalists for his criticism of the Turkish government. Disillusioned by the pseudo-democracy in Turkey, he became a Communist agent and later a free-lance European journalist who eventually repudiated Soviet Communism and found refuge in England.

The title he chose is somewhat misleading,

for the volume is not an indictment of the Middle East but of its ruling classes and the Great Powers, both Western and Communist. It is divided into two Books. The first is somewhat autobiographical, opening with a chapter entitled "The Rebel" and ending with one called "The Last Escape," followed by an Epilogue. In some 100 odd pages Humbaraci gives an account of himself and his varied activities from his youth through his career as a journalist and Russian agent to his flight from Lebanon to England. Parts of Book I read like a "cloak and dagger" thriller. One, however, written with a serious purpose.

Book II, which is somewhat longer than Book I, analyzes the cause of Russian successes and of Western failures in the Middle East during the past decade. He is outspoken in his condemnation of the unscrupulous means used by the Soviet in pursuit of its aims. He does explain, however, the means by which the Russians have penetrated the Middle East. He draws striking comparisons of Soviet successes and Western failures by explaining how the ineptitude of the Americans and the rivalry between Britain and the United States have contributed to the existing situation. He claims that neither the United States nor Great Britain concern themselves with the welfare, desires and hopes of the Near Eastern people, but are more concerned with defense against the Soviet Union.

The following observations from Book I give somewhat of its flavor. "The (Turkish) Republic had discovered that I was not a *pure Turk*. I had myself become a victim of the prejudice I had shared. I was a second class citizen." In explaining how he achieved a newsman's scoop he states that he learned through American "fondness for alcohol" that Anatolia was strewn with the wreckage of PT 47 US fighter planes, the Americans blaming the crashes on the mechanical ineptitude of Turkish fliers, the Turks on defective American planes. In commenting on his repudiation of Soviet Communism, he writes: "I faced the bitter realization that Soviet Communism, far from being the answer to the problems of the world, was a remedy far more evil than the disease it set out to cure."

In Book II, commenting on Soviet penetra-

tion, he states that: "The real explanation is that the West forced Arab nationalism to turn to Moscow. . . . Western blunders have been Moscow's greatest asset." Humbaraci's criticisms of American and British policies are illuminated by the "case method" of presenting actual situations which he maintains reveal the mistakes of these two Western powers.

◆ WILLIAM YALE is Professor at Boston University and Professor Emeritus, University of New Hampshire.

THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: MODERNIZING THE MIDDLE EAST, by Daniel Lerner with the collaboration of Lucille W. Pevsner. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958. 466 pages. \$7.50.

*Reviewed by Malcolm N. Quint*

In this very remarkable book Professor Lerner and Mrs. Pevsner examine and analyze one of the major problems facing the Middle East today—the adjustment of formerly isolated peoples to twentieth century technology and ideas. The authors discuss the process of social change in six Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iran) as viewed along the axis of mass communication media. The examination is based upon a series of field studies carried out in 1950 by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University and upon a formidable bibliography.

The central theme, that the Middle East is moving from traditional to modern society through several transitional stages, is analyzed and discussed in terms of individual personality, political, economic and sociological characteristics.

The purpose of the study is "To explain *why* and show *how* individuals and institutions modernize together." Modernity is defined as "a participant style of life . . . (and the authors) identify its distinctive personality mechanism as *empathy*."

A sample of about 1600 individuals in the six countries were asked some 117 questions about their social characteristics and their participation in the mass media of communication. "The sample in each country was purposively controlled to overrepresent the population of

movie-goers, radio listeners and newspaper readers." It was further limited to three provinces in each country. The authors warn that "No rigorous inference could be made from the controlled sample to the total population of any country."

Essentially one must agree with the analysis of social change presented. As people acquire literacy, participate to an increasing degree in the mass media of communication, become urbanized, and go beyond the confines of kin group, village or tribe, they become transitional in the sense that their adaptations to their natural, social and supernatural environments must be modified in conformance to the changes in the environments themselves and/or in their perception of the environments.

We are able to understand the transitional stages which involve, as the authors point out, a "conflict of values—continued loyalty to the old, growing desire for the new. . ." It is in an examination of the end product of this transition, the "modern," "empathic" and "participant" Middle Easterner, that a number of questions arise. The most important of these involves an underlying assumption of the authors—that traditional society in the Middle East is evolving into a modern (in Western terms) society. Even the most "modern" of Middle Easterners exhibits to a marked extent the "conflict of values" which characterizes the "transitionals," although the surface adjustment might be more facile. The adjustment involves an overt rejection of the old values which mitigate against social mobility, the major objective of both the "modern" and "transitional." Yet, as John Gulick has pointed out,\* for the "modern" man "the new has no meaning . . . except as an instrument to achieve certain ends; and the traditional has at the same time been devalued. . . . And so he is unable to derive emotional satisfaction from the traditional or from the new."

The rejection of traditional values is indeed difficult and, though one may overtly reject or derogate these rules of life, one may not so easily escape them since, on the unconscious level, behavior is regulated by them.

The basic flaw in the authors' analysis is the

assumption that the "modern" has already appeared upon the scene in the Middle East and that he is the end product of the transformation of traditional society. On the contrary, those people called "modern" by the authors are perhaps somewhat further along the road of transformation than those called "transitional" but they have a long way to go before coming to an end point. The authors recognize this in quoting Albert Hourani who said that the Levantines live in two worlds, without being of either one. They further say that "the Middle East today is at that critical juncture of need . . . for 'great rational prophecy.'" Without this "great rational prophecy" to delimit the goals of the transformation, the Middle Easterner must remain "transitional" and "neither fish nor fowl nor good red herring."

Drs. Lerner and Pevsner have, despite their own warnings, fallen into error when they attempt to identify and analyze the end stages of transformation. In a sense this error is relatively unimportant since they chart the changes which occur on the human level. The only category which has real relevance today is that of the transitional since both the "traditional" and the "modern" are merely "ideal types" in the Max Weber construct for the analysis of the all-important "transitional."

Just as the true "modern" does not exist in the Middle East at this point, so has the true "traditional" disappeared. Radio, for example, despite its rejection in 1950 by the traditionalists, according to the survey upon which the book is based, has by 1958 become all pervasive throughout the area and has gained wide, if not universal, acceptance among the so-called traditionalists. Along with this spread of mass communications has come an extension of western technology, still minimal in many places, but invariably present and carrying the seed of social change.

One may take exception to the deliberately biased and somewhat inadequate sample upon which the book is based, one may decry the sociological erudition in which the data is presented, one may protest at what appears to be misleading statistical tables and one may very easily quibble about many details and interpreta-

tions. One must, however, respect the authors for carrying out, as successfully as they did, a probing analysis of one of the major problems of the twentieth century—*The Passing of Traditional Society*. Despite its flaws, this book more than lives up to its promise of providing the most useful tool yet to appear for understanding this process in the Middle East.

\* Gulick, John, "Two Streams into One," *Al Kulliyah*, XXX:3, (March 1955) p. 12ff.

♦ MALCOLM N. QUINT is the author of "The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village" which appeared in the Autumn 1958 issue of the *MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*.

## EGYPT

VINDICATING A VISION, by E. E. Elder. New York: Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church, 1958. 336 pages. No price indicated.

*Reviewed by Edwin M. Wright*

This history of the American Presbyterian Church in Egypt reads like that of many other pioneer missionary groups in that the theme is almost always the same. But the details are most interesting and educational. In this particular study the stage is set on the banks of the Nile in 1854. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire following the rise of Muhammad Ali, and the emergence of the United States as a center of wealth, culture and power contributed to the background of the events. The first missionaries going to Syria (including Lebanon then) had reported on the stagnation of the old Christian Oriental Churches and the hostility of Islam. Unable to penetrate the seemingly solid resistance of Islam, the missionaries proposed to make available, through the Coptic hierarchy, the advantages which the Western Churches had gained during the period of the Renaissance and the age of enlightenment in Western Europe.

The Coptic Church, like other isolated old Churches, resented and feared the challenge to their old traditions and combines with Muslim authorities to oppose and eradicate this threat. The stories Dr. Elder tells are replete with heroism, discouragement and pathos. But soon the ferment began to work in the lay membership of the Coptic Church, which began to

demand reforms within the older body. And the same process occurred in the Muslim community. The first 25 years were the hardest. Then came the period of growth. Schools, hospitals and friendly contacts had broken down the solid front. To meet the needs of the Protestant community, theological schools were established and centers of activity were founded, mostly in the south around Asyut. In 1878 the Protestant Church was acknowledged officially as a "new ecclesiastical and civil corporation."

There is an interesting brief chapter on the rise of Egyptian nationalism, the 'Arabi revolt and its effect on the old Christian-Muslim relationship. The intervention by Great Britain in 1882 intensified Muslim attacks upon Christians inside Egypt. After these dramatic events, the story is a "success" report of heightened participation by Egyptians in educational, health and evangelistic enterprises. The mission had accomplished its greatest task of stimulating activities by the Egyptians themselves. Soon the government began to undertake national responsibility for the social phases of missionary work and eventually, because of its enormous resources, was enabled to greatly surpass the efforts by the missionaries in the fields of education, health and welfare.

Dr. Elder has compiled a very useful report on a century of American missions in Egypt. Then, in his final chapters, he outlines the new age—that of transition, when U.S. government policies regarding Israel and Egypt itself undermined the good will which a hundred years of Christian labor had established. As the second century opened, most of the old problems of 1854 had disappeared—religious fanaticism, disease and mass ignorance. But the new ones—nationalism, international affairs, the metamorphosis in traditional missionary emphasis—look formidable. They too may "give" as time moves on.

♦ EDWIN M. WRIGHT is a member of the Board of Governors of the Middle East Institute.

## IRAQ

PEOPLE OF THE REEDS, by Gavin Maxwell. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 224 pages. \$4.50.

Reviewed by Lady E. S. Drower

To those who know the marshes of lower Iraq fairly well—and there are many more of them than Mr. Maxwell in his somewhat naive description of the Khor as "an almost unknown land" seems to have imagined, his book, with its excellent illustrations, will bring a pang of nostalgia. For the marshes have a haunting charm of their own and he is word-artist enough to awake memories of the great whispering wastes through which the *marshbūfs* and *tar-radas* thread the narrow buffalo-ways called *gawābin*. Tall forests of reeds rise on either side to shut the traveler in a world to himself, and he sits back contentedly watching the lean boatman pole his well-pitched boat forward; the hissing, rasping noise of its progress through resisting reeds being a music far sweeter than the blare of loud-speakers which now makes most Oriental towns a horror of noise.

Mr. Maxwell has sat in the big guest-huts, the *mudbifs*, some of which are as big as small churches, where the light filters in through lattices into the vast dimness in which huge ribs of bound reeds support the rounded roof. He had the advantage of being with Mr. Wilfred Thesiger who knows the marshmen and the Arabic spoken by them, an interesting local speech in which one discovers ancient Babylonian words still in use, for, until the oilmen came with the avowed intention of turning the whole district into dry land and discovering its oil, the marshes can have changed little since Nebuchadnezzar ruled Babylon. His lack of Arabic was a drawback: he could bring a trained artist's eye to record visual impressions, but to be dependent on others for translation is to be excluded from very much. Another drawback, which he shares after all with Mr. Thesiger, is his sex! No one but a woman can be really intimate with women of the marshes, and they have both personality and endearing charm. They have much to put up with: both matrimony and motherhood are far from easy states. Some of the shaikhs make a hobby of marriage and boast of the number of virgin wives they have taken and divorced in a year. But many of the women have a rueful smile about it all and know well enough

how to coax, flatter and manage their *zilm*, as the menfolk are called. Sometimes magic is invoked, and one or two shaikh's wives have told me of dark doings which got rid of a rival. The women work hard: they pound the rice, grind the flour, bake the rice bread, milk the buffaloes, dye the cloth, fetch the bundles of fodder, and bear and suckle child after child—many of whom die—but, with it all, have a wry sense of the ridiculous and the inevitable. As for the children, they carry paddles as soon as they can toddle and are in and out of the water like young otters, for in some of the villages, Chubaish for example, every house is an island, raised on a mound of reed mats and mud.

Mr. Maxwell makes mistakes which could easily have been corrected by Thesiger; for instance, after describing a guest-hut his explanation of the word *sarifa* is "a smaller rectangular building designed for the entertainment of a smaller number of more intimate friends, but these are by no means general." (p. 85) The fact is that *sarifa* is merely the name of any ordinary reed hut; the plural is *sarrāif*. Such slips are easy to pardon when one reads word-pictures such as the description of a blowy night in a hut, and that of the stormy sky and landscape through which the author passed the next day.

The book is good entertainment and it is pleasant to read of familiar things described by a stranger who comes fresh to them.

◆ LADY E. S. DROWER is the author of *Water into Wine* and many other books on Iraq and the Middle East.

## IRAN

CLASSICAL PERSIAN LITERATURE, by Arthur J. Arberry. New York: Macmillan Company, 1958. 464 pages. \$8.00.

Reviewed by Sidney Glazer

The origin of Persian literature coincides with the emergence of Persian nationalist sentiment after 300 years of Arab domination, although it is not clearly reflected as such in the extant writings. The period spanning the five centuries from Rudagi (fl. 940) to Jami (d.



1492) is commonly called the "classical age," but this ancient convention might well be challenged since talented writers faithfully following the classical tradition have flourished to the present day.

There are few in the English-speaking world interested in this rich field who will not agree that, despite the availability of a history of it some 2000 pages long and another one-twentieth the size, a well-conceived volume of about 450 pages would serve a useful purpose. Particularly so, when the two extremes (Browne's *Literary History of Persia* and Levy's *Persian Literature*) are both over 30 years old. Therefore, when such an eminent authority as Professor Arberry says on the first page of his book:

However, since Browne and Levy wrote, much new material has been published both in Persia and elsewhere which, without affecting seriously the broad picture painted by them, has modified very considerably our perspective of many parts of that picture. It therefore seemed opportune to compile a new history of classical Persian literature, within the compass and following the proportions appropriate to a single volume work, for the assistance of students coming newly to the subject, as well as for the enjoyment of the wider public interested to discover the sum of what the poets and writers of Persia produced during the golden age.

one cannot but sit back in pleasurable anticipation.

Unfortunately, despite Arberry's good intentions, erudition and verve, it is to be doubted that either the elementary student will find it very useful or the wider public consider it generally entertaining. The limitations of both classes of readers to whom he sought to cater were not adequately appraised. The book can be wholly intelligible only to those with a background in Arabic literature and Islamic history and culture. Without this many allusions to personalities, works and events cannot be understood, for they are not explained in the text.

A beginning student or layman will find the general introduction a thicket of names and dates, hard to penetrate, even harder to recall when required later on. It would have been preferable to describe the historical events in more leisurely fashion as the account unfolded.

The author is disturbingly inconsistent in

providing perhaps excessive detail on a minor poet (e.g., precise day of death) and then completely ignoring for many others vital data. In general, we are given very broad generalizations on unsettled conditions rather than specific information on the times and circumstances affecting the individual authors.

The commentary on many poets of major stature and the translated excerpts have failed to convey their distinctive qualities, with the result that they seem to possess a certain sameness, the reasons for their title to eminence remaining unclear. While Arberry has proportioned the amount of space for each writer in accordance with fame and intrinsic merit, there are contradictions. In a book for beginners, why virtually dismiss Omar Khayyam by saying that he has been fully treated elsewhere and then expatiate on Hafez who has likewise been fully treated elsewhere? And it would seem that the highly regarded 12th century Said Hasan Ghaznavi, who exerted such potent influence on later poets, should have been accorded more than a line and excerpts taken from other than his encomiastic verse. The 13th century Pūr-i Bahā also failed to receive his due.

Students and laymen alike would have greatly benefited from a discussion of the Persian language, prosody, and the technical problems faced by the classical writers, not to mention the Islamic religion, sufism, etc.

Arberry is one of the great translators from Persian in our time and his concern with this phase of literature is therefore understandable. The far too many excerpts on the art of translation *per se* are highly interesting, but not especially relevant to the problem of grasping the meaning of the texts.

Countless references to places and names make such aids as maps, genealogical tables, etc. absolutely necessary for the non-specialist, and these have not been provided. The book, which undoubtedly will be used as a text and reference work, also suffers from a somewhat incomplete index. The omission from the bibliography of important studies by Slavic scholars is regrettable. Transliteration inconsistencies are an abomination for the beginner. Why Muḥammad on one page, Muḥammad on an-

other, *Ḳarā-Khitāy* and *Qarā-Khitāi*, and others? And in a work on Persian literature, is a transliteration system based on Arabic desirable?

Despite these essentially minor criticisms, *Classical Persian Literature* is a valuable work. Suffused with sound critical judgment and incorporating the results of most modern research, it tells the story vividly. A happy innovation was the inclusion of the views of Persian scholars, which are priceless guideposts for those seeking to penetrate both the essence and significance of the classical poets.

It was also gratifying to note Professor Arberry's determination not to ignore prose, even though much of it was utilitarian and not belletristic in intent. For this prose in its finer manifestations is a recognizable ancestor of much of the modern non-poetic literature of our day. And may the author be granted the will and energy to execute his half-promise of telling the story of the past 500 years of Persian literature in a sequel to the present volume. It is easy to agree that:

This is a story no less impressive than that which has now been completed; for it reveals how the creative genius of the Persian people, in the very time when it seems to be expiring at last, suddenly in response to new impulses coming from abroad rose from its death-bed to a life of surprising and measureless vitality.

It is the conviction of the reviewer that contemporary Persia is best understood from its 20th century writings. An account of the post-classical period is admittedly difficult to prepare owing to the insufficiency of preliminary critical studies. However, the total lack of such a work in English and its intrinsic importance make it all the more necessary.

◆ SIDNEY GLAZER prepares the bibliography section of the JOURNAL.

## ISLAM

ISLAM—THE STRAIGHT PATH, edited by Kenneth W. Morgan. New York: Ronald Press, 1958. 453 pages. \$6.00.

*Reviewed by A. A. A. Fyze*

In order to understand Islam in these times, we have a variety of materials at our command.

We have good introductions, treatises, histories, monographs, texts and encyclopaedia articles. It is, however, refreshing to find that a volume should be devoted to the understanding of the religion and its ethos by Muslims themselves; and when the adherents of the faith are drawn from the different countries of the world and have some authority to speak on their subjects, the results are both stimulating and instructive.

This is a volume the contributors to which are drawn from almost all parts of the world of significance to the Islam of today, and eleven of them speak on the subject of their choice, as representing particular geographical areas and particular phases of scholarship. In such an endeavor it is impossible to expect that all articles will be of a uniform excellence, or will be equally illuminating. Nevertheless, in giving praise to the editor, we must say that the task was well worth attempting and the results are on the whole rewarding.

Islam is not the monopoly of the Arabian peninsula; it is a religion and a message which was addressed to the whole of the world, and it is refreshing to see that Egyptians, Turks, Persians, Pakistanis and Indonesians have been invited to contribute. It will be noted, however, that no Indian has been included. This may either be an omission or a tacit but questionable assumption that Pakistanis alone may be said to represent Islam in that sub-continent. In the sub-continent of India (and Pakistan) there are about 100 million Muslims, mostly of the Hanafi persuasion; they express themselves in a well-developed language, Urdu; and their scholars use Arabic, Persian and Urdu with almost equal facility. As they represent a solid bloc of more than a quarter of the Muslims of the globe and as Urdu contains a large Islamic literature, perhaps an Indian scholar might well have been invited to contribute to the volume. For although the incomparable savant and thinker, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, has been taken away from us by the cruel hand of fate, perhaps some other, such as Humayun Kabir, Professor Ajmal Khan or Dr. Zakir Husain could well have represented India—a country having 45 million Muslims, thoroughly

steeped in Islamic teaching, and, by reason of the political, social and religious stresses, well able to speak for herself.

The best articles are by Shafik Ghorbal on "Ideas and movement in Islamic History," A. E. Afifi on "The Rational and Mystical Interpretation of Islam," and Mazheruddin Siddiqi on "Muslim Culture in Pakistan and India." Each of them has thoroughly digested his subject, and given us food for reflection and further study. The other articles are by Dr. Draz (Egypt), Muhammad Shaltout (Egypt), Dr. M. Shehabi (Iran), I. M. Husayn (Egypt), H. B. Cantay (Turkey) and there are representatives of China, and two from Indonesia.

There is a useful bibliography but it is not complete. In particular, the brilliant lectures of C. Snouck Hurgronje on *Mohammedanism* (Putnam, New York) is a surprising omission. It is still, in the reviewer's opinion, the best introduction to the study of Islam. The Imām Abū Ḥanīfa is called "Hanafi" (p. 361 and elsewhere), an obvious mistake which could have been avoided. In a second edition, perhaps a more scientific scheme of transliteration will be introduced.

On the whole, a useful guide; it should be widely used by all classes of readers.

♦ A. A. A. FYZEE is visiting professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University, Montreal.

KITAB AT-TAMHID, by Al-Bāqillānī (Abū Bakr Muhammad ibn at-Ṭaiyib), ed. by Richard J. McCarthy, S.J. Publications of Al-Hikma University of Baghdad; Kalam Series: No. I. Beirut: Librairie Orientale, 1957. English text: Foreword, pages 9-10; Preface, pages 11-13. Arabic text: Introduction, pages 9-46; edited text, 386 pages, indexes to 438; 3 plates.

*Reviewed by George Makdisi*

Bāqillānī is known among scholars of Muslim theology as one of the most celebrated members of the Ash'arite school of thought during its earlier period of development. Originally from Basra, he died in Baghdad in the year A.H. 403/A.D. 1013, about three-quarters of a century after the founder of the school, Abū'l-

Ḥasan al-Ash'ari. Like the founder, he too still held doctrines of Hanbalite inspiration and it was not until the 11th century and thereafter that Ash'arite thought achieved its separation from the Hanbalite affinities with which it had begun under its founder.

The school of Ash'arite theological thought has not as yet been the subject of a thoroughgoing study and there is much that still needs to be done before such a study can become possible. Many monographs on individual representatives of this school, especially those who belong to the early centuries, remain to be written. And before this can be done, many individual works must be studied and edited. Ghazzālī's (11th-12th c.) works have so far enjoyed the most attention on the part of scholars in the field, mainly because of his relation to the philosophers. But as a representative of Ash'arite thought, his works are of less import than those of his teacher, Juwainī (Imām al-Ḥaramain; 11th c.), or of the earlier Bāqillānī. Studies on Ash'arite thought often treat it as a constituted whole and rely on such late representatives as Nasafi, Ijī and Taftāzānī. Ijī is, of course, a mine of information on Ash'arism but one which will be of even greater use once the earlier period becomes known and discrimination in the various phases of development of Ash'arism becomes possible.

Father McCarthy, an American Jesuit and a longtime resident of Baghdad, has shown by this edition, as well as by his previous edition of the *Luma'* of Ash'arī (in *The Theology of Ash'arī*) and by a forthcoming edition (Bāqillānī's *Bayān*, cf. introduction, p. 28, note 6), that he has done much to provide some of the most important materials needed for the study of the early development of Ash'arism.

In the present edition, Father McCarthy anticipates the inevitable question which will be raised by colleagues in the field: why a new edition of Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd* when we already have one by two well-established scholars, Abū Rida and Khuḍairī? This question he then proceeds to answer. Acknowledging his indebtedness to the original editors, whose edition of the *Tamhīd* had been of great benefit to him while studying at Oxford, he points out that

their edition is based on one of three manuscripts—the one in Paris—which they did at a time when two other manuscripts known to be in Turkey (Aya Sophia, Atif Effendi) were not available to them because of World War conditions. Father McCarthy suspected that the Paris MS. was not complete; he had noticed that folio 60b did not continue on the following folio, 61a. His curiosity roused, he made efforts to obtain photographic copies of them and, receiving them in 1950, he discovered that more than one-third of the Paris MS. was missing when compared with the two MSS. of Turkey, both of which had the missing part.

The present edition therefore differs from the first by the fact that it is more complete by a substantial amount of the text. There is one other important difference. In the first edition there is a chapter on the Imāmate (Caliphate) which occupies one-third of the book. Father McCarthy omits this chapter from his edition. He does so on the basis that the length of this chapter has no precedent or sequel in similar works by other Ash'arite theologians, both before and after Bāqillānī, from Ash'ari himself (10th c.) to Shahrastānī (12th c.), and that great Ash'arites have regarded the Imāmate not as an integral part of works on the theology, but rather as a supplement to them. He gives two noteworthy reasons why he omitted this chapter: (1) the Imāmate, according to Bāqillānī himself, is an introduction to his work entitled *Manāqib al-a'imma*; in the Zāhiriya Library of Damascus, there is a copy of the second volume of this work and it should be published together with this chapter on the Imāmate which he omitted from his edition; (2) personally, he feels that the Imāmate is not a part of theology (*kalām*) in the strict sense, and since his field is theology, he willingly leaves this other work to be edited by another scholar who might be interested.

Father McCarthy's Arabic introduction gives, in addition to his reasons for the new edition, a description of the MSS. on which it is based, the title and authorship of the work and the principles of editing which he followed. There is also a list of corrections and a list of preferred readings appended to the published text.

A perusal of various parts of the text shows the excellence of Father McCarthy's edition. It is a most worthy first publication of a new series on Muslim theology sponsored by the new Al-Hikma University of Baghdad. The efforts of both the editor and the university sponsoring his patient and learned work will earn the gratitude of interested scholars as a new step forward in providing the materials for a genuine dialogue between East and West.

♦ GEORGE MAKDISI is Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies at the University of Michigan.

## PAKISTAN

THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN, by J. Russell Andrus and Asisali F. Mohammed. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958. xviii + 517 pages. \$8.50.

*Reviewed by Arthur Z. Gardiner*

The authors of this useful handbook have traced the economic history of independent Pakistan from its origins in 1947 to 1956. No phase of Pakistan's economic and sociological problems has been neglected in the descriptions of the manifold problems which this new country is facing, and the volume will be especially useful to students and to others needing a well-organized reference work. Unfortunately, there is no bibliography, a defect not so serious in view of the many references throughout the text to source materials.

The book, well and clearly written by authors who know their subject, is factual and descriptive rather than analytical and critical. It avoids prophecy, a tribute to the authors' prudence in dealing with a country whose future, despite the dedicated efforts of diverse groups of able men, still remains so obscure and fraught with difficulty arising from internal disunity. There is no discussion of the problems inherent in adjusting a modern economy to the tenets of an "Islamic Republic," the narrative throughout being pitched on a non-political, non-sociological key. The casual reader, unfamiliar with some of the realities that lie behind much of the bland descriptions in the pages of this book, might think he was deal-

ing with facts and data which apply with equal force to Western Europe or the United States which he assuredly is not. The credence which is due statistical conclusions in an economy such as Pakistan's, for example, is subject to very considerable discounts. The Pakistan "economic man" is by no means motivated by the same forces that apply to his counterpart in the West. American economy is still driven by people whose ambitions and capabilities were romanticized little more than one generation ago in the tales of Horatio Alger, whose heroes rose from newsboy to publisher. Unlike the United States, Pakistan is not a country where the ambition of every mother is founded on the possibility that her son has a chance to become President of the Republic. Islam, as a way of life, is not cognate with the organizational structure of industry, commerce, and finance to which citizens of Western industrialized society have necessarily become accustomed. These fundamental facts have a bearing on every phase of Pakistan's economy, but Mr. Andrus and Mr. Mohammed have avoided contact with such issues in their factual presentations.

The devaluation of the Pakistani rupee in 1955 was an interesting case study in international finance and, in the opinion of many observers, was carried out with the acme of precision, secrecy and despatch. It is regrettable that this maneuver has not been treated at greater length and in more analytical detail.

None of these observations should derogate from the utility of this excellent guide book, however, and it is to be hoped that its general usefulness will lead its authors to bring out further editions so that the contents may continue to be brought up to date. Within the limitations which the authors have set for themselves, an excellent factual summary has been prepared.

◆ ARTHUR Z. GARDINER is a specialist on the economies of Middle Eastern countries.

## TURKEY

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION: THE TURKISH CONSEIL D'ETAT, by Robert V. Presthus and Sevda Erem. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958. 54 pages; index. No price indicated.

*Reviewed by Richard D. Robinson*

Robert V. Presthus and his Turkish colleague, Sevda Erem, have produced a valuable, original contribution to the understanding of one facet of contemporary Turkey, the public administrative apparatus. As the authors state in their introduction, their aim is "to show the applicability of a systematic, quantitative research method to an aspect of a study of contemporary administration in a non-western country and to document the general effectiveness and a few shortcomings of the Turkish system of administrative law as evidenced by the Conseil d'Etat." The authors go on to point out, "Insofar as the policy implications of the study are concerned, its findings and recommendations may carry more weight than abstract legal exegesis about the need for change. Finally, it would appear that the method applied here is applicable to other societies that have adopted the French model of an administrative court of final jurisdiction." (page 3)

In short, the study analyzes the operation of the Turkish *Devlet Surasi*, or the Conseil d'Etat, the supreme administrative court to which are referred controversies arising from governmental or public action. The Conseil has both judicial and administrative functions in that it serves as a court of justice for trying high government functionaries and hearing appeals from private citizens against official acts, as well as an advisory body for offering opinions on draft laws and regulations and supervising contracts entered into by the government.

The analysis is based on the premise that the cases handled by the Conseil comprise a representative cross section of important administrative issues. Out of a universe of 87,640 cases heard by the Conseil in the 1947-1954 period, a sample of 2,131 was selected. Each case was analyzed according to its type, initiator, par-



ties involved, disposition, reason for disposition, original jurisdiction, and origin. As it turned out, the sample included 1,117 tax cases, 494 cases involving civil servants and 520 miscellaneous cases.

Many of the findings of the study are too detailed for inclusion here, but a few selected conclusions will suffice to show the nature of the study. In the tax field, for example, it was found that the two major categories of conflict concerned revaluation of tax and orders for liability due to failure to declare. In the civil service field, the right of the administration to remove personnel was consistently upheld. The Conseil also tended to uphold individual claims when village school teachers asked payment for additional duties such as administrative tasks. The most frequent "miscellaneous" cases were actions protesting condemnation proceedings by municipalities, the majority of which cases were decided in favor of the plaintiff.

Several general conclusions were reached by the authors: the 90-day limit for submission of claims was inadequate; civil servants were at a disadvantage under present law; the expense of litigation was not a critical factor; and a high percentage of decisions by provincial and burrough administrative boards was rejected by the Conseil.

One or two minor criticisms might be made of the study. The categories "denied" and "upheld" are not adequately defined in the tables. It is only by careful reading of the text that it appears that denied indicates that the administrative decision was denied (page 38), not an individual's claim, as is stated in a note to Table III. Also, the analysis of why the local administrative boards were so frequently overruled suffers from lack of evidence. I would suggest that the authors overlooked two important considerations here: (1) the fact that the local boards are over-zealous in pursuing political objectives and (2) only flagrant miscarriages of equity would be appealed to the Conseil in Ankara because the appellant is often a villager or small merchant who would only appeal on the basis of a sure thing. In the tax cases, in which tax commissions are generally upheld, the appellants are often sophisticated

businessmen who would appeal borderline cases. Hence a comparison between the local boards and the tax commissions on the basis of professional competence is not valid.

It is reassuring to find that the private citizen in Turkey can often secure a ruling against arbitrary government act, even under the present circumstances in which the government tends to exercise ever-increasing control. The Conseil appears to be relatively well-insulated from political incursions, though its authority is necessarily defined by the Grand National Assembly.

♦ RICHARD D. ROBINSON is lecturer on business administration at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

## TURKEY

INVESTMENT IN TURKEY, BASIC INFORMATION FOR UNITED STATES BUSINESSMEN, published by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U. S. Department of Commerce. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956. 186 pages. \$1.25.

*Reviewed by Kerim K. Key*

This useful handbook on Turkey is one of a series of U. S. Department of Commerce publications on foreign countries dealing with economic, commercial, financial, legal and other basic information. The basic text of the publication was prepared by Richard D. Robinson, then Turkish area specialist for the American Universities Field Staff. Several other specialists have also contributed to the preparation of the book. *Investment in Turkey* is not only useful to the American business community, to potential investors, and traders interested in Turkey and the Middle East, but is also of value to scholars of Turkish affairs, since there is a dearth of economic information on Turkey.

This publication is divided into 20 chapters dealing with such subjects as investment possibilities, physical features and resources, population, labor, agriculture, industry, finance, foreign trade, marketing, transportation and communications, and the structure of the Turkish business community. It also contains chapters on the structure of the government,

the taxation system, pertinent legislation and laws, as well as information on procedures for doing business in Turkey.

There are two maps. The first one shows the provincial administration consisting of 63 provinces. The number of provinces today has risen to 67, and include the following new additions: Sakarya, Adiyaman, Kirsehir and Nevsehir. Also, the Turkish name for Antioch in Hatay province should be given as Antakya. The second map shows the Turkish national highway system. Unfortunately, the two maps are inadequate. Turkey's rather extensive railroad network is not shown. There is no topographical map showing the physical features, nor are population density and locations shown. Location of natural resources and population centers are also of interest to businessmen and potential investors, and although discussed briefly in the text, they could be illustrated more effectively in graphic form.

Perhaps one of the most useful parts of this handbook is the appendix which contains supplementary economic data, statistics, information on the activities of the State Enterprises, the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, and a list of the American companies operating in Turkey.

While this is a most useful reference on Turkey, it is fast becoming outdated. The usefulness of the statistical tables is limited by the fact that the latest figures are for 1954 and 1955. This cannot be helped, however, since the publication of statistical data is always slow, and by its very nature, is rapidly outdated. Also, in the section dealing with government structure, three new ministries have been formed, namely, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Coordination, and the Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism. There are also some changes in the central and local governments. However, the publication is generally free of major errors in fact, spelling and transliteration. One solution to the problem of keeping the book current is the preparation of more recent statistical data and legislation as a supplementary publication. This would enhance the usefulness of the handbook until such time as a revised edition is published.

The existing copies of this handbook will soon be exhausted. It is hoped that a new edition reflecting the more recent changes will appear in the not too distant future. In the meantime, this is still the most handy and complete reference book for businessmen and scholars interested in Turkey's economic and commercial life.

- ◆ KERIM K. KEY is a Near East specialist in the U. S. Department of State and an Adjunct Professor of History at the American University.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

### General

- Documents: Soviet Russia's Anti-Islam Policy in Turkestan*, intro. and collected by Baymirza Hayit. Düsseldorf: Prof. Gerhard von Mende, 1958. 48 pages. No price indicated. Translations of articles and propaganda releases.
- Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business*, by Edward S. Mason. New York: Fordham University Press, 1959. \$2.50. The author, just returned from Iran and Pakistan, compares 19th century Western ideas to the problems facing the countries of South and Southeast Asia.
- Index Islamicus*, comp. by J. D. Pearson, assisted by J. F. Ashton. Cambridge: Heffer, 1958. A catalogue of articles on Islamic subjects published in periodicals and other collective publications from 1906 to 1955.
- The Near East: A Modern History*, by William Yale. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. History of the Modern World Series. 514 pages. \$7.50. A survey of the events from 1820 in the Ottoman Empire and Successor States.
- A Person from England and other Travellers to Turkestan*, by Fitzroy Maclean. London: Jonathan Cape, 1958. 384 pages; 20 photos and maps. 21s. Accounts of English agents, travelers and officials in Turkestan since the 19th century, including the author's recent travels there.
- Soviet Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries*, by Joseph S. Berliner. New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. xv + 232 pages; 18 tables, 10 appendices, 2 charts. \$4.25.

### Arab World

- Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment*, by Fayez A. Sayegh. New York: Devin-Adair, 1958. xvii + 272 pages; appendices, index. \$4.00. The history and theories of Arab nationalism.
- Bibliography of the Arabian Peninsula*, by Eric Macro. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1958. xiv + 68 pages, index to 80. \$3.00. A listing of articles primarily in English. The compiling was done principally between 1945 and 1950.

*On Nationalism and Socialism* (In Arabic), by Michael 'Aflaq, Akram al-Hurani, Munif al-Razzaz and Jamal al-Atasi. Cairo: al-Bath'a al-'Alamiyyah, 1957. 86 pages. No price indicated. An exposition of party philosophy by Ba'th leaders.

*Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate*, by Stephen Hemsley Longrigg. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. 416 pages. \$6.75.

*The Union of Egypt and Syria* (In Arabic), by Michael 'Aflaq, Akram al-Hurani and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. Cairo: al-Matba'ah al-'Alamiyyah, 1958. 55 pages. No price indicated. Opinion of Ba'th leaders on the Union.

### Egypt

*Egypt in Transition*, by Jean and Simonne Lacouture, tr. from the French by Francis Scarfe. New York: Criterion Books, 1958. 352 pages; illus., map. \$7.50. An analysis of modern Egyptian politics since the revolution, discussing political parties, foreign policy and internal reforms and problems.

*Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise*, by Frederick Harbison and Ibrahim Abdelkader Ibrahim. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958. x + 221 pages; index to 230. \$5.50. The authors find that Egypt is able to provide herself and her neighbors with high-talent manpower.

### India

*The Culture and Art of India*, by Radhakamal Mukerjee. New York: Praeger, 1958. 414 pages; 54 illus. \$10.00. The philosophical and religious movements of India are used as the essence of the culture and art of the country.

*The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations*, by Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. x + 221 pages. \$5.00. The authors identified two common denominators of India's diplomacy: Nehru's theory of a psychological climate of war, which largely governs India's behavior *vis-à-vis* the Great Powers and India's vigilance on behalf of the freedom and equality for the peoples of Afro-Asia.

*Industrial Change in India: Industrial Growth, Capital Requirements and Technological Change, 1937-1955*, by George Rosen. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies. 268 pages. \$5.00. A detailed study of the role in Indian economy played by the development of modern industry and the effects of economic planning.

*Pilot Project, India*, by Albert Mayer et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. xxiv + 367 pages; appendix, glossary. \$5.50. Report on an important planning project utilizing a different approach to underdeveloped economies.

*Poverty and Capital Development in India*, by D. K. Rangnekar. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. 328 pages. \$6.75. Contemporary investment patterns, problems and planning.

### Iran

*Iran in the Great War, 1914-1918*, (In Persian), essays by Muvarikh ud-Dawleh Sepehr. Tehran: National Bank Printing Press, 1957. 517 pages. 500 rials. Personal reminiscences of an Iranian man of affairs.

### Iraq

*Iraq's People and Resources*, by Doris Goodrich Adams. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. University of California Publications in Economics, 18. 168 pages; map. \$3.00.

*The Reconstruction of Iraq*, by Fahim I. Qubain. New York: Praeger, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1958. xxi + 277 pages; maps, charts, appendices. \$6.00. Basic problems of development.

### Israel

*Ben-Gurion*, by Robert St. John. New York: Doubleday, 1959. \$3.95. A biography.

*The Challenge of Development: A Symposium Held in Jerusalem, June 26-27, 1957*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, for the Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University, 1958. 233 pages. If 7, \$4.00. Included in the recorded discussions are the applicability of development experience in larger and more advanced countries to smaller areas, demographic and sociological issues, monetary policy, agricultural problems and the role of government in economic development.

*Concise Dictionary of Judaism*, by Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 237 pages. \$5.00. A short reference to Jewish history, religion, philosophy and literature.

*Herzl Year Book*, vol. 1, ed. by Raphael Patai. New York: Herzl Press, 1958. 342 pages. \$5.00. Thirteen essays on the influence and achievements of Theodor Herzl during his years as leader of the Zionist movement.

*The History of Israel*, by Giuseppe Ricciotti, tr. from the Italian by Clement Della Penta and Richard T. A. Murphy. 2nd edition. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1958. 2 vols.: 448 pages; 448 pages; illus., maps. \$16.00.

*It Has Come to Pass*, by James Thomas Farrell. New York: Theodor Herzl Press, 1958. 293 pages. \$4.50. Impression of a 1956 trip to Israel; non-political, centered on the adjustment and problems of immigrants.

*Projections of the Population of Israel (1955-1970)*, Benjamin Gil. Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1958. 42 pages; 17 tables, 9 diagrams. If 2. Projections of the population distribution are made by religion, sex and age in 1960, 1965 and 1970. The Jewish population is divided into Asia-African, European-American and Israeli-born. Minorities are Muslim, Christian, Druze and Muslim-Beduin. The components are combined in a manner to yield low, medium and high projections. Separate projections are made for existing population and expected immigrants.

*Utopians at Bay*, by Horace M. Kallen. New York: Herzl Press, 1958. \$4.50. A study of Israel from the perspective of a social scientist.

## North Africa

*L'Algérie et la République*, by Raymond Aron. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958. Tribune Libre, 33. 540 fr. An analysis of the problem of the integration of Algeria. The author examines the prospects for peace in the light of the May 13 revolution.

*Femmes de Tunisie*, by Henri de Montety. The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1958. Le Monde d'Outre-Mer Passé et Présent, Troisième Série: Essais II. 171 pages. No price indicated. A study of the Tunisian woman and the effect of modernization upon her traditional outlook.

*La Politique de Carthage: Abandon ou Sauvegarde de l'Union Franco-Tunisienne?*, by Simon Gros. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1958. Tribune Libre, 34. 420 fr. The exposition of the idea of a Franco-Maghrib association.

*Tunisia Unveiled*, by Thomas Hammerton. London: Robert Hale, 1959. 189 pages; illus. 18s. Essentially a travel book.

## Pakistan

*Oxford Economic Atlas for Pakistan*, ed. by C. F. W. R. Gullick. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. viii + 97 pages; tables, maps. \$2.95.

*Pakistan's External Relations*, by G. W. Choudhury and Parvez Hasan. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1958. 49 pages. Re. 1/8. A study of the foundations of Pakistan's international political and economic policies and a brief survey of their histories.

*Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation*, by Keith Callard. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. \$75. Mimeographed. This was prepared for the Lahore Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in February, 1958.

## Palestine Problem

*Forbidden Frontiers*, by W. Byford-Jones. London: Robert Hale, 1958. 188 pages. 21s. Life along the Arab-Israeli border and the effect of the border tension upon the lives of the people.

*Siege in the Hills of Hebron: The Battle of the Etzion Bloc*, ed. by Dov Knohl, intro. by Abba Eban, evaluations by Yigal Yadin and Yigal Allan, tr. from the Hebrew by Isaac Halevy-Levin. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1958. 389 pages; map. \$3.00. A documentary account of the defense of the Etzion bloc during the Arab-Israeli war.

## Sudan

*The Population of the Sudan: Report on the Sixth Annual Conference*, Salzburg: Philosophical Society of

Sudan, 1958. 97 pages; charts, maps, photos. No price indicated. Reports given at the University of Khartoum in January, 1958.

21 *Facts About the Sudanese*, by Karol Józef Krótki. Salzburg: Republic of the Sudan, Ministry for Social Affairs, Population Census Office, 1958. 60 pages; maps, charts, photos. No price indicated. A demographic picture of the Sudan drawn from the First Population Census.

## Art, Literature and Linguistics

*The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin*, by Henry and Renée Kahane and Andreas Tietze. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958. 598 pages; appendix to 752. \$15.00.

*Persian Painting of the Fifteenth Century*, intro. and notes by R. Pinder Wilson. London: Faber and Faber, 1958. Faber Gallery of Oriental Art. 15s. Famous miniatures are reproduced in color for the first time.

*A Survey of Persian Art from Prehistoric Times to the Present: Index Volume*, compiled by Theodore Besterman, ed. by Arthur Upham Pope. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. 142 pages. \$5.60.

*Vocabulaire Arabe-Kiptchak de l'Époque de l'État Mamelouk: Bulgat al-Mustāq Fī Luġat al-Turk wa-l-Qifzāq*, by Ananiasz Zajaczkowski. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1958. xxiii + 63 pages; 16 page text, 28 plates. No price indicated.

## History, Archeology and Religion

*Un Editto Bilingue Greco-Aramaico di Asoka: La Prima Iscrizione Greca Scoperta in Afghanistan*, tr. and annot. by G. Pugliese Carratelli and G. Levi Della Vida. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958. Serie Orientale Roma, XXI. vii + 34 pages. No price indicated.

*A History of Sharvān and Darband*, by V. Minoraky. Cambridge: Heffer, 1958. Arabic text, 32 pages; translation and commentary, 174 pages, index to 187. 3s. A history of eastern Transcaucasia in the 10th and 11th centuries, based chiefly on *Ta'rikh al-bāb*.

*Introduction à la Sociologie de l'Islam: De l'Animisme à l'Universalisme*, by Joseph Chelhod. Paris: Bessons-Chantemerle, 1958. viii + 231 pages. No price indicated.

*Islam and the Arabs*, by Rom Landau. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958. 256 pages. 21s. Designed for the general reader and university student. The book covers all aspects of Islamic history and culture.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer

With contributions from: Ernest Dawn, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, R. S. Harrell, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, W. Sands.

**Note:** It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 121. For list of abbreviations, see page 124.

## GEOGRAPHY

(General, descriptive, travel, natural history, geology)

- 11240 "The Arab world: a story in pictures." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 114 (N '58) 712-32. An interesting photo essay.
- 11241 MIKESELL, MARVIN W. "Transportation in North Africa." *Geog. Rev.* 48 (O '58) 575-76.
- 11242 SHOR, JEAN and FRANC. "Iraq—where oil and water mix." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 114 (O '58) 443-89. Account of a 3-month visit just before the revolution of 1958.

See also: 11300

## HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 11243 AYALON, DAVID. "The system of payment in Mamluk military society." *J. Econ. and Soc. Hist. of the O. 1* (Ag '57) 37-65. Details of the pay system of an army that "in its heyday was the strongest in Islam and one of the strongest in the world."
- 11244 BABINGER, F. "Das Raetsel um die Goldbeute von Byzanz (1453)." *Z. D. M. G.* 107, no. 3 (1957) 539-50. Mehmed II did a thorough job of reminting all his gold and silver.
- 11245 BARKAN, ÖMER LUTFI. "Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'empire ottoman au XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles." *J. Econ. and Soc. Hist. of the O. 1* (Ag '57) 9-36. An effective demonstration of the value of statistic analysis for the historian.
- 11246 CHURAKOV, M. "The conquest of North Af-

rica by the Arabs." (in Russian) *Palest. Sbornik* 3 (66) (1958) 107-26.

- 11247 GOITEIN, S. D. "New light on the beginnings of the Kārim merchants." *J. Econ. and Soc. Hist. of the O. 1* (Ap '58) 175-84. Documents from the Cairo Geniza make it possible to push the history of this important group of traders back to Fātimid times.
- 11248 GOLB, NORMAN. "Legal documents from the Cairo Genizah." *Jew. Soc. Stud.* 20 (Ja '58) 17-46. Translation of three 11th-13th cent. documents in Arabic, Hebrew, and Aramaic.
- 11249 GOTTSCHALK, H. L. "Al-anbarātūr—imperator." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 30-6. The title of Frederick II in Arabic sources.
- 11250 HAMIDULLAH, M. "Al-ilāf, ou les rapports économique-diplomatiques de la Mecque pré-islamique." *Mélanges Louis Massignon* II 293-311.
- 11251 JALILOV, A. "The anti-Arab movement of the Soghdians in 720-722 A.D." (In Russian) *Izv. Otd. Obshch. Nauk Akad. Nauk Tajik SSR* (Stalinabad) 13 (1957) 71-84.
- 11252 LEWICKI, TADEUSZ. "La répartition géographique des groupements ibādites dans l'Afrique du Nord au Moyen-Âge." *Rocznik O.* (Warsaw) 21 (1957) 301-43.
- 11253 PÉRÈS, HENRI. "La culture intellectuelles des femmes musulmanes en Espagne au Moyen Âge." *Rev. de la Médit.* 17 (N-D '57) 577-602. Mostly on the 11th-12th cent.
- 11254 ROEMER, H. R. "Ueber Urkunden zur Geschichte Aegyptens und Persiens in islamischer Zeit." *Z.D.M.G.* 107, no. 3 (1957) 519-38. A survey of recent studies.
- 11255 TSVETKOVA, B. "New data on Christian spahis in the Balkans under Turkish domination." (in Rus-



sian) *Vizant. Vremennik* (Moscow) 13 (1958) 184-97. They declined in numbers after the 15th cent. A study in class differentiation among and within the conquered Christian nations.

## HISTORY AND POLITICS (Modern)

- 11256 "The Soviet nationalities policy as a model for Asia." *World Today* 14 (N '58) 478-86. The author doubts that the economic and cultural developments in the Central Asian republics can be matched elsewhere in Asia without dictatorial rule.
- 11257 "The watch on the Gulf—aftermath of the revolution in Iraq." *Round Table* no. 192 (S '58) 315-9. Both Soviet communism and Arab nationalism can be contained by "keeping the northern barrier of the Baghdad Pact impregnable" and "simultaneously fostering the growth of a liberal policy wherever behind the barrier British influence is effective."
- 11258 AGOSTINI, RÉGIS. "Egypte et Inde: deux conceptions du neutralisme." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 73-88. Egypt's neutralism is purely pragmatic, dictated not by principle—as in the case of India, which is neutralist in the full sense of the word—but by national interests.
- 11259 ALEM, JEAN-PIERRE. "Troubles insurrectionnels au Liban." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 37-48. An analysis of the forces supporting and opposing Lebanese President Chamoun during the 1958 crisis.
- 11260 ARUNOVA, M. R. "The farman of Nadir Shah." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Mr-Apr '58) 116-20. Facsimile and translation of a 1739 document listing various tax quotas.
- 11261 BAJRAKTAREVIC, F. "Die arabischen Urkunden des Staatsarchivs von Dubrovnik (Ragusa)." *Islam* 33 no. 1-2 (O '57) 135-41. The rich archive contains some ten thousand Turkish items and 23 Arabic documents of Maghribi origin from the 16th-18th cents.
- 11262 BAZILANTS, A. P. "The occupation policy of the USA in Azerbaijan, 1919-1920." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 22-38.
- 11263 BERTIER, FRANCIS. "L'idéologie sociale de la révolution égyptienne." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 49-72. The socio-economic causes of the 1952 revolution; the content of the Nasir program.
- 11264 BIRDWOOD, LORD. "Conflicting pressures in the Middle East and North Africa." *R.C.A.F.* 45 (Jl-O '58) 233-44. An interesting account of impressions gleaned from a leisurely, wide-ranging tour of the area.
- 11265 BRAINE, BERNARD. "Storm clouds over the horn of Africa." *Internat. Aff.* 34 (O '58) 435-43. Unless "positive, vigorous, and speedy action"—not spelled out here—is taken by the British government, there will be serious trouble in Somalia, not the least being abandonment of the western camp by the Somalis.
- 11266 CAGLE, MALCOLM W. "The neglected ocean." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 84 (N '58) 54-61. The Indian Ocean continues to grow in importance in naval thinking. The author discusses the pressing need and possible make-up of an Indian Ocean fleet.
- 11267 CHEJNE, ANWAR. "The role of Arabic in present-day Arab society." *Islamic Lit.* 10 (Ap '58) 195-234. An invaluable study of the Arabic language as a mainspring of Arab nationalism. Includes a summary of the great debate on the colloquial-classical problem.
- 11268 COLOMBE, MARCEL. "Panorama du trimestre." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 7-22. A review of Arab politics during the spring of 1958, with emphasis on Lebanon.
- 11269 COLOMBE, MARCEL. "Panorama du trimestre." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 7-16. The 1958 coup d'état in Baghdad, landing of Americans in Lebanon, battle at the U.N. are viewed as a "new proof of the inconsistency of Anglo-American policy" and a major victory for the USSR. The author urges a rejection of the "plans, projects, pacts, doctrines, programs and other chimeras that have made the situation in the Arab orient what it is today."
- 11270 FIORAVANZO, GIUSEPPE. "Italian strategy in the Mediterranean, 1940-43." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 84 (S '58) 65-72. Admiral Fioravanzo's account says that the true mission of the navy was to assure the delivery of supplies to Libya.
- 11271 GILEAD, B. "Turkey's Middle Eastern policy (July 1954-February 1958)." (in Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hebadash* 8, no. 4 (1957) 284-7.
- 11272 GOLANT, V. Y. "Egypt in Napoleon's economic-geographic description." (in Russian) *Palest. Sbornik* 3 (1958) 137-50. Analyzes Napoleon's *Guerre d'Orient*, stressing its value for the historian.
- 11273 IBRAHIMOV, S. K. "From the history of the Kazakh's foreign trade contacts in the 18th cent." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 39-54.
- 11274 KARASAEV, L. "On the formation of a Kazakh bourgeois nation." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk Kazakh SSR, ser. ekon.* 1 (8) (1958) 47-63. Language, psychological affinity, and territorial contiguity tended to promote it, but the economic basis was deficient. The bourgeois Kazakh nation had not yet arisen when the revolution paved the road for the formation of a socialist nation.
- 11275 KERIMOV, M. A. "The Transcaucasian Soviet republics and Turkey, 1920-1922." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 3-21. Traces the establishment of friendly relations during these years.
- 11276 LANDA, R. G. "The struggle of the Algerian people for national independence." *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 26-38.
- 11277 LAURENT, FRANÇOIS. "L'Arabie séoudite à l'heure du choix." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 89-100. Saudi Arabia, like Lebanon, is endeavoring to maintain neutrality between the two Arab blocs. The events in Lebanon will undoubtedly influence not only Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, but also the fate of the Saudis themselves.
- 11278 LAURENT, FRANÇOIS. "Perspectives irakiennes." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 17-24. Stresses the differences between the Egyptian and Iraqi revolutions, noting the bases of General Qasim's anti-Nasir policy.

- 11279 LEWIS, WILLIAM. "Somalia: a new crescent on the horizon." *World Aff.* (Washington) 121 (Fall '58) 83-5. A State Department official ponders some of the problems facing the area as it approaches independence.
- 11280 MINGANTI, PAOLO. "Considerazioni sull'unione fra Siria ed Egitto." *Oriente Mod.* 38 (F '58) 101-6. Interprets the Syro-Egyptian union as a move by Quwatli and the Ba'th party to block efforts by Khālid al-'Azm to gain predominance in Syria.
- 11281 NOUR, FRANCIS. "Particularisme libanais et nationalisme arabe." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 29-42. A penetrating analysis of the nature of Christian-Muslim tensions and their manifestations both in internal and in foreign affairs.
- 11282 POLK, WILLIAM R. "The lesson of Iraq." *Atlantic Monthly* (Boston) 202 (D '58) 49-54. The lesson of the July coup is that the U.S. should unreservedly come to terms with the new rulers and disengage from Jordan in order to achieve two main objectives in the Middle East: "sufficient peace to prevent a world war and a sufficient flow of oil to maintain the European economy."
- 11283 RIBAUD, ANDRÉ. "Baghdad et Téhéran au lendemain du coup d'état irakien." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 27-8. Although the present régime in Persia survived, not without profound apprehension, the violent shock of the Iraqi coup, the elements of danger still exist. The Shah must act resolutely while there is still time.
- 11284 RONDOT, PIERRE. "La nation kurde en face des mouvements arabes." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 55-69. The author regards as significant the recent liberal measures in favor of the Kurds adopted by Baghdad and Tehran. He thinks the Kurds may well play an important role in maintaining the equilibrium of the Orient, but nothing requires them to be "specially tied" to arabism.
- 11285 RONDOT, PIERRE. "Quelques réflexions sur les structures du Liban." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 23-36. The influence of communal factors in the 1958 crisis.
- 11286 ROTHSTEIN, A. "British reformism and the colonial problem." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 8-25. The British Labor Party is a henchman of capitalism and imperialist suppression of colonial peoples. A commentary on Labor reports of the last fifty years.
- 11287 SCARCIA, GIANROBERTO. "A proposito delle rivendicazioni persiane sul Bahrein." *Oriente Mod.* 38 (Ja '58) 1-18. Reviews the development of Bahrein's political and legal status since the 17th cent., with an interesting discussion of the present Persian policy.
- 11288 SHEMIR, SH. "Five years of the liberation rally in Egypt." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hemizrah Hebadash* 8, no. 4 (1957) 261-78. Reviews the rise and decline of the Rally (intended originally to create a mass basis for the new régime), its partial success, and final withering away when its functions were transferred to the state bureaucracy.
- 11289 SKRINE, CLARMONT. "Iran revisited." *R.C.A.J.* 45 (Jl-O '58) 218-32. A startlingly optimistic picture of the new prosperity and spirit abroad, especially the sense of confidence in the future. The author attributes

this change both to western interest and aid to the energetic, efficient leadership of the government.

- 11290 SURIEU, ROBERT. "Problèmes yéménites." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 43-53. Too rapid modernization, which includes the rupture of its traditional policy of isolation, has created numerous problems with which Yemen cannot cope unaided.
- 11291 THOMPSON, CAROL L. "American policy in the Middle East." *Current Hist.* 35 (O '58) 234-9. The U.S. objective of stability has been too expensive. The author suggests assistance "without strings" to help undeveloped nations help themselves.
- 11292 VOBLIKOV, D. R. "Anglo-American rivalry in Ethiopia after World War II." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Ag '57) 27-38.

See also: 11293

### ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications)

- 11293 FAYDEAU, FRANÇOIS. "Les accords franco-égyptiens du 22 août 1958." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 71-9. The ancient ties between France and Egypt as well as the important service to be provided by France as a purchaser of cotton and supplier of equipment are likely to lead to a complete normalization of relations between the two countries.
- 11294 KAMEN-KAYE, MAURICE. "Petroleum development in Algeria." *Geog. Rev.* 48 (O '58) 463-73. History and appraisal of French oil discoveries in Algeria, which has "large amounts" of "recoverable oil."
- 11295 ROSSI, PIERRE. "L'Irak devant la réforme agraire." *Orient* no. 3 (1958) 81-93. Agriculture is, and will be, the foundation of Iraqi economy. The article includes a discussion of a number of published studies. Written before the 1958 coup.

See also: 11241, 11247, 11300

### SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, population and ethnology, medicine and health, religion and law)

- 11296 DJEDOU, A. "La prière du vendredi au temple de la Mekke." *Mélanges Louis Massignon* II, 17-22. Impressions of a pilgrim in 1954.
- 11297 HIRSCHBERG, M. Z. "Judaizing Berbers of North Africa." (in Hebrew) *Zion* (Jerusalem) 22, no. 1 (1957) 10-20.
- 11298 KISSLING, H. J. "Die Wunder der Derwische." *Z.D.M.G.* 107 (Ag '57) 348-61. A collection of texts on parapsychological experiences of dervishes.
- 11299 MIKESSELL, MARVIN W. "The role of tribal markets in Morocco." *Geog. Rev.* 48 (O '58) 493-511. Background and recent trends of the shifting *suq*.
- 11300 SAVAGE, C. D. W. "A year in Mazanderan." *R.C.A.J.* 45 (Jl-O '58) 269-75. The random notes of

an engineer on the northern Persian province's agriculture, industry, wild life, and archaeology.

- 11301 SEMENIUK, G. I. "On the problem of slavery among nomadic peoples." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk Kazakh SSR, ser. ist.* (Alma Ata) 1 (6) (1958) 55-82. Since their economy has no scope for an expanded labor force, nomads are prone to kill prisoners, as records from the Hun to the Mongol invasions show. See also: 11267, 11281, 11306

## SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, QUR'AN, AND THEOLOGY

- 11302 FAURE, ADOLPHE. "Le *tajawwuf* et l'école ascétique marocaine des XI-XII-XIII siècles de l'ère chrétienne." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 119-31. Abū Ya' qūb Yūsuf at-Tādili b. az-Zayyāt (d. 1229) wrote this still unpublished tract with its 276 biographic sketches on saints popular among the Berbers.
- 11303 GARDET, LOUIS. "La langue arabe et l'analyse des 'états spirituels.'" *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 215-43. A contribution to Sufi lexical studies.
- 11304 GAUDEFROY-DEMOMBYNES, MAURICE. "Les sens du substantif *ḡayb* dans le Coran." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 245-50. It means either "revelation" or "that which cannot be known" or both.
- 11305 HADJ-SADOK, M. "Le *Mawlid* d'après le Mufti, poète d'Alger Ibn 'Ammār." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 269-92. Analysis of an 18th cent. work *Niḥlat al-labīb bi-akḥbār ar-riḥla ila 'l-ḥabīb* (printed in 1902).
- 11306 IDRIS, H. R. "Contributions à l'histoire de la vie religieuse en Ifrikiya Ziride (X-XI siècles)." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 329-59. Notes on nine medieval jurists.
- 11307 ISKAKOV, A. "Chokan Valikhanov on the origin of religion." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk Kazakh SSR, ser. ekon.* 1 (8) (1958) 89-97. This early Kazakh scholar (1835-1865) was the first to refer to traces of shamanism and folkloristic non-religious attitudes among the Kazakhs.
- 11308 JOMIER, J. "Le nom divin 'al-rahmān, dans le Coran." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 361-81. Some uses cannot be explained by Jewish and Christian sources. Judeo-Christian sectarianism, or the Baptist Sabaeans come to mind. However, the question must still be left open.
- 11309 STROTHMANN, R. "Die Mubāhala in Tradition und Liturgie." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 5-29.
- the Umayyad caliphate." *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* no. 12 (1958) 219-33. In spite of continuous warfare between the Umayyad caliphs and the Byzantine emperors, literary evidence indicates that commercial relations existed between Syria, Egypt and Byzantium, and that al-Walid I requested and obtained financial help, workmen and mosaic cubes for the decoration of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina and the Great Mosque in Damascus.
- 11312 GROHMANN, A. "Einige arabische ostraka und ein ehevertrag aus der oase Bahriya." *Studi in Onore di Aristide Calderini e Roberto Paribeni*, II. (Milan '57) 499-509. From the 9th and 14th centuries.
- 11313 HAYES, R. J. "Contemporary collectors, XVIII. The Chester Beatty library." *Book Collector* (London) 7 (Autumn '58) 253-64. A survey of the largest, privately endowed library of Greek, Armenian, Arabic, Persian and Indian MSS, many of them illuminated with fine miniatures. The library is now in Dublin.
- 11314 JARGY, SIMON. "Chant populaire et musique savante en proche orient arabe." *Orient* no. 2 (1958) 107-22. A summary of the different types of Arab popular music.
- 11315 KADYRBAIEV, M. K. "Some early monuments of nomads in Central Kazakhstan." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk Kazakh SSR, ser. ist.* (Alma Ata) 1 (6) (1958) 94-104.
- 11316 KRAEMER, JÖRG. "Zu den 'Arabischen Homer-versen'." *Z.D.M.G.* 107, no. 3 (1957) 511-18.
- 11317 LUNDIN, A. G. "The chronology of Himyarite inscriptions." (in Russian) *Palest. Sbornik* 3 (66) (1958) 98-106.
- 11318 MANKOWSKI, TADEUSZ. "Les tentes orientales et les tentes polonaises." *Rocznik O.* (Warsaw) 22, no. 1 (1957) 77-111.
- 11319 NAGEL, LUCIE OLIVER. "Some Middle Eastern ceramics in the City Art Museum of St. Louis." *Oriental Art* 4 (autumn '58) 116-8. A short survey of the museum's main holdings in Persian pottery from the 10th to the 13th centuries and of Turkish pottery from the 16th and 17th centuries.
- 11320 ROBINSON, B. W. "The Tehran manuscript of *Kalila wa Dimna*, a reconsideration." *Oriental Art* 4 (autumn '58) 108-15. This important MS with 34 miniatures, which were formerly attributed to the period 1410-1420, is now dated shortly after 1468. It may have been executed for the youthful Sultan Ḥusayn Bayḡārā in Herat. The arguments are based on stylistic and historical considerations.
- 11321 TORRES BALBO, L. "Almería Islámica." *al-Andalus* 22, no. 2 (1957) 411-57.
- 11322 WRIGHT, G. R. H. "Tents and domes in Persia." *Mos* 58 (O '58) 159-60. Notes on the origin of the dome and its influence on architecture.

## ART

(Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics, painting and music)

- 11310 FARÈS, BISHR. "Philosophie et jurisprudence illustrées par les Arabes; la querelle des images en Islam." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 77-109. Notes on illuminated MSS. Discussion of iconoclasm.
- 11311 GIBB, H. A. R. "Arab-Byzantine relations under

## LANGUAGE

- 11323 "The congress of Arab academies." (in Arabic) *Majallab* (Damascus) 32 (Ja '57) 1-226. An account

- of the September 1956 meeting, which dealt largely with language problems (colloquial, script, simplification of grammar).
- 11324 ASHNIN, F. D. "Principles of differentiation of Turkish demonstrative pronouns." (in Russian) *Vop. Yez.* 7 (Mr-Apr '58) 101-8.
- 11325 DHORME, E. "L'arabe littéral et la langue de Hammourabi." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 7-15. Parallels between ancient forms of literary Arabic and Akkadian. Speculates on possible Mesopotamian influence in antiquity.
- 11326 FLEISCH, H. "Études sur le verbe arabe." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 153-81. Notes on: (1) the first form, (2) the passive, (3) tense and aspect.
- 11327 FUECK, J. "Zur arabischen Wörterbuchfrage." *Z.D.M.G.* 107 (Ag '57) 340-7.
- 11328 GADZHIEVA, T. "The system of past tense forms in modern Azerbaijani." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk Azerbaidzhan SSR, ser. obsch. nauk* (Baku) 3 (1958) 73-89.
- 11329 KENDLI, GAFAR. "Azerbaijani classics in the Khedivial library." (in Azerbaijani, Russian summary) *Izv. Akad. Nauk Azerbaidzhan SSR, ser. obsch. nauk* 3 (1958) 63-71.
- 11330 LITTMANN, E. "Ein ägyptisch-arabisches Scherzgedicht." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 121-6. Text and translation of an item recorded in 1911.
- 11331 PETROV, G. M. "The Dari language in Iran today." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Mr-Apr '58) 114-6. Tabulation of data from *The Geographical Dictionary of Iran* on the 144,000 people who speak this idiom in southern Persia.
- 11332 SEVORTIAN, E. V. "The historical position of the transitivity-intransitivity category in Turkic." (in Russian) *Vop. Yez.* 7 (Mr-Apr '58) 25-40.
- 11333 SHIHĀBĪ, MUṢṬAFĀ. "A glance into the *Murjīd*." *Majallab* (Damascus) 32 (Jl '57) 314-27. Notes on the well-known Arabic dictionary.
- 11334 STRELCYN, S. "Matériaux éthiopiens pour servir à l'étude de la prononciation arabisée du copte." *Rocznik O.* (Warsaw) 22, no. 1 (1957) 7-54. Edition and translation of a Paris MS comparing Coptic, Arabic, and Ge'ez words.
- 11335 ZAJACZKOWSKI, ANANIASZ. "Opisy zaloby (jas) w tureckiej wersji poematu *Husrev u Şirin ze Złotej Ordy*." *Rocznik O.* (Warsaw) 21 (1957) 517-26.
- See also: 11267
- ### LITERATURE
- 11336 ALIEV, G. Y. "Early Christian sources of the legend about Khosrov and Shirin." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 87-96. Greek, Armenian, and Syriac data on the hero (of over 60 poetical works). Shirin probably spoke Aramaic.
- 11337 ALIEV, G. Y. "The legend of Khosrov and Shirin in Firdousi's *Shahname*." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 190-210. The earliest source is not Tabarī, but Jāhīz in his *Good qualities and their opposites*.
- 11338 ALIEV, R. M. "Saadi's Gulestan and textual criticism." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 89-152.
- 11339 BERTELS, E. E. "The fifth munazara of Asadi of Tus." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 55-88. Text, translation, and commentary on a dispute over the excellence of the Persians.
- 11340 BINT ASH-SHĀṬĪ, ed. "The *Risālat al-ghufrān* of Abū-'l-'Alī al-Ma'arri." *Majallab* (Damascus) 33 (Ja '58).
- 11341 BRAGINSKII, J. S. "Origin of the *ghazal* in Tajik and Persian literature." *Sov. Vost.* 4 (Mr-Apr '58) 94-100. Abundant illustrative material in this sketch of the development of the genre from folkloristic sources through the 10th cent. poets, particularly Rudaki.
- 11342 BULGAKOV, P. G. "Ign Khordadbeh's Book of *Roads and States*." (in Russian) *Palest. Sbornik* 3 (66) (1958) 127-36. Two versions have been preserved since the 9th century.
- 11343 CERULLI, E. "Le théâtre persan et ses origines." *La Nouvelle Clio* 7-9 (1955-7) 181-7. Indian influence is suspected.
- 11344 FINNEGAN, JAMES. "Al-Farabi et le *Peri now* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 133-52. The Greek treatise was scarcely known before Avicenna's time.
- 11345 GALBIATI, G. "Norme giuridico-morali per arabi cristiani (da un codice arabo del XIV secolo)." *Studi in Onore di Aristide Calderini e Roberto Paribeni II* (Milan '57) 513-6.
- 11346 GANDJEI, TOURKHAN. "Ueberblick ueber den vor- und frueh-islamischen tuerkischen Versbau." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 142-56.
- 11347 HEKMAT, A. A. "Shafī'aa Athar, le poète aveugle de Pir Shēkāft." *Mélanges Louis Massignon II*, 313-25. The poet lived in the 18th century.
- 11348 JAHN, K. "The yugas of the Indians in Islamic historiography." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 127-34. The conception of a division of world history into ages of the gradual decline of man was widespread in India, and was noted by Birūnī in the 11th cent. and Rashid ad-Dīn in the 13th cent.
- 11349 KAPELIUK, M. "A Yemenite folk *qasida* about the 1948 revolt and the Imam's assassination." (in Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 8, no. 4 (1957) 279-83. Text, translation, and annotations. The Imam's daughter, married to the chief plotter ('Abdallāh al-Wazīr), laments her fate, torn as she is between loyalties.
- 11350 KÖBERT, R. "Die Einführung Birūnīs zu seinem Verzeichnis der Schriften Rāzīs." *Orientalia* (Rome) 27, no. 2 (1958) 198-202.
- 11351 KRACHKOVSKII, I. Y. "An unknown translation from Abū-'l-'Alī al-Ma'arri." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 111-3.
- 11352 MAHFŪZ, ḤUSAYN 'ALĪ. "Ibn Sina the poet." (in Arabic) *Majallab* (Damascus) 33 (Ja '58) 169-74.

- 11353 MUGINOV, A. M. "The Leningrad MS of the life of Sheikh Rūzbihār." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 114-6. A 14th cent. Persian account by 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. Šadr ad-Dīn about his grandfather, a sufi master and author, who lived from 1128-1209.
- 11354 OSBANOV, M. N. "Collections of Iranian heroic epos (*Hudayname* and *Shahname*) as sources of Firdousi's *Shahname*." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.* 19 (1958) 153-89.
- 11355 OSMANOVA, Z. G. "Abū'l-Qāsim Lāhūtī." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 74-86. An analysis of the works of the "first Persian proletarian poet" (1887-1957).
- 11356 PAPADOPOULOU, A. "Tewfik el-Hakim et son oeuvre." *Rev. du Caire* 21 (Ap '58) 257-79.
- 11357 QALAMAWI, SOHEIR. "La critique littéraire et le nationalisme arabe." *Rev. du Caire* 21 (My '58) 350-60.
- 11358 ROSENTHAL, F. "Sayings of the ancients from Ibn Durayd's *Kitāb al-Mujtama'*." *Orientalia* (Rome) 27, nos. 1, 2 (1958) 29-54, 150-83. A by-product of the author's study on *Humor in early Islam*.
- 11359 RUSTAMOV, E. "The munazara 'Bow and Arrow' by the 15th cent. Uzbek poet Yakini." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Ag '57) 90-106.
- 11360 VILCHEVSKII, O. L. "Khaqani; some features of his poetry and world outlook." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Ag '57) 63-76. An analysis of the work of the 12th cent. Persian poet from Azerbaijan.
- 11361 WILZER, SUSANNA. "Untersuchungen zu Gazālīs *Kitāb at-Tauba*." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 51-120.

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- 11362 ALIEV, R. M. and OSMANOV, M. N. "Some Tehran University publications." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Ag '57) 167-73. Notes on 6 volumes (published during the last 10 years) dealing with the history of Persian letters.
- 11363 GARIBIAN, A. S. "The development of Armenian studies in the Soviet period." (in Russian) *Izv. Akad. Nauk SSR, otd. lit. i yez.* 17, no. 1 (1958) 27-33. A survey of etymological dictionaries, studies in comparative grammar, language history, dialectology, and lexicography.
- 11364 SEVORTYAN, E. V. "Turkish linguistics at the time of the eighth congress of Turkish linguists." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Mr-Ap '58) 130-42. A survey of scholarly work in Turkey.

See also: 11368

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- 11366 "S. E. Malov." *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 200. An obituary of the eminent Turcologist (1880-1957).
- 11367 "I. M. Reisner." *Sov. Vost.* 4 (Mr-Ap '58) 228-9. Reisner was an Afghanist (1899-1958) who took part

in the writing of several collective histories of the Near East.

- 11368 CANARD, MARIUS. "Un grande figure d'humaniste au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle: Reiske, helléniste et arabisant (1716-1774)." *Rev. de la Médit.* 18 (Mr-Ap '58) 119-49.
- 11369 DIETRICH, A. "Adolf Grohmann." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 1-47. Includes a list of his publications.
- 11370 SPULER, B. "Carl Brockelmann." *Islam* 33 (O '57) 157-60.

## MISCELLANEOUS

- 11371 "Preparations for the 25th International Congress of Orientalists." *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 3-7. The 1960 Congress will be held in Leningrad.
- 11372 "The 24th International Congress of Orientalists." *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 186-9.
- 11373 BABINGER, F. "Ein Jahrhundert morgenländischer studien an der Münchener universität." *Z.D.M.G.* 107 (Ag '57) 241-69. Covers the period from 1826 to 1926.
- 11374 ELISSÉEFF, N. "L'Islamologie en URSS d'après un ouvrage récent." *Mélanges Louis Massignon* II, 23-76. An abstract of N. A. Smirnov's *History of the study of Islam in the Soviet Union* (1954).
- 11375 FRANKE, HERBERT. "Bericht über den XXIV internationalen orientalistischen kongress in München." *Z.D.M.G.* 107, no. 3 (1957) 18-23.
- 11376 FYZEE, A. A. A. "Islamic studies in India." *Mélanges Louis Massignon* II, 183-214.
- 11377 KHALFIN, N. A. "The first USSR conference on orientologists." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Ag '57) 184-91. It was held in Tashkent, June 4-11, 1957.
- 11378 KONONOV, A. N. "The 8th congress of the Turkish Linguistic Society." (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (Ag '57) 195-7. Held in Ankara in July 1957.

## BOOK REVIEWS

- 11379 *A concise history of Islam*. Oriente Mod. 38 (Ja '58) 99. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 11380 *Historical atlas of the Muslim peoples*. Oriente Mod. 38 (Ja '58) 99. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 11381 ALKAIEVA, L. A. *The works of Halis Ziya Uşaklıgil*. (in Russian) *Sov. Vost.* 3 (D '57) 146-7. (V. S. Garbuzova). A fine study of the 19th cent. Turkish writer.
- 11382 ALLOUCHE, I. S. and REGRAGUI, A. *Catalogue des manuscrits arabes de Rabat, II série*. *Z.D.M.G.* 107, no. 3 (1957) 648-51. (O. Spies). The volume describes 1189 Arabic MSS acquired from 1921 to 1953.
- 11383 ARBERRY, A. J. *Classical Persian literature*. R.C.A.J. 45 (Jl-O '58) 323-4. "A detailed and authoritative one-volume history of Persian literature up to the fifteenth century, and also of European translations and descriptions of it."
- 11384 BABINGER, F. *Reliquiensbacher am Os-*



- manenhof in XV. Jahrhundert. Z.D.M.G. 107, no. 3 (1957) 654-6. (U. Heyd). These two studies—one on the sale of sacred relics, the other on gold coinage under Mehmed II—enrich our knowledge of 15th cent. East-West contacts.
- 11385 BALY, DENIS. *Multitudes in the valley: church and crisis in the Middle East*. Internat. Aff. 34 (O '58) 546. (J. E. F. Gueritz).
- 11386 BANNER, ERNST. *Das Buch der vierzig Stufen von 'Abd al-Karim al-Gili*. *Orientalia* (Rome) 27, no. 1 (1958) 127-33. (R. Köbert). The 14th cent. mystic's treatise *Marātib al-wuṣūḍ*.
- 11387 BERGER, MORROE. *Bureaucracy and society in modern Egypt*. *Hamizrah Hehadash* 8, no. 4 (1957) 335-6. (G. Baer).
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- Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society.** Rs. 10/- (Pakistani); single issue Rs. 3/- (Pakistani). *q* Pakistan Historical Society, 2/45 Jacob Lines, Karachi, Pakistan.
- Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.** £2 8s; single issue £1 10s. *semi-ann* Royal Asiatic Society, 56 Queen Anne St., London, W.1.
- Journal of World History.** See *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*.
- Kirjath Sepher.** \$5; single issue \$1.25. *q* Jewish National and Univ. Library, POB 503, Jerusalem, Israel.
- al-Kulliya.** £E .20; single issue £E .10. *semi-ann* Khartoum Univ. College, Khartoum, Sudan.
- al-Machriq.** Lebanon and Syria, £1 25; foreign, \$9; single issue £1 4.50, \$2. *bi-m* Fr. I-Abdo Khalife, S.J., Univ. Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Majallat al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi.** £S 10. *q* Damascus, Syria.
- Man.** £1 10s; single issue 2s 6d. *m* Royal Anthropological Institute, 21 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.
- Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph.** *irreg* Univ. Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon; agent: Librairie Orientale, Place de l'Étoile, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin.** Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$5; single issue 50¢. *m* (Oct-June) *q* (July-Sept) Metropolitan Museum of Art, 5th Ave. at 82nd St., New York 28, N. Y.
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- Middle East Journal.** Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Middle East Institute, 1761 N St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
- Middle Eastern Affairs.** \$5—foreign and domestic; single issue—50¢, double issue—\$1. *m* (10 issues per ann) Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 432 4th Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.
- Le Muséon.** 300 Belg. fr. 2 double vols. per year Le Muséon, 9 Ave. des Hêtres, Héverlé-Louvain, Belgium.
- Muslim World.** \$3; single issue 75¢. *q* Dr. Kenneth Cragg, ed., Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford 5, Conn.
- National Geographic Magazine.** \$6.50; foreign, \$7.75; single issue 65¢, 75¢. *m* National Geographic Society, 16th & M Sts., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
- New Times.\*** \$3.50 or 14s; single issue 10¢, 4d plus postage. *w* Moscow, USSR.
- Oriens.** TL15; \$5. *semi-ann* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, c/o E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; agent for U.S. & Can.: Prof. Dr. Eberhard, 604 Panoramic Way, Berkeley, Calif.
- Orient.** *q* ed. Marcel Colombe, 114 Champs Elysées, Paris VIII.
- Orientalische Literatur Zeitung.** *q* J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, Scherlstr. 2, (10B) Leipzig, C1, Germany.
- Oriente Moderno.** \$8. *m* Istituto per l'Oriente, Viale Davide Lubin 2, Rome.
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- Proceedings Royal Society of Historical Studies.** *irreg* 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Revue du Caire.** Egypt, £E 2.25; foreign, 2000 fr; single issue £E .20, 200 fr. *m* 3 rue Dr. Ahmed Hamid Said, Cairo; Les Éditions des Cahiers du Sud, 28 rue du Four, Paris 6e.
- Revue Egyptienne de Droit International.** Egypt, £E 1; foreign, £E 1.25. *ann* Société Égyptienne de Droit International, 16 Ave. el-Malika, Cairo.
- Revue des Etudes Islamiques.** 12 rue Vavin, Paris 6e.
- Revue Historique.** France, 1500 fr; foreign, 1750 fr; single issue 450 fr. *q* Prof. Pierre Renouvin, ed., 7 Place de la Sorbonne, Paris 5e; Presses Universitaires de France, 108 Blvd. Saint-Germain, Paris 6e.
- Rivista degli Studi Orientali.** Lire 3000. *q* Istituto di Studi Orientali, Univ. di Roma, Roma.
- Rocznik Orientalni.** Warsaw, Poland.
- Round Table.** UK, £1 10s; foreign, \$5; single issue 7s 6d, \$1.25. *q* 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York St., London, S.W.1.
- Royal Central Asian Journal.** £1 5s; single issue 7s 6d, July/Oct double number 9s 6d, plus postage. *q* Royal Central Asian Society, 2 Hinde St., Manchester Square, London, W.1.
- Saeculum (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte).** DMW 24; single issue DMW 7. *q* Verlag Karl Alber, Johanniterstr. 4, Freiburg/Breisgau; V. Karl Alber, Freiburg-München, Germany.
- Sovetskaia Etnografia.\*** \$7.50 or £1 10s; single issue \$2.10, 8s 6d plus postage. *q* Moscow, USSR.
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- Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. *semi-ann* Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH, Wiesbaden, Germany.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- |   |   |                               |
|---|---|-------------------------------|
| A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique           | Mag., Magazine                            | Univ., University, université |
| Acad., Academy                          | Mid., Middle                              | Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung      |
| Aff., Affairs, affaires                 | Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.               | <i>Arabic</i>                 |
| Afr., African, Afrique, etc.            | Mus., Museum, musée                       | K., Kitab, etc.               |
| Amer., American                         | Natl., National                           | Maj., Majallah, etc.          |
| Archeol., Archaeological, archéologique | Nr., Near                                 | <i>Russian, Polish, etc.</i>  |
| B., Bulletin                            | Numis., Numismatic, numismatique          |                               |
| C., Central                             | O., Oriental, oriente, etc.               | Akad., Akademii               |
| Cent., Century                          | Pal., Palestine                           | Fil., Filosofi                |
| Contemp., Contemporary, etc.            | Phil., Philosophical                      | Inst., Institut               |
| Cult., Culture                          | Philol., Philological, Philologique       | Ist., Istorii                 |
| D., Deutsch                             | Polit., Political, Politique              | Izvest., Izvestia             |
| Dept., Department                       | Proceed., Proceedings                     | Lit., Literaturi              |
| East., Eastern                          | Quart., Quarterly                         | Orient., Orientalni           |
| Econ., Economic, économique             | R., Royal                                 | Ser., Seriya                  |
| For., Foreign                           | Res., Research                            | Sov., Sovetskoye              |
| G., Gesellschaft                        | Rev., Review, revue                       | Uchon., Uchoniye              |
| Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc. | Riv., Rivista                             | Vostok., Vostokovedenia       |
| Gt. Brit., Great Britain                | S., School                                | Yaz., Yazika                  |
| Hist., Historical, historique, etc.     | Soc., Society, société                    | Zap., Zapiski                 |
| Illust., Illustrated                    | Stud., Studies                            | <i>Turkish</i>                |
| Inst., Institute                        | Trans., Transactions                      | Fak., Fakülte                 |
| Internat., International                | U.S., United States                       | Univ., Üniversite             |
| J., Journal                             | USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |                               |
| L., Literature, etc.                    |   |                               |
| M., Morgenländisch, etc.                |   |                               |

## Readers' Commentary

*The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.*

Dear Sir:

I have just read David Finnie's most interesting article entitled "Recruitment and Training of Labor: The Middle East Oil Industry" in the Spring number of *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*. On the whole, the article is an excellent one, and I feel that the author is to be congratulated on his accuracy and objectivity.

Through no fault of his own, he has, however, fallen into error over one point which, though it is now remote both in time and relevance, is of importance for historical truth. In the concluding portion of his article the author, when discussing the question of the employment of foreigners and the attainment of efficiency, quotes a passage from L. P. Elwell-Sutton's book *Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics*. In this passage Elwell-Sutton said, with reference to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.'s operations in Persia, that, "although the concession (i.e. the D'Arcy Concession) stipulated that the only foreigners employed should be managers, engineers, master drillers and inspectors, the many thousand British and Indian staff went far outside those limits. Not only that, but British employees completely monopolized all posts above a certain grade, a fact that apart from anything else made it extremely difficult for the government to get any information to back its claims."

Unfortunately, Elwell-Sutton's book is an extremely unreliable guide to such matters, as it is based far more on propaganda and bias than on facts. In this case, it is entirely wrong to assert that the Persian Government had extreme difficulty in obtaining information to back its claims.

Under the terms of the D'Arcy Concession, the Persian Government had a representative

in London who was termed the Imperial Commissioner. He received every month a detailed report of the Company's operations in Persia, and he had, moreover, the services of an eminent chartered accountant for the purposes of checking the Company's accounts and its royalty payments. Furthermore, the Company always welcomed and encouraged the visits of Persian ministers and notables to the scenes of its operations in the south. Had there been more of such visits (Dr. Musaddiq for instance never visited them) there would have been far fewer misunderstandings, as much of the criticism directed against the Company was due to ignorance of the facts.

Under the 1933 Concession, which succeeded the D'Arcy Concession and prevailed until 1951, we find that the Persian Government both obtained even more information, both from the Company and other sources, and used it more intensively. In London the Imperial Delegate (as he was then termed) received regular reports as before, while in Persia the Minister of Finance set up a Petroleum Department where the information obtained from these reports and many other sources, both about the Company and the world petroleum industry, was collated and studied. The Director of the Petroleum Department used to pay frequent visits to Abadan and the oil fields, where he was given every facility to obtain all the data that he required. There was also a Government representative stationed at Abadan who had the fullest facilities for information. Furthermore, for many years prior to 1951 even the highest grades of the Company's staff in Persia included many Persians (who of course predominated in the less high grades and completely filled the lower ones) to whose

knowledge of oil affairs their successful conduct of operations single-handed throughout 1951-1953 is the best witness.

L. Lockhart  
63 Grange Road  
Cambridge  
England

Dear Sir:

Please refer to the article captioned "Afghanistan and the USSR" by Mr. R. K. Ramazani, published in your issue of Spring 1958 (Vol. 12 No. 2).

We have come across the following statements in the article:

1. "In 1950 Pakistan cut off the importation of petroleum products into Afghanistan for about three months, by closing Afghanistan's main transit route." (Page 146)

2. "... Pakistan closed her border to Afghanistan for the second time, this time for a period of five months." (Page 148)

May I please point out that at no time did Pakistan close the border nor did it place any restrictions or impede the flow of traffic to and from Afghanistan. Despite such political differences that may have existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan has since its inception given all facilities to Afghanistan for its transit trade through Karachi and land routes. In fact, the transit facilities have on the whole been more liberal than envisaged in the Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention of 1923 which Pakistan inherited from the British Indian Government in 1947.

A study of the figures of Afghan transit trade through Pakistan since 1952 will show that there was an upswing until 1955 when the Afghan Government began to direct her transit trade through the USSR resulting in the sudden, though short-lived, decline in flow of traffic through Pakistan. However, the figures given below show that since September 1955, there has again been a gradual improvement. The figures of Afghan transit trade through Pakistan given below are in rupees:

Year	Imports	Exports
1952 (Oct., Nov. & Dec.)	15821472	21248499
1953	85962624	88242198

1954	82753969	90217802
1955	60154212	49612155
1956	101406273	23323726
1957	103368304	113115171
1958 (for Jan. & Feb.)	14508048	22557840

Pakistan has recently signed a Transit Trade Agreement with Afghanistan which will give Afghanistan customs free transit facilities in Karachi port and on Pakistan railways under customs bond. Pakistan has also accepted an offer of aid from the U.S.A. for certain projects which will improve port and transport facilities so that the Afghan goods may move faster through Pakistan territory.

These actions of the Pakistan Government are in keeping with her policy of fostering good relations which it has pursued all along since its independence and for further strengthening good neighborly ties with Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if the correct position could be brought out in your magazine.

S. M. Haq  
Press Attache  
Embassy of Pakistan  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The letter of an anonymous "British Contributor" on the subject of Oman in your Summer (1958) issue cannot be allowed to stand without challenge. His objective is understandable enough, but the "confusion," to which he refers, is entirely imaginary; and largely due to the refusal of the British Government and the Sultan of Masqat to publish the document which makes the situation perfectly clear. He even refrains from mentioning that the Treaty of Sib was negotiated and agreed between the two parties concerned under the auspices of the British Government.

Be that as it may, the third party to the treaty has evidently had no objection to the publication of its text, the English translation of which, published in New York and London, is "roughly correct," as your correspondent grudgingly admits. So everyone interested in the subject is in a position to see for himself exactly what was involved in the treaty of "peace agreed upon between the Government of the Sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, and Shaikh

'Isa ibn Salih ibn 'Ali on behalf of the people of Oman, whose names are attached hereto."

Treaties of peace are normally concluded between States at war; and, in this case, it was the people of Oman, who never recognized the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Sultan of Masqat, who were making war against the latter's territories on the coast. The treaty was intended to, and did in fact, buy off their hostility: *on the recognition of their independence.*

It provided for the mutual restoration of good-neighbourly relation, mutual freedom of access by the citizens of each State to the territory of the other, and mutual extradition of criminals seeking asylum from their lawful Government. Above all it provided that the Government of the Sultan "*shall not interfere in their (the Omanis) internal affairs.*"

Nobody in the coastal area at that time wanted to do that: all they wanted was to be free from attack by the Omanis. But no one at that time imagined that Oman might some day become an area of potential economic impor-

tance. And no one can deny that, if there are valuable minerals in Oman, they constitute an important element in the country's "internal affairs." *Hinc illae lacrimae!*

It is not the Sultan himself, but the British elements controlling the whole of his administration, even down to the post-office, who are to blame for the recent lamentable quarrel between Arab elements, who know exactly where their legitimate boundaries lie. And Oman is by no means the only Arab country with undetermined frontiers. Jordan, Sa'udi Arabia, Yaman and the Aden Protectorates are all in the same box, and manage to get along very nicely without specific agreements on their limits.

In conclusion, if there is really any doubt about the validity or meaning of the Treaty of Sib, let the matter be submitted to an impartial tribunal. Armoured cars and bombers are not a civilised answer to claims of right.

H. St. J. B. Philby  
Riyadh  
Sa'udi Arabia

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